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VI A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
Introduction
Problem statement
“In many ways, mine action management is as much about information as it is about
landmines.” This statement was one of the central conclusions of the GICHD Study of
Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action. In seeking to obtain the necessary
information to plan and manage programmes effectively, mine action has seen a
considerable number of surveys carried out.
In particular, a number of surveys have sought to record the location and scale of
hazardous areas, and, increasingly, an assessment of their social and economic impact
as well as the success of mine clearance projects. However, it is a daunting task to
accurately record unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine contamination, and the
outputs of many surveys have seemingly failed to satisfy stakeholders despite the
expenditure of millions of dollars during the last 15 years.
Thus, concerns have been voiced that surveys are unnecessarily time-consuming and
expensive, that their purpose is not always clear, that data is not integrated effectively
with end users and that survey approaches do not yield the results to which they lay
claim. 
Even definition and terminology in mine action survey is contentious. The first
International Standards for Humanitarian Demining, issued by the United Nations in
1997, referred to three levels of survey: Level 1, which was a general assessment of the
mine and UXO hazard; Level 2 (technical survey); and Level 3 (post-clearance survey).
Informally, some actors later referred to a Level 4 or land use survey.
In accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), however, survey
is now broken down into two main categories: the general mine action assessment1
1
1 The general mine action assessment is “the process by which a comprehensive inventory can
be obtained of all reported and/or suspected locations of mine or UXO contamination, the
quantities and types of explosive hazards, and information on local soil characteristics,
vegetation and climate; and assessment of the scale and impact of the landmine problem on
the individual, community and country.”
and technical survey.2 There are also, however, so-called “emergency” surveys that do
not fit neatly within either category. Post-clearance survey has been replaced by post-
clearance documentation. There have also been more frequent instances of “land use”
surveys – to evaluate – months or even years after demining operations have been
completed – whether cleared land is being used appropriately and by the intended
beneficiaries.
In sum, the role of survey is perhaps the most challenging and most critically debated
aspect of mine action.
Terms of reference
Study aim and objectives
This study aimed to define and clarify the role of survey in mine action. The specific
objectives of the study were to:
¾ Review the importance and use of survey in mine action;
¾ Identify the end users of survey data and review their requirements and
expectations;
¾ Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of surveys in providing end users with the
information they need;
¾ Review the use of survey data in strengthening mine action planning and priority
setting; 
¾ Propose, as necessary and appropriate, changes to the IMAS; and
¾ Elaborate conclusions and recommendations for future survey design and
implementation.
Scope and focus of the study
The study reviews the use of survey for mine clearance, mine risk education and
victim assistance programmes and projects. It focuses on the use of survey data:
¾ By the national mine action centre or equivalent;
¾ Among mine action organisations (vertical or programme coordination); 
¾With other humanitarian and development actors (horizontal coordination);
¾ Among levels of government (intra-governmental coordination); and
¾ By donors.
Methodology
The study draws on mine-action-specific case studies in four countries conducted by
consultants to the GICHD: Angola (Nick Cumming-Bruce); Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Laurence Desvignes and Jussi Hanhimaki); the Lao People's Democratic Republic
(Lao PDR) (Guy Rhodes); and Mozambique (Nick Cumming-Bruce). A workshop was
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2 A technical survey (previously referred to as a Level 2 survey) is “the detailed topographical
and technical investigation of known or suspected mined areas identified during the
planning phase. Such areas may have been identified during the general mine action
assessment or have been otherwise reported.”
held for the study team to review and finalise the proposed methodology for the case
studies and for the study as a whole.
The study's lessons, challenges and recommendations were written by Charles
Downs. They also draw on evidence from the case studies as well as a number of other
sources, including a literature review and previous evaluations of mine action
surveys, especially the evaluation of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS). A desk study
of Kosovo (Alessandro Conticini and Valerie Quéré) is also incorporated into the
research.
The conduct of the study is guided by a Study Advisory Group of relevant experts set
up by the Study Project Manager, Eric Filippino (see the Appendix).
Report layout
Following this introduction, the first chapter describes the Key lessons, challenges and
recommendations for survey in mine action. Chapters 2 to 5 contain the four country
case studies in (Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lao PDR and Mozambique,
respectively) with annexes at the end of each chapter. Chapter 6 includes the desk
study of Kosovo. The report concludes with a bibliography, glossary of abbreviations
and acronyms, and an appendix, which contains a list of the members of the Study
Advisory Group.
3Introduction
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Chapter 1




Mine action survey has developed far from its roots and is today an essential
component of all mine action programmes, providing both descriptive information
about the problem and the essential basis to plan for increased effectiveness of
programmes responding to the landmine problem of each country.
The case studies in this book describe the evolution of the survey process carried out
in five countries, each within the context of its respective mine action programme.3
Each case describes and discusses issues faced in that country, and includes country-
specific recommendations by the respective author. The cases are also valuable for the
broader implications of the issues raised and lessons learned from each experience.
Some lessons have been learned from experience in more than one country, perhaps
indicating insufficient exchange of experience and slow collective learning by the
mine action community. In other cases, lessons learned became part of the shared
wisdom for the next survey. 
This chapter highlights some of the broader lessons, but each case study is worth
reading for its richer discussion of specifics. Here follow four sections.
1. Where are we now? looks at the current situation of mine action survey. 
2. How did we get here? considers the broad trends in development of mine action
survey from its roots in rapid appraisal approaches of the 1980s and the first mine
action programmes in the 1990s leading to the current dominance of the Landmine
Impact Surveys (LIS) of the Global Landmine Survey process. 
3. Issues faced and lessons learned summarises the experiences of utilising survey in
mine action, including using LIS results in programme management.  
4. Key challenges and future directions provides recommendations for discussion and
action. 
5
3 This chapter draws upon the case studies contained in this book as well as those in the
Scanteam, Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process, 2004, and the author's own
experience, including discussions with colleagues conducting or using the results of mine
action surveys in many countries and organisations around the world. 
In summary, the experience of survey in mine action shows that: 
¾ General survey should focus not only on contamination but also on communities and
the impacts they suffer due to landmine-caused blockages;  
¾ Continuing discussion is needed regarding the factors and weights to be used in
scoring landmine impact;  
¾ There is a recognised need for follow-up of Landmine Impact Surveys, both in the
strategic use of survey results and to obtain confirmation of blockages and the technical
minefield information necessary to plan operations; and  
¾ Additional challenges include: 
¾ integrating up-to-date impact and hazard information into a single comprehensive national
database; 
¾ adjusting scores to reflect the results of action undertaken;
¾ selecting priorities with the community; and 
¾ measuring the impact of mine action within each programme as well as globally. 
Where are we now?
A major evaluation, carried out in 2003, found that the global LIS process could “after
only a few years, point to some very impressive achievements,” including the production of
“reports, databases, and other outputs that provide a qualitatively better and more accurate
description and analysis of the mines/UXO problems, and thus provide a better basis for mine
action … decisions.”4 Regarding the future, the evaluation observed that: “The GLS is
evolving, with more efforts and attention now being paid to areas such as training/capacity
building, including the use and updating of the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database, follow-up use of the LIS results through Strategic Planning, etc.”5
As of the end of 2005, LIS surveys had been completed in 14 countries and regions,6
and surveys are under way in Angola, Casamance, Iraq, Sudan and Vietnam.7 Most
reports can be found on the SAC website,8 but some are only available from the
respective government authority. Case studies for Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Laos and Mozambique can be found in this work and for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Thailand and Yemen in the Scanteam
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process.
The general mine action assessment is defined in IMAS (04.10) as “the process by
which a comprehensive inventory can be obtained of all reported and/or suspected
locations of mine or UXO contamination, the quantities and types of explosive
hazards, and information on local soil characteristics, vegetation and climate; and
assessment of the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the individual,
community and country.”
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4 Scanteam, 2004: 1.
5 ibid.
6 Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Cambodia, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Northern Iraq, Somaliland, Puntland, Thailand and Yemen.
7 The Northern Iraq LIS, although conducted by UNOPS according to SWG protocols, was
not subject to UN quality assurance due to difficulties in obtaining visas. The Vietnam LIS
focused on socio-economic impact at the level of the commune rather than the community,
and the government did not request UN quality assurance.
8 SAC website:  www.sac-na.org; LIS Explorer website: www.sac-na.org/lisexplorer
Broadly speaking, there are two types of survey: those that focus mainly on the nature
and extent of the suspected hazard (i.e. the explosive ordnance and the site) and those
that focus on the impact of that contamination on people, communities and areas.
Surveys that focus on the suspected hazardous area (SHA) are essential to prepare
operational work plans and require technical expertise among the surveyors. Hazard
surveys have gone by a variety of names, including: – General Survey, Level One
General Survey, Mine and Danger Area Surveys, and Emergency Surveys.9 Surveys
that focus on impact are essential for strategic planning and work cycle prioritisation,
and require social science expertise among the surveyors. Impact surveys have
generally been known as Level One Impact Surveys and Landmine Impact Surveys.
Hazard surveys tend to view the world from the perspective of the minefield, and lead
to prioritisation based on minefield characteristics. Impact surveys tend to view the
world from the perspective of the local community, and lead to prioritisation based on
reducing the impact of minefields on the community. While the GLS impact surveys
define impact as based on victims and blockage of community social or economic
activities, some earlier impact surveys focused primarily on the proximity of
hazardous areas to the community and the resulting risk to community members. 
The various types of survey collect different types of data and support alternative
approaches to data analysis and priority setting. Generally speaking, hazard surveys
will lead to a prioritisation of minefields for complete clearance, whereas impact
surveys will lead to prioritisation of communities and planning of targeted clearance
and marking efforts to eliminate blockages. Depending on their roles, some
stakeholders are more interested in some data than others – this is the source of many
of the current debates and progress regarding mine action survey. To meet the
different needs of various stakeholders, a national programme eventually requires all
the information in the various types of surveys.
Priority setting is the most critical process in mine action programme management.
Each programme sets priorities on a regular basis, and staff members (both national
and international) usually have their own approach and ideas as to what the priorities
should be. Experience shows that there is often agreement from different perspectives
about specific places. However, the approach to priority setting should identify
priorities to support the goals of the respective programme. These include direct mine
action goals (rapid reduction of new victims, elimination of all landmines and of all
effects of landmines) and support to local and national development (support to local
economic development, support to regional road or electrification system
rehabilitation). In addition there is a management goal of effective use of resources. 
Thus priority setting based on hazard alone will eventually lead to elimination of all
landmines and may permit more efficient clearance activities by selection of the
minefields most appropriate for the available clearance assets. However, it may not
provide much immediate relief to the population nor support government
development activities. Priority setting based on community impact will respond to
more perceived community needs, although it may not resolve their development
difficulties and may not be aligned with national development priorities. Priority
setting based on proximity of minefields to communities may better target hazard
sites for clearance, but will likely result in greater requirement for clearance rather
7Key lessons, challenges and recomendations
9 Emergency surveys generally have a security focus rather than a humanitarian focus. For
this reason, they are primarily oriented to obtain hazard and risk information related to
access points and routes.
than marking areas that do not block community activities. There is simply no
formula to select the best priorities in all settings. It is a management process that
requires information, consultation and judgement, followed by periodic reviews of
the results obtained. 
Development of the Landmine Impact Survey shifted attention from minefield hazards
to impact through blockages affecting communities, with significant weight to recent
victims. It provides a logical basis for prioritisation, but collects less information on
minefields themselves. Prioritisation will lead to response with greater impact – the
response itself will include the necessary amount of clearance to address the problems
of priority communities, while it also includes other actions where expensive
clearance is not essential to relieve blockage. 
Operational planning requires a specific follow-up survey to confirm blockages,
determine their causes, decide how to respond (clearance, marking, mine risk
education – MRE) and collect site information for task planning. Thus technical survey
remains necessary. Furthermore, the decision about which areas may not require
clearance to remove blockages should be made in consultation with the community,
which will often have a more balanced view of the impact.
The GLS Evaluation summarises what it considers “very impressive” achievements: 
¾ “The mine action community has been able to come together to establish the Survey
Working Group (SWG) and GLS through a collaborative and deliberative process
unheard of in any other sector of development and emergency action. 
¾ The LIS produces reports, databases, and other outputs that provide a qualitatively
better and more accurate description and analysis of the mines/UXO problems, and
thus provide a better basis for mine action decisions. 
¾ The LIS has developed a methodology and standards which are recognised and
followed by key actors involved in landmine surveying. These are set out in
Protocols and Advisory Notes that are easily available and which are subject to a
process of continuous discussion and updating. 
¾ The surveys that are carried out become known by the full GLS community and are
thus subject to considerable discussion and debate.  
¾ The GLS process has contributed to increasing the profile of  mine action in the
partner countries. This has partly been done by providing national authorities and
mine action stakeholders with information-rich products that are useful for
decision making but also useful from an informational and awareness-raising
perspective vis-à-vis the population at large. The LIS strengthens the argument for
allocating national resources to mine action since the factual basis regarding the
mine/UXO problem and what to do about it is qualitatively and quantitatively
better, and identifies the problem as manageable/‘bounded’. Finally, the LIS is a
major support to national authorities and local mine actors in their own fund
raising dialogue with donors.”10
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How did we get here?  The roots of mine action survey
Mine action survey today has developed from two main roots: experience gained in
early mine action programmes in the 1990s; and rapid assessment methodologies
widely used in rural community development and public health since the 1980s.
Rapid appraisal
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) was developed in the early 1980s by practitioners
working in rural community and watershed development. It solidified through
several meetings at the Institute for Development Studies in Sussex, England, and
Khon Kaen University in Thailand, and became more widely known through writings
of Robert Chambers (e.g. 1981, 1994a, b, c). RRA advocates critiqued the existing
approaches to information collection for programme design, arguing specifically that:
(i) large scale quantitative surveys took far too long, provided precise information of
questionable value and were expensive and wasteful, while (ii) typical field visits were
little more than “development tourism”, obtaining superficial biased information from
the most accessible and articulate counterparts. This bias favoured the views of those
in urban areas, in settlements near tarmac roads, available during “office hours”,
represented by government officials and local male leaders; it gave less attention to
those less accessible due to distance, gender, time, season or social standing.
Rapid Appraisal Procedures (RAP) were developed by public health practitioners,
particularly working to design more effective maternal child health and nutrition
programmes. RAP developed coherence and its name through a United Nations
University sponsored “16 Country Nutrition Study” in the mid-1980s.11 RAP
advocates critiqued existing surveys as providing information too slowly and without
the social richness necessary to fully understand the problems, the reasons underlying
family nutrition decisions, and possible solutions. 
RRA and RAP developed as parallel approaches with occasional exchange. Both
groups (RRA most articulately) started from the premise that local people have a very
well developed understanding of their environment, that they are continually
innovating and adapting, and that the outsider will best understand local reality with
and through insiders. They tried to apply methodologies developed in anthropology
and marketing – while drastically shortening the normal time for anthropological
research – to assure sufficient rigour in what otherwise might have been a “quick and
dirty” field assessment. Toward this end they gave prominence to certain techniques
of qualitative research based on development of rapport and careful listening,
including: key informant interviews, focus groups, triangulation (use of multiple
methods and perspectives to confirm critical insights), social and community
mapping, transect walks and others. These approaches often obtained richer and more
complete understanding of specific communities and problems, as a result of which
programmes were (re)designed to be more appropriate and effective.12
While very successful in improving understanding and detail in programme design,
the rapid appraisal methodologies have been critiqued themselves. While local
knowledge is often far greater than previously recognised, its accuracy still is limited
9Key lessons, challenges and recomendations
11 Scrimshaw SCM and Hurtado E., 1987.
12 See Scrimshaw and Gleason, eds., 1992, for many examples.
by local experience. Thus it may be very accurate regarding intra-household food
distribution, seasonal rainfall, and current use of plant varieties, but far less accurate
regarding introduction of new plant varieties, national electrification plans, and
regional flood control programmes. Knowledge and impact vary among social groups
(e.g., gender, age, ethnicity), while participatory consultation – particularly if aiming
at consensus – tends to reflect local power relations. Availability of people to
participate depends on a number of factors in addition to power and social relations,
including time of day, day of week, season, location of meeting, etc. Furthermore,
respondents may answer what they think an interviewer wants to hear, or in terms of
the programme the interviewer may be able to influence (e.g. emphasising landmine
problems when talking to a mine action surveyor). These issues have generally been
recognised by practitioners, who have suggested approaches to overcome them,
although recently the more political aspects of participation have been re-emphasised
by critics.13
Over time, the advocates of these approaches have moved toward a greater focus on
community empowerment. In some cases this reflects concern that the initial
approach simply reinforces the existing local power structure. It reflects respect for
local knowledge and the belief that the solution of many problems could be carried
out by the community, if given the resources. Finally, it also reflects the accumulated
experience that the outside resources to resolve problems often come more slowly and
in lesser amounts than promised. 
RRA from the beginning recognised the importance of providing information back to
the community. This was at one and the same time instrumental (validating the
information and interpretation), respectful (recognising the community as partner not
simply “source”) and empowering (possibly leading to action by the community). Both
RRA and RAP have increasingly emphasised the aspect of community learning, thus
facilitating a community-based response to the problem. In the case of RRA, advocates
had moved by the early 1990s to Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), often including
community planning,14 which gives precedence to community learning over outsider
data collection. 
The LIS developed partly out of the rapid appraisal tradition. Some of the key
elements in Rapid Appraisal relevant for mine action survey are:
¾ Confidence in local knowledge (obtained through focus groups, key informants,
community mapping, and visual verification); 
¾ Use of multiple sources (gender, social group, location) for triangulation;
¾ Recognition of the limits of local knowledge;
¾ Care to ensure methodological soundness; and
¾ Feedback to community, support to community analysis, planning and response. 
History of survey in mine action15 
The specific history of mine action survey is unique to each country, sometimes
building upon but often learning in isolation the lessons learned elsewhere.
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13 E.g., Kapoor, 2002 and Cooke and Kothari, 2001.
14 See Chambers, 1994a, b, c; Selener, Endara and Carvajal, 1999; and Freudenberger, 1999.
15 For more extensive discussion of the history of survey in mine action, see Rhodes, “Mine
Action Survey,” in GICHD, (2005b).
Nonetheless, there are certain features shared among the surveys of the 1990s. In each
country initiating mine action activity it has been common to begin by conducting a
survey of the situation (location and area of minefields/SHAs) while urgent clearance
begins. These first surveys, sometimes national but often more localised, were
conducted by clearance operators for several purposes: to obtain information on the
extent and location of specific threats in order to estimate the extent of the problem; to
warn communities of the problems they face; and to plan clearance activities. Among
the earliest lessons learned was the importance of good records, of both the suspected
contamination and the actual clearance. 
The International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations, published
by the UN in 1997, reflected the shared understanding of the time, particularly
regarding the focus on the minefield. The standards referred to three types of
survey:16
LEVEL ONE (GENERAL) SURVEY
The objective of a Level One (general) survey was to collect information on the general
locations of suspected or mined areas including on areas affected by mines and on
areas not affected. Areas were supposed to be categorised and the reliability and
credibility of data recorded. A Level One Survey was a prerequisite for the planning
of a Level Two (technical) Survey.
LEVEL TWO (TECHNICAL) SURVEY
The objective of a Level Two (technical) survey was to determine and delineate the
perimeter of mined locations initially identified by a Level One survey. The marked
perimeter forms the area for future mine clearance operations.
LEVEL THREE (COMPLETION) SURVEY
The objective of a Level Three (completion) survey was to accurately delineate the
perimeter of the area actually cleared, usually conducted in conjunction with the mine
clearance teams.
As mine action programmes matured, they typically conducted national surveys to
more accurately determine the extent of the problem. The key data collected focused
on the nature and size of the SHAs – dimensions, soil, ground cover, type and age of
mines – as well as some information regarding access and facilities in the nearby
community. This provided a more complete basis for programme planning, resource
mobilisation, and allocation of assets among regions in proportion to the distribution
of the problem, as well as for setting task priorities according to the technical nature
of the contamination.
Among the earliest conclusions was that landmine clearance is a slow and expensive
process. If the only goal is to eliminate all landmines from A to Z, then the only
important questions in priority setting are technical and logistical. While political
factors may enter into consideration, in the long run all minefields must be eliminated.
They are distinguished essentially by their hazard and site characteristics, and priority
setting should provide for the most efficient use of assets to move forward with total
clearance as rapidly as possible.
11Key lessons, challenges and recomendations
16 DHA, International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations, 1997.
However, with acknowledgement that mine action will continue for a long time came
greater recognition that it does make a difference which minefields are resolved first
and which are left for longer. The choice to work in one area is a choice to leave
hundreds of other areas for later. The choice to work in one area benefits a specific
community and leaves others to face their problem alone for longer. Recognition of
these “opportunity costs” increased awareness of the importance of appropriate
priority setting. Existing minefield databases generally did not contain information on
the impact of the respective minefields on the community or the country – since they
implicitly expected that all were equally a problem only resolved by clearance – thus
they did not provide a good basis to decide which areas should be dealt with first to
provide greater benefit to the people of the country. This in turn led to the need for
information on which minefields were causing great (or insignificant) problems, for
which the perspective of the local mine-affected community was argued to be the
appropriate reference point. Out of this awareness came the proposal that surveys
should focus on the impact of suspected hazardous areas on communities.
Thus, in the first decade of mine action, most surveys were of contamination, focusing
on the presence and nature of minefield hazards. A few surveys began to consider the
impact of the minefields in terms of the risk they posed to the local population, seeking
to identify and prioritise those minefields posing a greater risk, particularly on the
basis of their proximity to community activities. Early examples of this trend included
Laos (1997), Afghanistan (1998-1999) and Kosovo (2000). The next step in the evolution
was to focus on the socio-economic impact of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
through global landmine surveys.
Soon after the signing of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in December 1987,
a group of NGOs formed the Survey Working Group (SWG) to develop a global
landmine survey (GLS) and established the Survey Action Centre (SAC) attached to
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) to execute the surveys. The GLS
was to be carried out through national Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) to (a) define
the scale and socio-economic impact of landmine contamination, (b) provide a reliable
national database to be used in future mine action planning and priority setting to
address impact, and (c) establish baseline data for measuring overall performance of
mine action programmes individually and worldwide.
One of the main outputs of the LIS is the grouping of communities according to an
impact score based on a limited set of indicators from information obtained through
interviews with the local population. Although other methodologies were considered,
it was decided to maintain a very simple approach, considering all communities
without regard to population (thus introducing a “rural bias” to counter “urban bias”),
considering blockage by type of resource rather than by number of blockages of each
resource, giving high weight to victims (each victim equivalent to two categories of
blockage). The survey would identify the approximate location of all minefields, but
did not invest much training or effort in narrowing the precise boundaries. Thus, each
SHA would need to be re-surveyed for actual clearance.
Over the course of several meetings, decisions regarding scoring included: (a) scores
should apply to communities rather than to hazards; (b) each victim during the 24
months preceding the survey visit received two points – this made the number of
victims a strong driver of the impact score; (c) presence of minefields warranted two
points and unexploded ordnance (UXO) one point, regardless of their numbers or the
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total extent of contamination; (d) a total of ten predefined blockage categories were
established (e.g., agriculture, water sources, schools, etc.), and five additional user-
defined categories were created to capture country-specific issues; (e) blockage of any
category would warrant a score of up to three points, regardless of the number or
degree of blockage; and (f) a total of ten points were allowed for all blockage
categories combined, with the relative weight of each category open to adjustment up
to a maximum of three points on a country-by-country basis.
The SWG invested considerable effort to ensure the reliability of the methodology, the
significance of the results, and the statistical confirmation of the extent of coverage,
which it incorporated into a series of public protocols used to guide all landmine
impact surveys and reflected in extensive training and pilot testing for each survey.17
All LIS follow a standard methodology, record their data in a standard database
designed for this purpose (International Management System for Mine Action –
IMSMA) and are monitored by a UN Quality Assurance Monitor whose reports
provide the basis upon which the UN determines whether or not to “certify” the
survey process.18 This methodology became the basis for all impact surveys,
regardless of whether a survey was conducted under the direct auspices of the Survey
Action Center (the SWG secretariat) or by other parties familiar with the impact
concept and the SWG protocols (e.g. Northern Iraq).
The first LIS effort, conducted in Yemen in 1999-2000, provided a comprehensive view
of the landmine problem in the country. Importantly, it highlighted areas of high and
medium impact that were not previously recognised as such. It was clear even before
the survey was completed that there would need to be further assistance to ensure
effective use of the results, for which a “survey utilisation” strategic planning
component was added and became a common follow-on to an LIS. The results from
Yemen lent themselves to setting programme priorities and the government adapted
its programme correspondingly. The progress and results of the Yemen LIS also
occurred at the right time to inform the on going discussions leading to the IMAS. This
had two very important results: the definition of survey came to include impact as an
essential component; and the question of whether surveys should focus on minefields
or affected communities was debated widely, with the community-impact consensus
sinking deeper roots more quickly than would otherwise have occurred. 
The LIS approach represented a shift for the humanitarian mine action community
from setting priorities based principally on minefield contamination characteristics to
setting priorities for responding to greatest impact, in order to eliminate community
blockages. This was consistent with the IMAS attention to reducing to an acceptable
level the risk to population associated with planned use of land. The IMAS
discussions focused on the concepts of risk to normal activities and risk reduction under
uncertainty. The LIS discussions successfully shifted the concern in survey from the
characteristics of minefield contamination in isolation to the impact of minefields on
communities, particularly through blockage/interference with regular community
activities (farming, water collection, schooling, etc.). The qualitative shift in 2000 was
not in the details of the SWG methodology, but rather in the focus on community
impact through blockages. This reflected the broader shift to viewing mine action
effectiveness in terms of delivering benefits to local communities – the single most
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important step toward strengthening the management and effectiveness of mine
action worldwide.
Issues faced and lessons learned
Intense discussions have developed on the methodology, implementation and use of
the LIS and its results in various countries. Some discussions have led to clarifications
of the methodology itself; others have focused on the effective use of the LIS results;
while still others have involved trying to go beyond limitations encountered with the
LIS. Several of the more important issues are discussed below. 
LIS methodology
Relations with host governments. Survey are conducted with the full knowledge and
agreement of the host government. While a memorandum of understanding is signed
with the government as a precondition to the survey, in most cases actual government
buy-in was weak at the beginning and only developed as results began to appear and
their utility became evident. The relationship to government was also ambivalent
from the survey team side, since the implementing NGOs generally sought to protect
the survey's integrity from potential government efforts to influence the outcome.
Reflecting this, before the first LIS, there was a concern that government briefings be
kept to the minimum necessary during the survey period, and that results should only
be released when the entire survey was complete in order to avoid efforts at
manipulation. The extent to which the survey was integrated with other mine action
efforts also varied widely among countries. At the beginning, it was thought better to
have the LIS team based in its own facility, rather than with the national agency. Early
experience indicated that these should not be major concerns, that good flow of
information is crucial, and that co-location can enhance communication.
Selection of implementing partners. Implementing partners initially were picked by
SAC from among interested member NGOs of SWG. A more formalised partner
selection process was established in 2002, responding in part to VVAF's interest in
remaining involved with national LIS surveys after SAC separated from it. In
addition, early surveys were done by implementing partners not otherwise active in
the country. This was due in part to necessity, but it was also thought to ensure
neutrality on the part of the survey implementer. Experience has shown that the
methodology and professionalism of partners means the risk of bias is modest, while
the benefit of working with implementing partners already in the country brings
critical contextual insight and language skills. 
Preliminary Opinion Collection. Preliminary Opinion Collection interviews with
government officials (general administration, health, military, etc.), NGOs and other
actors were the starting point for identification of potentially mine-affected
communities. The first surveys sought to interview scores of individuals, while later
surveys reduced the outreach somewhat. One potential source of expert opinion
–existing mine contamination databases – was not widely used. Preliminary Opinion
Collection proved to be neither fully reliable nor comprehensive. The quality of data
collected varied widely: nonetheless, it served as the starting point for determining
which communities should be visited and the magnitude of the effort.
14 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
Questionnaire. The SWG protocols define “minimum data requirements” for all LIS
surveys, to be collected through questionnaires designed for each survey. SAC also
provided copies of the early survey instruments to serve as models for later
questionnaires. Adjusting the questionnaire to the national setting – often primarily
an issue of clarity of translation of terms and concepts – is already part of the normal
process in SWG protocols, although it tends to be learned anew by each set of
implementing partners, partly because of the lack of continuity among survey field
managers.19
Limited information on SHAs. The LIS questionnaire collected less minefield
information than clearance operators were accustomed to obtain from minefield
surveys. Furthermore, although the LIS teams produced sketch maps of the SHAs,
IMSMA did not indicate the SHA location nor boundaries, only providing circles sized
in proportion to the estimated area. A follow-on technical survey is thus always
required when a given site is tasked. While several operators have complained about
this, experience indicates that a follow-on survey would be good practice – even with
more information collected the first time around – in order to reconfirm the technical
and impact data and plan the specific operation.
Overestimation of total SHA area. The problem of exaggerated size of SHAs as
determined by LIS survey teams has been observed in most countries. LIS data tend
to overstate the extent of contaminated areas, since the survey teams were not
expected nor trained to carefully determine boundaries. Unfortunately, this had the
effect of apparently increasing the total contaminated area and reduced somewhat the
credibility of the survey in some countries. This creates the risk of a programme
expending significant resources to “clear the database” rather than to clear minefields.
Recently, increased attention has been given to training and equipping survey teams
for better estimation of the boundaries of suspect areas. 
Coverage of mine-affected communities and SHAs. All LIS surveys (except
Mozambique) were designed to provide complete coverage of all mine-affected
communities. However, the LIS is unlikely to provide 100 per cent coverage of mine-
affected communities, and SHAs not associated with any community have been
identified following nearly all LIS. One of the questions asked in each community
seeks to identify further mine-affected communities, which, once identified, were
recorded and visited in turn. This process continued until no further communities
were identified or until nearly all such identifications proved to be false positives
when visited. Systematic sampling of false negatives was included to determine the
level of confidence in the results and the likely extent of coverage of the landmine
problem in the country. When it became clear in early surveys that the planned review
could involve increasing the number of villages visited by as much as 100 per cent, the
methodology was reviewed and lower thresholds were sometimes set to ensure a high
level of confidence that 90-95 per cent of mine-affected communities were covered. 
Scoring. The scoring system has been debated in each country and the methodology
allows for national review of the weighting scheme for blockages. Several countries
have made adjustments to the weights and concluded that the results were
meaningful. Alternative weights can also be applied at the regional level if the
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authorities so determine and this may be useful for operational planning. Discussion
about the impact scoring system often focused on the significant weight given to
recent victims. It is sometimes argued that this distorts the scoring, since an incident
involving five or more fatalities on a vehicle transporting people through a given area
is enough to raise the nearby community to high impact, even if there was no other
problem. Others have asked whether five victims in one incident should weigh the
same as five separate incidents with one victim each. To which village should an
accident be assigned if it involves an outside traveller passing both villages by more
than one kilometre?  Is an incident caused by the lack of a traveller's local knowledge
the same as one suffered by a local person?  Should incidents involving handling UXO
be the same as stepping on a landmine? Furthermore, in many countries it is difficult
for an area with no recent victims to have sufficient categories of blockage to reach
high impact, although in some heavily contaminated countries (e.g. Northern Iraq)
about half of the high impact communities had sufficient blockages to qualify as such,
even without victims.20 Some countries have therefore decided to keep full attention
on the “high” and “medium” impact communities. In any case, the level of impact calls
attention to the specific community for further action, not only for clearance, and the
appropriate action should be assessed in the follow-up survey. 
Ranking of community impact. Design of the scoring system involved a number of
simplifications and the SWG sought to maintain a simple system for ranking
community impact, settling on three categories – low, medium and high –
corresponding to scores of 1-5, 6-10 and 11 and above respectively. This ranking
system was to be used in all countries to enhance comparability. The ranking was to
provide an overview of the national landmine problem and to direct more intensive
analysis and expensive clearance resources to high-impact communities. The ranking
system proved very powerful in directing attention to high-impact communities, by
highlighting them and their limited number, which presented a much more
“bounded” problem and thus an achievable solution. In most countries, the number of
high-impact communities proved to be significantly lower than expected by those
working in the country. In some cases this has led some stakeholders to question the
scoring, with concern that other communities with essentially the same degree of
impact were being relegated to a lower category (and thus get less attention) due to
artefacts of the scoring system. The SWG and most governments have tried to
maintain international attention and support for efforts to resolve both high- and
medium-impact situations.
Rapid appraisal bias. LISs were conducted through group interviews, key informant
interviews, community mapping and visual verification. These are the typical tools of
rapid appraisal and the results have the strengths and weaknesses of the method. The
data collected was only as good as the community sources providing it. It was limited
in some cases by the fact that many people were still displaced. Some critics expressed
concern that a visit of a few hours was too short to establish sufficient rapport to
ensure that good information was obtained, and that it was biased against women as
well as others who happened to be unavailable during the short visit. There were cases
where victims of gunshot wounds and other injuries were identified as landmine
victims in order to obtain more assistance. Furthermore, information was sometimes
distorted by informants who had their own strategies regarding the survey: problems
may be overstated with the hope of obtaining greater assistance, or understated to
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avoid interruption of relief assistance, tourism or travel. While the quality of the
questionnaires and data entry were carefully assured, the possibility remained that
the information obtained was incomplete or otherwise biased. The possibility that
information is biased or provided “strategically” reinforces the need to seek multiple
data sources (triangulation) and to reconfirm the accuracy and completeness of the
information during any follow-up survey conducted prior to any specific task. 
Limits of community information regarding national priorities. There are inherent
limits in the impact survey methodology and scoring that reduce its effectiveness in
understanding certain types of contamination problems. For example, focus on
community impact does not adequately capture blockage data regarding projects that
are important beyond the immediate community, such as regional or national
roadways, electrification and water systems. These blockages need to be identified by
other data collection efforts and should be incorporated into the same mine action
database. Similarly, the impact survey methodology does not readily consider future
changes in use of land, although changes in land use and population movements may
result in new blockages and risks. In such situations, the appropriate first step may be
to review the proximity of SHAs in relation to planned movement routes and
settlements and identify those situations requiring further investigation. 
IMSMA database limitations. The LIS questionnaire was hard-coded into the
database system then under development (the Information Management System for
Mine Action – IMSMA) which was used to record all responses and compile results.
While this was a major step forward, it also brought a number of limitations.
First, the IMSMA database was initially developed as a repository for survey data that
could be analysed according to impact and other considerations and has been adopted
by virtually all mine action programmes established since 1999. IMSMA was not
initially designed as an active instrument for operational management of mine action
programmes. As a result, each mine action programme where IMSMA was deployed
had to develop its own add-on or parallel software to support operations, some of
which have been incorporated into later versions of IMSMA. This fact was a
disincentive for existing major programmes to convert to IMSMA from their home-
grown databases. This problem was eventually overcome with the external funding of
LIS together with development of greater IMSMA operational-support capabilities.
Second, there is a need to integrate other key data sets (e.g. bombing data, previous
survey data which may require identification for verification, SHAs not associated
with any community) but the LIS was not designed to collect this, nor IMSMA
designed to handle it. Thus, there is a need to develop mechanisms for integrating all
relevant data.21
Third, there is a need to incorporate national development and other concerns along
with community impact.
Fourth, there is a need to invest in local staff to manage the database, but funds are not
always available for such an open-ended commitment.
Fifth, there is a need to invest in updating the database and revising the national
impact report. There sometimes has been a tendency to treat the LIS as a snapshot
which should remain as such, rather than as the launch pad for a comprehensive
dataset which requires updating. 
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Some of these are technical issues and some are organisational – but they are all
important to ensuring effective information management for national mine action.
Gender issues in mine action survey. The relevance of gender issues has been
recognised in mine action survey and LIS teams usually make specific efforts to
incorporate gender concerns. The UN's Gender Guidelines for Mine Action22 calls
particular attention to: the importance of having women as well as men on the survey
teams; conducting interviews at times and places suitable for participation by both
women and men; conducting group meetings with women alone as well as with men,
depending on the cultural context, in order to obtain information from all; gathering
information from both women and men about the location and nature of the landmine
threat; collecting data disaggregated by gender for mine victims; and collecting and
analysing the data with attention to the different daily experiences and risks of men
and women.
Timing of LIS – too late? It has been suggested that the LIS was conducted “too late”
in some countries – primarily countries that already had a national minefield database
(e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina). This position has been argued as seeking to avoid
waste of funds since the landmine situation was presumed to be already well known,
and has been used to rationalise reduced cooperation by some NGOs (e.g. in
Cambodia and Mozambique). The existing databases were not generally used in the
design of the LIS. Yet none of the existing databases were community-impact based –
and once the survey was completed the new database as well as the impact-based
approach to planning and priority setting were generally recognised as very positive
(with lingering doubts about the Mozambique LIS). 
Timing of LIS – too early? In some cases (e.g. Angola, Eritrea) it has been suggested
that the LIS was conducted “too early”. This argument was based on the absence of
populations displaced by conflict (and thus unable to report on contamination) and
the relative weaknesses of central and regional authorities in making use of the
results. While these are both limitations, those involved have generally found that the
displacement issue affected a limited (though important) part of the country and that
the results are welcome whenever they are produced.
Retro-fit LIS. LIS were conducted as retro-fit surveys in two countries with extensive
minefield databases – Afghanistan and Northern Iraq. While there was some
scepticism regarding the usefulness of the survey by staff in both countries (as they
believed the problem was well known), management in both cases enthusiastically
supported the LIS. Initial SWG discussion had suggested that a retro-fit survey would
be simple and fast, but implementers in both countries realised that it required a full
survey visit, not only to obtain blockage data but also to update SHA and victim
information. The result was a far more complete understanding of the problem,
utilising the existing database to identify known mine-affected communities and
SHAs, while also searching for more. In both cases the total estimated contaminated
area at the end of the retro-fit survey was significantly less than the total estimated
area prior to the survey. Because all affected communities and known SHAs were
visited, the previous database was superseded by the new one, with earlier
contamination estimates validated or disconfirmed by the new survey. 
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UN Certification. UN certification of the final survey report, based on UN quality
assurance of the process, is a core element of the LIS process. While several UN QA
monitors have provided very useful real-time feedback to the LIS implementers, the
certification process itself was questioned in the GLS Evaluation Report.23
Certification was designed to be based on compliance with the SWG protocols, and is
thus a confirmation of correct procedure followed rather than an endorsement of the
substance of the results. This limitation was highlighted in the certification process for
the Mozambique LIS, which was generally felt to not have been of the quality or
coverage expected – but which the UN judged to have followed the procedures in the
SWG protocols. Many of those involved in the Mozambique certification process
sought to distance themselves from the certification given, thus casting doubt on the
certification process as a whole. 
Use of LIS results in programme management
Impact of impact survey results. The LIS has provided information to complete the
profile of the national landmine/UXO problem, and this has to some extent modified
the existing understanding in nearly all countries where it has been conducted. Most
authorities have reallocated assets among regions and in some cases retrained teams
to better match the revised understanding of the problem. In Yemen, YEMAC opened
a second regional centre for long-term clearance in a highlands region not previously
recognised as so strongly impacted by landmines. In Laos, a socio-economic survey
carried out prior to the GLS led UXO LAO to change the regional distribution of
clearance teams to better reflect the newly clarified distribution of UXO impact. In
Chad, the National Demining Institute (HCND) retrained clearance teams to enhance
capacities to address UXO after the LIS revealed a high proportion of injuries from
UXO. While not all countries used the survey results in the same manner, virtually all
countries have redesigned their mine action programmes in response to the impact
information produced by the LIS.
Use of results for strategic and operational planning. As the first LIS survey
progressed, it became clear that use of the results for strategic and operational
planning was going to require further investment of resources for analysis and
planning. A separate survey use project was created, which has since been a standard
feature of the approach.24 One view had been that the list of high impact communities
– whether ordered by specific score or by geographic region – would provide the task
list for clearance. As the first results came in it quickly became apparent that this
approach alone was not appropriate:  community impact score should be a factor in
prioritisation but not the whole story. “High impact” is not the same as “high priority.”
“High impact” should lead to focused attention of expensive resources to further
analyse and respond to the problem. “High priority” is a possible result of considering
communities and SHAs within the framework of national priorities. Other factors are
also important: other communities may warrant clearance and marking would
respond to more communities more rapidly, as would MRE. Thus, the approach taken
was that the set of high impact communities provided a working list of communities
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warranting priority attention, initially through follow-up survey to confirm the earlier
results and to plan the most appropriate response. Although early discussions were
oriented largely to the allocation of scarce clearance assets to high impact areas, as
results became available they provided the basis for further management decisions.
Follow-up surveys sought to confirm blockages of specific communities and to
provide more precise boundaries for clearance or marking as appropriate. Clearance
assets would go particularly to high impact communities, but also to resolve
blockages in the surrounding community cluster. Mine marking resources would be
used in high and medium impact communities for those larger minefields that did not
create blockages. Mine risk education assets worked with clearance and marking
teams, and also addressed broader safety education in low impact communities and
with the population as a whole. Implications for planning are addressed in each LIS
report, with a more comprehensive approach outlined in Downs and van der Merwe,
2003.25
Impact of blockage removal. Prioritisation of high impact communities for clearance
was meant to provide greater benefits for communities and the nation. However, it
highlighted a limitation in the approach:  while landmine blockage may have a high
impact on the community, removing the landmines may not eliminate the effect of the
impact: the community may not use the land as it did previously, particularly if
complementary resources are required to reactivate the old activity. For example,
agricultural land may have been unusable due to landmines, but may not be used
when the landmines are removed due to lack of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds,
water) or disputed ownership. Thus there was a recognition that the likely impact of
clearance should be assessed as part of the planning process, since lack of use for an
extended period after clearance would cancel most of the benefits of the clearance
effort. This assessment requires involvement of community stakeholders in the
operational planning process. This was attempted in the minefield-focused Task
Impact Assessments (TIA) of  Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and has been carried out
most effectively in the Community Mine Action Plans in Bosnia and Herzegovina
which BHMAC has developed on the basis of the Task Assessment and Planning
(TAP) procedure originally proposed by SAC.26 
Measuring the results of mine action programmes. Most mine action programmes
continue to report their results primarily in the traditional terms of square metres
cleared and landmines/UXO removed. While such indicators may be useful for
measuring the efficiency of site operations, they are not adequate indicators of
programme results. The LIS approach does suggest other possible indicators of
results:  blockages cleared; changes to victim incidence rates overall and for places
with previous incidents; profiles of victims; numbers of previously impacted
communities now free of impact; population freed of impact; number of “high” or
“medium” impact communities in current workplan. Furthermore, programmes
should monitor the use of land once it has been cleared – is it used for the purpose that
justified its original prioritisation for clearance? Knowing the use of land after
clearance serves two essential purposes:  (a) documenting the actual use of the cleared
land and thus the benefits derived from the mine action programme, and (b)
validating the planning assumptions that led to the task assignment – if the use is not
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as planned, the programme managers should know, determine the reason for the
difference and correct planning assumptions for the future. Very few programmes
conduct regular post-clearance impact assessments, although it should be standard
practice of good management. 
Stakeholders and expectations in mine action surveys
There are a variety of stakeholders to be considered with regard to mine action
surveys:  local, national and international. 
Local stakeholders. Local stakeholders include local populations, mine action
operators in the specific area and local government officials. The local population is
potentially the most affected by the survey results, but there may be significant lags
before the results are known and mine action efforts are initiated. However, the
survey process can help the local population become better informed of their risk and
potential actions, if so designed. 
Local operators have an interest in learning more about the nature of the SHAs, but
are unlikely to learn much from the survey (unless these operators are also
responsible for establishing priorities). 
National stakeholders. National stakeholders include national operators (domestic
and external), the national Mine Action Centre, and other national officials responsible
for policy or management of sectors affected by landmine contamination. National
operators (unless they are survey operators) are interested primarily in the outputs of
the survey. Their expectations will rarely be met by the LIS alone, and they will
normally have to conduct a technical survey for the specific areas where they work.
Officials of the MAC or National Mine Action Authority (including those responsible
for MRE and victim assistance) have strong interest in the overall survey outputs and
the resulting analysis of the national and local landmine problems. This information
gives the MAC and the NMAA the basis to plan and task for work on a cyclical and
annual basis, as well as to plan for work and additional assets that may be required
over a longer time. It has also become somewhat of a donor expectation that landmine
impact surveys will be conducted in most mine-affected countries, and thus a
condition for resource mobilisation. Other government officials potentially will be
concerned with the survey results indicating mine impact on their areas or sectors of
concern, which they need to consider in their own planning.
International stakeholders. International stakeholders include donors, mine action
NGOs and UN agencies involved in mine action. The GLS seeks to provide
international comparability of results, in response to an initial donor concern to
potentially allocate funding taking the threat and progress into consideration. The LIS
have improved the clarity of the overall international picture but do not seem to have
led to reallocation of donor resources.  
Donors have two main interests in mine action surveys: (i) to develop a more accurate
and comprehensive picture of the landmine problem worldwide and (ii) to assist
governments to more effectively plan and manage their own mine action
programmes. To date, donors have primarily supported national governments to
obtain LIS surveys and have sometimes monitored to ensure that the national
programmes seek to become more effective by using LIS results. 
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In addition to those conducting surveys, NGOs involved in advocacy or seeking to
determine where their operational assistance might be useful are interested in
surveys, primarily as an instrument for a more complete understanding of national
landmine problems. The UN has been one of the main sponsors of the impact surveys,
both to strengthen information and management of national programmes and to
obtain an improved, comprehensive picture of the world landmine problem. The UN
also uses the information obtained through impact surveys to guide its own policies,
technical support and resource mobilisation for national mine action programmes. 
Stakeholder interest. The parties most interested in impact surveys are the survey
operators, UN and national MAC/NMAA (supported by donors). For most of the
other stakeholders, the impact surveys may be nice to have but seem to be a diversion
of resources from the direct solution of the problem. This is one of the main strands of
current debate, especially when NGO operators have priorities that differ from the LIS
impact scores, whether due to limitations in the LIS or limited perspective of the
NGOs, based in part on less than comprehensive data.
Key challenges and future directions
The landmine impact survey has become the central component of the General Mine
Action Assessment in support of strategy and planning. It has been an important
element in the successful shift of focus for general planning from the minefield to the
community and from hazard/contamination to socio-economic impact. Results are used by
governments to obtain a better understanding of their national mine problem and to
reallocate resources to better respond to that problem. While this shift has improved
the ability to formulate strategic plans and to set priorities for mine action generally, the
LIS process still faces a number of challenges. Some of these may be resolved by
adapting how an LIS is planned and implemented. Examples here would include
partner and stakeholder involvement; estimation of SHA areas; and the application of
the LIS protocols, particularly regarding impact scoring. Other challenges relate to: (i)
how well the LIS data are updated to reflect socio-economic evolutions in the country
as well as the results of actions undertaken; (ii) effective use of the LIS outputs and
complementary data for strategic planning and priority setting; (iii) technical survey
follow-up for operational planning; (iv) further development of IMSMA as the
comprehensive database for mine action programme management; and (v)
measurement of progress and impact of mine action programmes nationally and
globally.
Host government involvement. The LIS is an important strategic support element for
government. Nonetheless, relations with host government often have been difficult
during the survey process, although this has improved in some recent surveys.
Government agreement is sometimes given in expectation of rapid results and with an
eye to additional donations. Even if the survey organisers explain how long the
process may take, expectations of quicker turnaround remain. Government
commitment to the survey often becomes manifest only when the results begin to be
available. Still, it is important to cultivate good relations with the host government, to
include in the survey teams personnel who may continue in similar functions once the
LIS is completed, and to provide interim reports as provincial or other sub-areas are
completed. 
Feedback to government and communities. It is important to provide feedback to the
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government and to specific communities during the survey process – in some cases
the impact score may be known at the end of the visit. Provincial reports should be
provided as they are available. Where available, MRE community liaison teams could
follow up with high impact communities soon after they have been identified to
discuss preventive actions the community can take. This should be followed with
community consultation during the operational planning process, to reconfirm the
nature of blockages and the availability of the necessary resources for the community
to make the intended use of the land once the blockages have been removed.
SHA area estimation. The LIS is not an operational support tool and field operators
have generally been dissatisfied with its results, particularly with the lack of accurate
boundaries. The expansion of the total hazardous area by surveys is perceived as a
significant problem that was not initially given importance by the SWG.27 Once
identified as an SHA, an area needs to be “processed” (i.e. resurveyed or cleared) to be
declared safe – it is not IMAS-compliant to simply reduce the areas as the result of bad
data or improper estimation (unless a new estimation is carried out). Otherwise, the
overestimation of SHAs in the LIS will result in scarce resources being spent to “clear
the database” rather than clear minefields. Collection of more accurate boundary
information should be a standard aspect of all future surveys. To minimise the
problem, it is important to improve area estimation by applying the newly developed
SWG protocol on “visual inspection”, supported by appropriate training and
equipment and by including survey team members experienced in mine clearance.
Even with more accurate estimation and careful mapping of SHA polygons, impact
surveys will not be sufficient for operational planning. Follow-on technical survey to
obtain technical information, confirm blockages and determine the best course of
action is a necessary step to plan specific operations in each location. The LIS results
can direct resources for these expensive tasks to the more limited number of
communities where they are likely to deliver the greatest benefits. There have been
proposals for national technical survey projects but in most cases this would be a poor
use of scarce resources for low priority areas. Instead, technical survey should be
addressed primarily to priority areas to develop specific operational plans rather than
for general information collection. 
Task assessment and community planning. Removing blockages will not necessarily
eliminate the full impact of the landmines. It is important to determine whether other
resources required for the blocked area to return to its original use (or better) will be
available when the blockage has been removed. If the required resources will not be
available, the priority of the respective clearance effort should be lowered.  Such an
assessment should be conducted with the respective community and could be part of
a broader process of community planning, similar to the Community Mine Action
Planning TAP process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Priority setting. The purpose of priority setting is to identify a limited number of tasks
to receive greater attention, in order for the programme to have the greatest impact
possible in each operational cycle. Once these priorities have been identified, a follow-
up technical survey should be conducted of each location. This would be necessary
even if full minefield information were collected during the first visit. The purpose of
the follow-up survey, which should involve direct discussion with the community, is
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to complete the information on the SHAs, confirm the existence of blockages and their
cause, and determine the plan of action necessary to eliminate the blockages at the
minimum cost. Once approved, the plan should be followed to eliminate the blockage
with the necessary combination of clearance and marking.
Impact confirmation in all surveys. Even the field operators of SWG members have
sometimes been, at best, neutral to the LIS results. While some SWG members have
integrated a focus on landmine impact as a standard part of all their survey activity,
including technical surveys, it would be beneficial for each operational SWG member
to confirm that their field staff have fully adopted this approach. SWG members
should more actively guide their field staff to support and have realistic expectations
of the LIS process, and to incorporate collection of LIS-type data as a standard part of
their own survey actions.  Furthermore, the IMAS chapters related to survey should
be reviewed to ensure that they provide sufficient importance to inclusion of impact
confirmation as standard. 
Updating victim scores. The number of victims is a key driver in the total impact
score. Once a high score has called attention to the community and the appropriate
response has been taken, the victim information is primarily relevant for on-going
regional and national victim assistance programmes. Blockages once removed
disappear from the database and no longer enter into the updated impact score.
However, victims remain in the impact score until at least 24 months after their
accident. This distorts the ability to update the database and impact scores to reflect
solution of community problems. The SWG should address the need for rescoring
communities to reflect actions taken; the procedure developed would be implemented
by national programmes, supported by IMSMA.  
IMSMA and overall programme priority setting. Mine action programmes require a
single comprehensive database, able to support analysis of further priorities based on
community impact and other types of data. This is important to know the situation of
the entire country, as well as for use on specific development projects as they arise. For
example, while the LIS focuses on community impact, the national mine action
programme must deal with a wider range of impacts and needs, including national
development programmes and risks caused by hazards. Some of these may be area
based (e.g., population resettlement) while some may be linear (e.g. roads and power
lines). If IMSMA is to be this database, initially populated by an LIS, then it must also
integrate other relevant data, including SHAs not associated with communities, as
well as information on national development priorities into the analysis and setting of
programme priorities.  
Keep the mine action database alive. The database should be maintained so that it
contains up-to-date data. Ongoing analysis of the survey results and programme
progress requires ongoing investment in the information system staff as well as
institutionalisation of the impact survey process to maintain up-to-date data. The
initial LIS is sometimes referred to as a “snapshot”, but is better thought of as a
starting point – an investment in comprehensive data collection that should be fed and
kept as a living tool to reflect changing reality. As new mine-affected communities or
SHAs come to attention, or new mine incidents occur, they should be added to the
database. The results of mine action to clear or mark areas to eliminate blockages
should also be updated into the database. The strategic summary of community
impact status should be updated and reported at least annually. Much of the
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information to update changes will come from within the programme – clearance
reports, follow-up confirmation by MRE teams, etc. – while in other cases data may be
obtained through other entities, such as the ministry of health regarding new mine
victims, the ministry of agriculture for land use details, or the ministries of roads or
electricity for planned expansion of their networks. Survey utilisation and data
integration are necessary in each case and should be planned and budgeted as part of
the LIS and mine action information projects.
Impact of mine action – local and global. Programme managers, national
governments, donors and the local community all wish to see the greatest benefits
generated by mine action resources, both at the country and global levels. Post-
clearance impact assessments (PCIA) should be conducted following the clearance of
blockages in order to determine (a) actual use of the land as an issue in itself and (b)
whether the assumptions that led to prioritisation of the site were correct (and, if not,
to reconsider those assumptions as applied in other situations). Finally, there remains
the challenge of estimating the current status of the worldwide landmine problem and
assessing progress towards its solution. The LIS have established meaningful country-
specific baselines against which progress can be measured. In addition to general
desires to eventually clear all landmines, the international community should
maintain particular attention on the “high” and “medium” impact communities
identified by the LIS in each country. Among the success indicators to consider are:  (a)
number of blockages existing/removed; (b) number of “high” and “medium” impact
communities in a country; (c) share of “high” and “medium” impact communities in
annual work plan; (d) number of high-risk SHAs; (e) number of new mine victims; (f)
number of mine-affected communities; (g) number of people living in mine-affected
communities; (h) total area contaminated; and (i) traditional output measures.
Changes in any of these indicators will reflect progress against national mine
problems and they can be aggregated to estimate global progress against the
worldwide landmine problem.
Conclusion
Mine action survey has come far in a relatively short period. Mine action survey today
– with its focus on community impact – has developed from the minefield surveys of
the 1990s and the rapid appraisal approach of other development fields. Landmine
Impact Surveys have been or now are being completed in more than a dozen countries
and regions. In the process, much has been learned but further challenges remain. The
case studies in this book provide a grounded discussion of the individual country and
of overall process and advances. The cases provide specific recommendations for the
respective countries, which may also be relevant elsewhere. This chapter has sought
to highlight the broader themes and to identify several of the remaining challenges
and possible solutions.
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Chapter 2
The case of Angola
Nick Cumming-Bruce
The origins of Angola's landmine problem
Angola faces a formidable task of social and economic reconstruction after four
decades of almost continuous warfare in which local combatants, supported by
external powers, made heavy use of landmines. The incidence of mine casualties
during these years is estimated to be one of the highest in the world28 and mine
contamination on roads alone still presents a major obstacle to reconstruction, limiting
the movement of people and goods in a country whose small population (about 14
million people) are dispersed across an area the size of France and Spain combined.
Angola's mine contamination resulted from four main phases of war, starting in 1961
with the nationalist struggle for independence from Angola's Portuguese colonial
rulers. This struggle started with uprisings and massacres of white settlers in northern
Angola, provoking ferocious retaliation that sent an estimated 400,000 refugees fleeing
across the border into neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo)
and the Republic of Congo. To stem insurgency from groups across the northern
border, Portuguese forces in Cabinda province soon resorted to laying mines.
Over the next decade, various guerrilla factions, initially short of weaponry,
responded increasingly by laying their own mines as supplies from foreign backers
started to rise. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), active in
eastern Angola and supplied from Zaire, resorted to a war of attrition using mobile
units that minimised direct engagement with Portugal's forces and used landmines
both to inhibit their movement and to demoralise them. The Union of the Angola
Peoples and its successor, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), also
used some mines in central Angola. The National Union for Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) did not acquire the supplies or skills to be active in mine warfare
until the mid- to late-1970s. 
By then the conflict in Angola had shifted from nationalist and anti-colonial struggle
to internecine struggle between guerrilla armies that drew support from the Cold
29
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War's superpower rivals and neighbouring countries. A military coup in Portugal in
1974 paved the way for a hasty withdrawal from all its colonies and set Angola's
independence for November 1975. An agreement between the FNLA, UNITA and
MPLA signed in January 1975 provided for a joint interim government and integrated
army, but by mid-year they were at war, the MPLA receiving support from Cuba and
the Soviet Union, the FNLA from the US (and landmines from China), and UNITA
from South Africa.
The MPLA controlled the capital, Luanda, but not much else and it seemed in danger
of losing even that as South Africa invaded southern Angola to support UNITA and
Zairean forces, backed by the US, invaded on behalf of the FNLA. At that point a huge
influx of Soviet weapons and Cuban troops shored up the MPLA. The troops from
Zaire and South Africa pulled out and the MPLA formed a single-party government
that won broad diplomatic recognition, although not from the US. The war, however,
continued to spread.
UNITA, with local roots mainly among the Ovimbundu people of central and
southern Angola, steadily expanded its area of operations, helped by South Africa,
whose troops made repeated incursions into Angola between 1981 and 1983. The
South African Defence Forces (SADF) then occupied parts of the south in a bid to
create a UNITA buffer against the MPLA-supported South West African People's
Organisation (SWAPO), which was battling South Africa's presence in Namibia.
Under the Lusaka accords signed in January 1984, South Africa agreed to pull out of
Angola if the MPLA ceased support for SWAPO, but in 1985 its troops became active
again in Angola supporting UNITA against a government offensive. UNITA in the
meantime also benefited from a decision by the US Congress to repeal a ban on covert
assistance to the group. Between 1986 and 1991, UNITA ranked second only to
Afghanistan in receipt of covert US aid.29
In 1987-88, fierce fighting centred on the MPLA-held town of Cuito Cuanavale, where
UNITA, strengthened by a reported 3,000 to 5,000 South African troops, attempted to
check an advance by MPLA and Cuban forces, in the process laying dense minefields.
UNITA/South African attempts to capture the MPLA-Cuban base in the town failed,
however, and that proved to be a turning point in the war. South Africa changed its
strategy, withdrawing troops from Angola, although they laid more minefields close
to the Namibian border before they left. The Soviet Union also made clear it would not
continue to finance the MPLA military indefinitely.
Peace talks in early 1989 led to agreement on a cease-fire in June 1989 but soon
collapsed. Agreement on the role to be accorded UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi proved
a key obstacle to peace and while intense diplomacy ensued to pull together an
agreement that would hold, fierce fighting also erupted. Only in May 1991 did the
talks reach a conclusion with signing of the Bicesse Accords, a process helped by the
end of the Cold War and more US-Soviet cooperation. The deal called for MPLA and
UNITA forces to be integrated into a 50,000-strong national army, the holding of
elections and the deployment of a United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to
monitor implementation of the agreement.
Elections took place in September 1992, but Savimbi rejected the result and within a
month the two sides had returned to war. In this phase of the conflict, both sides
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focused on holding or seizing towns and both engaged heavily in laying mines. These
included defensive barrier minefields laid by the government of Eduardo dos Santos
around towns and cities it held, which were then sometimes ringed by additional
mines laid by UNITA (which largely controlled the countryside) to obstruct the
inhabitants getting out to collect water, fuel and food. In Huambo province in 1993,
MPLA forces dropped mines by air to protect its retreating troops. UNITA's military
fortunes waned, however, as its external support started to dry up while MPLA troops
were strengthened by heavy investment in new arms. 
In September 1994, the two sides (but not their leaders) signed a new agreement, the
Lusaka Protocol. This provided for a new UNAVEM peace-keeping mission with
some 7,000 troops, who started to deploy in 1995 and were to stay for 15 months.
Cease-fire violations occurred but steadily diminished, and by 1997 UNAVEM was
pulling out, leaving in its place the UN Observer Mission in Angola. 
Hostilities resumed, however, at the end of 1998 after Savimbi stalled implementation
of the Lusaka accords. Clashes occurred first in Kwanza Norte, Lunda Norte and
Cuando Cubango, and then spread to many other parts of the country in the next few
months. Although the government had signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention in December 1997,30 both sides continued to lay landmines. By September,
refugees were again crossing into the neighbouring Republic of Congo and the UN
estimated that more than 1.3 million people were displaced internally. In late 1999, the
government claimed it had driven UNITA out of most of its strongholds in the central
highlands and its troops continued to enjoy success in the first four months of 2000.
Although UNITA appeared to be in a state of disorder, it resorted to guerrilla attacks
as the year progressed. 
In June 2000, President dos Santos reaffirmed the validity of the Lusaka agreement
and said UNITA and Jonas Savimbi could be pardoned if they renounced war, but the
fighting continued. By 2001, the number of internally displaced people had risen to an
estimated 4.3 million and a further 430,000 people had fled to neighbouring countries.
Fighting continued in central and eastern Angola and both sides continued to use
landmines: the government to protect military positions; UNITA to stop people
escaping government areas and to deny the access to their fields.
The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 brought a rapid end to
hostilities. The government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UNITA in
April ending hostilities and a formal peace was declared in August. The only area
where fighting continued was in the northern, diamond-producing province of
Cabinda, where the government launched an offensive against the Cabinda Enclave
Liberation Front (FLEC). 
Peace left the government confronting a humanitarian crisis with around 1.8 million
people in need of food relief. Of the country's total population of 14 million, an
estimated 4.6 million had been displaced internally and roughly half the population
had gravitated to the capital to escape the fighting. In addition, more than 440,000
people had taken refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Namibia.
Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),
however, was severely constrained by the devastation to the country's roads and
bridges and widespread presence of landmines. 
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Many areas of the country had been mined several times in the course of different
phases of the conflict and reflecting the movement of frontlines. Mines were laid
within populated areas (such as Luena) as well as in dense barrier minefields
surrounding them. The density of mines laid in those locations, however, had less
impact than random, nuisance mine-laying. For the purposes of providing
humanitarian relief, small numbers of mines could deny access to thousands of
kilometres of road.
History of mine action in Angola31
After the Bicesse accords, signed in May 1991, responsibility for demining lay with the
Angolan government and mine clearance was undertaken initially by teams
belonging to its armed forces, the FAPLA/FALA. With elections approaching, they
gave priority to demining roads, railways and mined areas inside towns or villages.
Their efforts, though, were judged to have only limited scope or effectiveness. The
teams lacked organisation, resources or support, and they had few records or maps of
mine-laying to work from.
A Joint Mine Clearing Commission meeting in March 1992 noted that none of the mine
clearing teams had a radio or vehicle, and most lacked basic demining equipment
such as helmets, flak vests, mine markers, demolition materials or even properly
functioning detectors.32 Although FAPLA/FALA teams received support from British
military engineers, most mine clearance had ground to a halt by mid-1992. In southern
Angola, the SADF also provided training and advice up to mid-1992 to FAPLA/FALA
demining teams, which reported clearing some 300,000 mines.
In May 1992, Kap Anamur, a German non-governmental organisation (NGO), began
a mine clearance project in southern Cunene Province. Within a year it was operating
with five German and 25 national staff. By the end of 1994, it claimed to have cleared
more than 50,600 anti-tank mines and 25,300 anti-personnel mines, but it kept few
clearance records or markers showing where it had worked. 
Humanitarian mine clearance only acquired significant momentum after the 1994
Lusaka accords. This opened the way for the arrival of 7,000 peacekeeping troops
under the umbrella of UNAVEM, and for operators such as the Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) and HALO Trust in 1994 and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in 1995. 
In late 1994, the UN set up a Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) to coordinate the
activities of NGOs, UNAVEM and the Angolan military, and to build capacity and
support for NGOs in fundraising. A central committee was then established involving
the UN Special Representative, UNAVEM and CMAO to coordinate the military and
humanitarian needs of mine action, including committees that focused on UN troop
deployment and the quartering and demobilisation of Angolan troops. 
In June 1995, UNAVEM gave the South African company, Mechem, a US$6.5 million
contract to clear 4,500 kilometres of priority roads. Working with two teams, in the
north and the south, and using air-sensing, mine-protected Casspir vehicles, it
completed most of the task by early 1997, although obstruction by UNITA forces
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resulted in some roads being left uncleared. In addition, by early 1997, UNAVEM
troops had built or repaired some 38 bridges. 
Other key developments included setting up a Central Mine Action Training School in
late 1995 as a joint government-UNAVEM initiative to produce trained deminers. The
UN also helped to fund the first general survey of Angola, which was conducted by
NPA in 1995-98. The resumption of hostilities, however, halted both the survey and
much of the mine clearance then under way, and was accompanied by renewed mine-
laying. 
The UN operation, however, became the object of widespread and damning criticism.
UNAVEM commanders proved unwilling to support a unified programme. By
stalling disbursement of funds from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
CMAO was left unable to implement clearance plans. An assessment of mine action in
Angola carried out for the UN in 1996 found that “the UN proved unable to provide
the type of leadership and human resources needed to overcome political difficulties
in Angola and the administrative and bureaucratic problems associated with peace-
keeping missions,”33 and the UN's failure to appoint staff with the expertise and vision
to manage the programme meant CMAO was unable to “move the programme
forward substantially.”34
Angola's Council of Ministers had, in the meantime, issued a decree in May 1995
setting up a National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (Instituto
Nacional de Remocao de Obstaculos e Enghenos Explosivos or INAROEE) under the
Minister of Welfare and Social Reintegration. INAROEE's mandate was to coordinate
and conduct mine clearance and to set priorities for the sector. By December 1996, in
addition to its headquarters in Luanda, it had opened four regional headquarters. It
planned to deploy 12 66-man demining brigades, three to each area, by mid-1997,
expanding later to 18 brigades – one for each province. But those plans were stalled
by shortages of funds. 
INAROEE's founding decree gave no indication of how it was intended to interact
with any other agency, including the UN. This created a vacuum in relations with both
CMAO, which was supposedly coordinating mine action and supporting institutions
like INAROEE, and UNAVEM, which had set up a training institute that would be the
source of INAROEE's demining manpower. Only in April 1997 did the Angolan
government and the UN sign a two-year agreement for the UN's Department for
Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP to undertake a US$25 million programme to provide
INAROEE with technical and management support. As part of this development,
INAROEE was provided with a database populated with the results of the NPA
survey, and in 1997 it took over the mine action training school.
But delays in creating a framework for institutional ties with organisations like
CMAO and UNAVEM resulted in correspondingly slow development of INAROEE's
capacity, both as an implementing and a coordinating agency. By the end of 1997, it
was still operating only seven demining brigades. Moreover, much of the mine action
under way in the mid- to late-1990s occurred largely on the initiative of individual
demining NGOs with often nominal supervision or direction from central
government or provincial authorities. A UNDP review mission in 1998 found that
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INAROEE's dual role as regulator and implementer had become an impediment.
Underlining widespread concern about the effectiveness of the organisation,
Landmine Monitor reported in 2002 that INAROEE had been unable to provide it
with clear statistics for mine clearance activities.35
In July 2001, after consultations with the UN and donors, the government set up the
Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) to
take over from INAROEE the role of regulator/coordinator. CNIDAH, answering to
the Council of Ministers, is responsible for setting policy and standards, planning
mine clearance, survey, and mine risk education and marking. It provides a forum for
consultation with the armed forces, other government agencies and mine clearance
agencies, represented in the provinces by the governor. Its status also benefited from
the appointment as its head of General Santana Andre Pitra Petroff, a respected
veteran politician and special counsellor to Angola's president. 
The aim of the change was to integrate mine action into a wider government agenda
of social and economic reconstruction, resettlement of refugees and IDPs and the
provision of emergency relief. However, CNIDAH's ability to perform the functions
assigned it was constrained by a lack of experienced manpower and the extremely
slow delivery of resources by UNDP, which holds the mandate for capacity building
in the mine action sector. The UN's decision to support CNIDAH was taken in August
2002, but the UN authorised funds only at the end of March 2003, equipment was not
delivered until the end of November, and CNIDAH only became operational with its
own permanent offices in January 2004.
INAROEE meantime was reorganised and reformed under new management as the
National Demining Institute (INAD) with a mandate to function only as a demining
agency. INAROEE's Technical Demining Brigades (Brigadas Tecnicas de Sapadores),
starved of funds as a result of donors' lack of confidence, have not hitherto proved
productive but under INAD have a new opportunity to prove themselves. By 2004,
INAD had seven brigades with around 67 men each and planned to increase this over
two years to 15 brigades.36 In response to its demand to be involved in the Landmine
Impact Survey, INAD was given responsibility for two provinces. INAD's ability to
realise its expansion plans, however, depended on the government's willingness to
finance them. At the end of 2004, funds promised by the government had not come
through.
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The General Survey of Angola
The 1994 Lusaka accord opened up opportunities for mine action on a significant scale
for the first time after 30 years of conflict. Up to that point, the only survey work that
had been conducted was to support emergency clearance at specific locations. The
General Survey started in 1995 – then known as a Level 1 Survey – therefore marked
the first attempt to provide a systematic and comprehensive picture of the extent and
location of mine contamination across the country.
Survey objectives
The objectives were “to investigate and record mine information – in the process
identifying high- and low-risk areas which is essential for the safe reconstruction of
the country's infrastructure and the resumption of productive activities”.37 The overall
humanitarian priority at the time was repatriation of IDPs and refugees. Particular
attention was therefore paid to road access and to the conditions required both for the
movement of people and the distribution of food and other relief. Obstacles included
the generally poor level of local amenities and the levels of tension in specific areas,
often linked to the military presence.  
Survey teams marked on maps the roads they used in green and those used by other
vehicles and considered accessible in yellow. Roads that were inaccessible were
marked with a dotted red line. The teams gave GPS fixes for known or suspected
mines and recorded details of reported accidents.
The survey was geared specifically to producing information useful to demining
agencies. NPA's four-page mine site reporting sheet, adopted as standard by all
participants, provided enumerators with the option to provide a reference for the
centre point of the suspected mined area (SMA), or a polygon map with grid points
defining its perimeter, a more precise representation than required in impact surveys
and one that allows a far more accurate depiction of the mine threat to linear features
such as roads, railway lines and power lines. 
At the same time, the UN's terms of reference specified that, in recording general
Agency NPA and HALO, Greenfield Consultants (GFC)
Client UN/INAROEE
Type Level 1, General Survey
Objective To record details of mine sites and identify high and low-risk areas
of contamination
Dates/duration 1995-98
Scope National (15 of 18 provinces completed)
Focus To report mine information that would support reconstruction 
Info management Visual Dbase
Cost n/a
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details of mined areas, the survey should address criteria applied both to areas that
were mine- or UXO-affected and to those that were not affected in order to identify
what were high-risk and low-risk areas. In accordance with standards set by the 1996
International Conference on Mine Clearance Technology in Denmark, areas were
recorded as mine-affected if the reports submitted were based on information
provided by people unqualified in mine action and not confirmed by survey teams.
Areas were designated high- or low-risk only on the basis of reports from survey
teams.3
Implementation
The survey started out involving NPA with support from several other NGOs active
in demining in Angola. HALO Trust undertook to survey two provinces, Huambo and
Bie; GFC/CARE took on Kuando Kubango; and MAG, which had started working in
Moxico, would undertake survey in that province, although the southern half of the
province, then under UNITA control, was largely inaccessible. As the survey
progressed, however, NPA took over all provinces with the exception of Huambo and
Bie. Most of the work was undertaken in 1996-97 when NPA operated six survey
teams, but from mid-1997 it reduced the number of teams.
A major obstacle to survey work, then as now, was the dire state of the roads as a result
of fighting, mining, destroyed bridges or neglect. In a country of Angola's size
implementation was slow as a result. To complicate matters, survey teams worked for
the most part with poor quality, outdated and small-scale maps of 1:100,000 whose
data was not compatible with GPS, resulting in some error in GPS fixes. 
Provincial reports, however, made up for this weakness by giving considerable detail
on the condition of roads and bridges. These came in charts representing conditions
on individual roads as well as colour-coded provincial summary maps. The provincial
reports also include written description of roads providing GPS fixes for known or
suspected mines and recording details of reported accidents as well as information on
their physical state, vegetation and political/military factors. 
Implementation, however, was seriously affected by the tense military situation and
general climate of suspicion that prevailed after the Lusaka accord and the survey
acknowledges the quality of information supplied varies substantially between areas.
A precondition of the survey was that both the government and UNITA confirm
agreements allowing free access to the areas they respectively controlled and the
release of information, but this was never forthcoming. Military on both sides
remained sensitive to allowing the survey of areas they considered of strategic
importance and in some areas teams were turned back at roadblocks, threatened or
just treated with hostility. 
Survey teams needed to work in many areas with liaison officers – a process that
facilitated access but which could also add significantly to the amount of time needed
to complete surveys. Moreover, while some liaison officers proved helpful in
obtaining data, others clearly were assigned with the principal objective of tracking
the movements of survey teams. Although cooperation in many provinces was good
and conditions improved in the course of 1996, an NPA report in that year notes that
“in comparison to mine surveys undertaken in countries such as Mozambique or
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Cambodia, the amount of cooperation from the military authorities in Angola is
poor”.39
Outputs 
Despite these conditions, NPA and its partners by the end of 1997 had completed the
survey in nine of Angola's 18 provinces and had achieved partial coverage of five
more.40 Although some headway was made in 1998, the fragile peace collapsed
towards the end of the year and the survey could not continue. By then NPA had
produced survey reports on 13 provinces. Although surveys of Huambo and Bie by
HALO Trust were not complete, reports were also prepared on those provinces. The
reports filed thus covered Angola's most densely populated areas, although quality of
data varied enormously between different regions. The provinces for which no reports
were entered were the politically sensitive oil-producing province of Cabinda and the
diamond-rich province of Lunda Norte. Cuando Cubango, also unfinished, was not
then a priority, given its relatively small population sparsely distributed over
enormous distances. 
In view of the inability to complete the survey, NPA did not issue a final survey report
but hard copies of the provincial survey reports were compiled and made available to
relief agencies in Angola. These are considered among the most significant outcomes
of the operation. The data they contained was provided to INAROEE to be entered in
a centralised database set up by Vision Dbase. But at the time INAROEE was a one-
way street for information and Angola's infrastructure did not support easy exchange
of electronic data, particularly among organisations working in the provinces. Hard
copies were therefore essential and became almost certainly the most widely used
product of the survey. 
NPA, as part of a programme to support development of local mine action capacity,
shared its survey coordinator with INAROEE as a database manager, supervising the
entry of survey data into its database. The process was fraught with problems that
ranged from shortage of experienced operators to frequent power cuts, and many
survey reports were lost.41 Moreover, there was no quality assurance on data entered
by survey teams. Operators encountered a lot of inconsistencies in data entries and
found coordinates badly recorded but lacked the capacity to send material back to
operators for confirmation.
Outcome
The survey was widely used by relief agencies in Angola as a result of the availability
of hard copies. Although overtaken by renewed hostilities, which resulted in
additional mining, the data remains a valuable reference point for operators in the
absence of other sources of data on the location of suspected hazards. 
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40 NPA (1998: 5). The provinces completed were Benguela, Bengo, Kuanza Norte, Malanje,
Uige, Zaire, Kuanza Sul, Namibe and Huile. Provinces where survey teams had achieved
considerable coverage but additional areas needed to be explored were Bie, Kuando
Kubango, Cunene, Huambo and Moxico. Those where minimal or no work was completed
were Cabinda, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Luanda.
41  Information provided by Sara Sekkenes, NPA, December 2004. 
The database, however, appears to have been little used at the time that data was fresh
and soon fell into a state of disrepair as a result of the weakness and lack of motivation
on the part of INAROEE management. Some rehabilitation of the database was
carried out after 2001 but an unknown amount of the data entered was lost. 
Landmine Impact Survey
The end of the war united Angola under a national government for the first time in
more than 40 years, providing a new opportunity for sustained action to address the
problems of mine contamination and to develop the institutional framework for
undertaking it. But Angola still lacked a comprehensive national survey of the
landmine and UXO problem and its impact. NPA and its partners in the general
survey had covered all but three provinces, but the data was focused on minefields
and the survey had been overtaken by the last round of fighting.
The Survey Action Center proposed a landmine impact survey to fill the gap by
providing an assessment of the socio-economic effects of landmine contamination
focused specifically on communities. Donors appeared to be unwilling to fund such a
project while INAROEE remained the Angolan institution charged with oversight of
demining, so low was the credibility of its management. The Angolan government's
decision to set up CNIDAH, however, met an essential prerequisite for obtaining
donor support. The EU agreed to provide US$1.8 million and the US came forward
with US$1 million. Other major contributors included Germany, which provided
US$787,000, and Canada contributed US$559,000.
Outputs planned
The LIS was intended to provide CNIDAH, the new national authority, with a basis
for planning and prioritising mine action and thus offered it an opportunity to
introduce a degree of coherence that had not previously existed in Angola. It was
hoped that it would enhance the role of the national authority in a sector where
demining organisations had hitherto operated largely autonomously in the areas in
which their donors funded them to work.
In addition to the survey report, the project should leave CNIDAH with a populated
IMSMA database.
Agency Coordinator: Survey Action Center; Implementers: NPA, HALO,MAG, INTERSOS, Santa Barbara, INAD.
Client Government of Angola
Type Impact survey
Objective An overview of mine/UXO contamination impacts to provide abasis for planning and prioritising mine action 
Dates/Duration Original estimate: December 2003-August 2005 (revised to February2006) 
Scope National
Info management IMSMA
Cost Original estimate: US$5.8m
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Implementation
SAC initially estimated the cost of the LIS at US$5.8 million and planned to complete
data collection in February 2005, 26 months after the start of the project, and to issue
a final report six months later in August 2005. The targets appear to have been set,
however, before preliminary assessment of practical issues of implementation had
been completed. It must have quickly emerged from advance survey missions and
preliminary opinion collection that there would be little chance of meeting either goal
given the operating environment in Angola. After an operational review in November
2004, the deadline for completing data collection was extended to August 2005, set
publication of the final report for February 2006 and raised the total cost estimate to
US$6.7 million. Donors are concerned that costs may rise even higher, prompting
some to propose an independent review of the survey before agreeing to provide
additional funds.
SAC received offers from a number of organisations to survey the whole country but
never deemed this a practical proposition given the size of Angola, its political
complexities, and the logistical challenges posed by weak infrastructure and
communications. SAC preferred instead to employ operators already active in the
country42 and five organisations signed on as implementing partners.43 This approach
offered considerable advantages over the strategy adopted, for example, by CIDA for
the LIS in Mozambique, using one agency with no local experience to undertake the
survey for the whole country. 
Implementing partners brought to the survey knowledge of mine action and the
provinces they would survey, experience of working in the challenging local
conditions and working relationships already established with provincial authorities.
In addition, as direct beneficiaries of the information, it is in the operators' own
interests to generate the best quality data possible. Furthermore, in coordinating the
Angola LIS, SAC has found that smaller operators tend to be more efficient than big
organisations. The bigger partners operating more teams have generally encountered
more problems with staff absence due to sickness and other factors.44
SAC's director and operations officer carried out an advanced survey mission to
Angola in October 2002 and returned two months later in December to discuss
implementation and terms with the UN and prospective implementing partners.
However, SAC and the Angolan authorities did not sign a formal agreement on
conduct of the survey until 2004. SAC says that from the outset, it consulted in detail
and had strong support from CNIDAH's president, General Petroff, who reportedly
issued a letter supporting SAC's activities in December 2002.45 In contrast,
international agencies and stakeholders working with CNIDAH and other
government departments say Angolan authorities felt insufficiently consulted in the
preparation of the LIS and SAC needed to make more effort to foster a sense of
Angolan ownership of the project, shown by experience in other countries to be
essential to the end use of the survey.
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43 NPA initially took on the survey in nine provinces, later reduced to seven (Zaire, Uige,
Bengo, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje, Lunda Sul); HALO Trust took on four
provinces (Benguela, Huambo, Bie, Cuando Cubango); MAG took on one (Moxico); InterSos
two (Huila and Namibe); and Santa Barbara one (Cunene).
44 Uli Tietze, SAC Senior Coordinator, 3 September 2004.
45 Information provided by Bob Eaton, SAC Director, 17 December 2004.
The delay in reaching an agreement between SAC and Angolan authorities was partly
a result of the demand made by INAD late in the process that it should participate in
the LIS and take over conduct of the survey in five provinces. Initial discussions and
planning for the LIS had taken place at a time when INAROEE had ceased to exist,
and INAD was still in the process of setting up and taking over control of INAROEE's
demining brigades. Discussions with INAD led to an agreement in mid-2004 that it
would take over conduct of the LIS in two of the politically most sensitive provinces,
Cabinda and Lunda Norte, previously assigned to NPA.
The task of identifying the basic administrative unit of the survey and the total number
of communities that would need to be visited for the survey was undertaken only in
February 2003 by Anthony Zenos, a consultant with extensive knowledge and experience
of mine action in Angola. At that time a comprehensive village-to-village survey of all
communities had been undertaken only in Benguela province. Using that data to
extrapolate an average village population and using data from other sources, notably the
Ministry of Health, the consultant produced an estimate of 16,906 communities that
would need to be surveyed,46 a far higher number than SAC had envisaged. Even this
number has turned out to be an underestimate. In Huambo, the report envisaged 1,542
communities would need to be surveyed, but in the process of conducting the survey
HALO Trust found 2,826.47 Similarly in Malanje, NPA expected 1,097 communities
according to the initial estimate and had to contend with 2,145.48 The higher number of
communities to be surveyed had obvious implications for both the budget and time
needed to complete the survey, but no adjustment was made at this stage.
Preliminary opinion collection carried out by SAC at the national level appears to
have been cursory and unproductive. SAC sent out questionnaires to 67 organisations,
including government departments and NGOs, but received replies from only some
five or six, providing data of variable, often poor, quality.49
NGOs were critical of SAC's approach. It sent out a 13-page questionnaire in mid-
November 2003 requiring considerable amounts of data in a particular format within
a tight deadline. According to one interviewee, some of the data requested could only
have been obtained by consulting offices in the provinces, a necessarily slow process
given the lack of telecommunications facilities. In the view of several, the request and
time allowed to fulfil it were unrealistic and SAC as a result failed to collect potentially
useful data that would have been available to it with a more flexible approach. In
particular, SAC made no use of the NPA General Survey on the grounds that its
minefield-focused data was incompatible with the community-focused objectives of
the impact survey. A number of LIS stakeholders found this a surprising omission. The
general survey offered at least a potentially valuable reference point for checking the
quality and accuracy of the information collected by impact survey teams. 
Stakeholders also expressed surprise at the absence of any systematic public
information campaign to raise awareness of the LIS and its objectives among both
relief agencies and the general public. One LIS implementing partner found that one
year after the start of the project, one of the key UN agencies in Angola was still
unaware of the LIS and its purpose. 
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47 Information provided by SAC Coordinator, Uli Tietze, 23 August 2004.
48 NPA survey coordinator, Valerie Warmington, 24 August 2004.
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SAC's Luanda office, however, was itself under heavy pressure in the early stages of
the LIS towards the end of 2003 as a result of staff shortages. SAC appointed four
expatriate staff in Luanda to coordinate the LIS, but the first appointee as field
coordinator, from Mozambique, was rejected by Angolan authorities without
explanation and the replacement candidate arrived only in May 2004. Shortly before
he arrived, the database officer resigned on personal grounds and, as a result of delays
in the government issuing a visa, her replacement did not arrive until mid-June 2004. 
Training was conducted in three separate sessions for HALO Trust, NPA and the other
implementing partners, but was entirely in English. In retrospect, SAC felt it would
have been better to have had a Portuguese-speaking trainer available. Some
participants felt the training was too short and failed to go into sufficient detail.
Moreover, testing of the survey questionnaire was compressed into the training
session. Since the implementing partners worked to different timelines, it only proved
possible for HALO Trust and NPA to field test the instrument. By the time the other
implementing partners started training the questionnaire was already in use.
Preparing for data collection in the field encountered a number of teething troubles.
HALO Trust, in its contract, insisted on procuring its own equipment with funds
provided by SAC. NPA provided a list detailing vehicles and equipment required to
SAC, which was to handle the procurement. SAC, however, opted to buy a different
and cheaper vehicle than that stipulated and not equipped for the operating
environment in Angola, forcing NPA to have the vehicles fitted locally with features
required under its SOPs.50 This did not delay the start of data collection but proved a
costly and time-consuming distraction from core survey issues.
The 18-page survey questionnaire is one of the most elaborate ever used in an LIS and
also broke new ground with amendments introduced by stakeholders. Its
preparation, however, dragged on for more than six months. Discussions between
stakeholders started in late 2003 and led to agreement on the need for a number of
changes to the questionnaire. The original questionnaire, for example, did not include
any questions about roads, which, in the context of Angola, are of critical importance.
Then SAC distributed a questionnaire in March 2004 that omitted some of the agreed
amendments. Discussions continued with stakeholders until May, when a new
questionnaire was issued. By then, HALO Trust had completed its survey of most of
Huambo province with the previous questionnaire. Once the changes were agreed,
HALO had to resurvey the area already covered, involving some 130 communities,
using the new questionnaire. This represented eight days, or 80 survey team days, of
additional work.51
Unlike other impact surveys implemented by a single organisation, SAC agreed to a
HALO Trust proposal that it take advantage of the impact survey process to collect
technical data. This included polygon mapping of suspected minefields, giving
turning points and a perimeter, but did not extend to area reduction. HALO used
existing, survey-trained staff for the task and has found that collecting the extra data
has not added significantly to the time teams need to spend at any given location or
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50 Information provided by NPA Luanda. Vehicle deficiencies identified by NPA included the
lack of features regarded as basic requirements for operating in Angola, including a bumper
or grill capable of supporting a KODAM radio aerial, lack of a second fuel tank and lack of
either a hook or winch.
51 Information provided by HALO Trust, 19 August 2004.
slowed down survey implementation. It argues that the extra time invested in
acquiring what might be deemed “Level 1.5” data giving a more precise outline of
minefield locations will represent a significant saving later by precluding the need to
undertake a full technical survey before proceeding to clearance. 
HALO Trust, however, is the only implementing partner to be undertaking this level
of data collection and no provision was made for publishing its technical findings in
the final LIS report. The IMSMA database in CNIDAH needed another module to
accommodate polygon data and CNIDAH staff lacked the training to process it.
Among other implementing partners, some needed to recruit extra staff to carry out
the survey and did not have time to train them in technical data collection. Some were
sceptical of the value of producing maps of minefield perimeters based on estimates
rather than area reduction. 
Early findings of the Angolan LIS meanwhile have sharpened the long-running
debate on how the LIS impact scoring system needs to be refined to address local
conditions more accurately.52 Key issues include the weighting given by the scoring
system to blockages of agricultural land and mine/UXO contamination of
infrastructure such as roads and power lines. Operators produce numerous examples
of how the system as presently structured cannot capture the reality of the impact that
mines and UXO have on the community.53 The default scoring system gives a value to
blockages of land and water sources that is not necessarily appropriate to conditions
in Angola, with its vast tracts of sparsely populated land and plentiful water.
Similarly, surveyed communities may consider themselves not directly affected by
mine/UXO contamination of roads or power lines that are outside their immediate
locality but of importance to the provincial or national economy. Among the
unresolved issues in the LIS was whether SAC or the operators would have
responsibility for analysing the survey data collected.
The results of HALO Trust's survey of Huambo province, the first provincial survey
to be completed, highlight the issues. The province is one of the most densely
populated and in the past three years has recorded one of the highest mine/UXO
casualty rates. Applying the default scoring system, the Huambo survey found only
three communities to be highly impacted, another 27 to be medium impact and 112 to
be low impact.54 “Anyone who knows the country knows that doesn't reflect reality,”
was the comment of one demining agency staffer, echoed by a number of
interviewees. By comparison, the 1996-98 General Survey in Huambo had identified
193 minefields in the province of which 121 were deemed by surveyors to be high-risk.
Still, SAC found that applying scoring systems giving different weightings to
blockages made little difference to the number of high-impact communities, although
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52 The default scoring system assigns two points for the presence of mines, one point for
UXO, two points for each recent victim and ten more points divided between a range of
different blockages. 
53 Two examples from Moxico province: parts of the population in the town of Luau are
living within a minefield, but houses, which are the only blockage, are not assigned a high
score in the system. Without recent victims, therefore, a community that by any rational
criteria rates as a priority clearance task would emerge as a low-impact community. In
Cazomobo, three districts which include suspected mined areas have had no recent victims
and will similarly appear as low impact, but these are districts to which families returning to
the area will be directed to settle.
54 Information provided by SAC Coordinator, Uli Tietze, 23 August 2004.
it did produce significant variations in the numbers of medium- and low-impact
communities.55
The Huambo survey also drew attention to another key issue for the Angolan LIS:
access. Angola has few all-weather roads, and after three decades of war, most of its
roads are in extremely poor condition and hundreds of bridges have been destroyed
in the course of fighting. In the November to March rainy season, many secondary
roads become impassable. Many roads cannot be travelled on because they are mined.
From the outset of the LIS there have been questions whether survey teams would be
able to access enough communities to produce a sufficiently comprehensive
assessment of mine/UXO impacts. Huambo province is relatively well served by roads
yet even there, working in the dry season, HALO Trust found 138 localities
inaccessible, 87 of them cut off by mined roads.56 In other provinces, particularly in
the rainy season, access promised to be substantially more difficult, raising the
question of whether SAC would find time and money for survey teams to return to
these areas. 
The matter of access is one of several that pose a larger question about the merits of
proceeding with the Angola LIS at this time or whether the survey would have
benefited from a delay of one or two years. In this debate, the advantage of acting
swiftly to produce a report that would accelerate preparation of a national strategic
plan has to be weighed against the possibility that delay would have allowed the
survey to take place in conditions that allowed the collection of more comprehensive,
better quality data. Delay would have given survey teams improved access as roads
became accessible by clearance or opened up by bridge repairs.
Another key issue in this debate is the quality of data available to surveyors given the
large-scale movements of internally displaced people that have occurred within the
country in the two years since the end of the civil war and the large number of
refugees in neighbouring countries who have or are about to return to Angola.57 This
has two important consequences. 
First, assessments of landmine impacts and clearance needs quickly become out of
date in areas where new population movements and settlements create new socio-
economic needs and development priorities. 
Second, newly settled communities lack sufficient knowledge of their locality to
provide quality data to an impact survey. In Malanje, the first province surveyed by
NPA, senior survey staff expressed “real fear that we are not getting good data from
the villagers”. NPA was concerned by what appeared to be under-reporting of mine
contamination. It appears villagers were reluctant to identify roads as mined for fear
that the roads would then be closed to delivery of humanitarian assistance. NPA had
found significant discrepancies between the information villagers provided to survey
teams about mining of roads and the information obtained from a variety of sources
by UNOCHA and the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOR). The data recorded in
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57 As of 25 August 2004, UNHCR estimated that 239,154 Angolan refugees had returned
home since the signing of the April 2002 peace agreement and 201,846 remained in the main
countries of asylum. It expected repatriation of the remaining refugees abroad to be
completed by the end of 2005.
IMSMA, however, was the data obtained by survey teams. Still, the UN Quality
Assurance Monitor's initial finding was that the number of false negative and false
positive responses was not excessive compared with other impact surveys.58
An IMSMA database has been created in CNIDAH to store data collected by the LIS.
Although entry of LIS data is under the supervision of SAC's database officer, the
work is performed by CNIDAH operators. Therefore it remained unclear how, or if,
data such as the minefield polygon maps produced by HALO Trust would be used. 
The CNIDAH database team also maintains the former INAROEE database as the
repository of operational data. No mechanism or procedure had been established for
synchronising the two. As a result, mine/UXO clearance reports were being entered
only in the INAROEE database, creating a risk that the LIS would continue to record
hazards that had already been removed and would thus be out of date before it was
completed. To avoid this, it had been proposed that clearance reports should be filed
in IMSMA format to allow the LIS database to stay current.
Unmet needs
The LIS was described by one observer with detailed knowledge of Angola and mine
action there as akin to putting a Rolls Royce engine into a Fiat 500. Angola in general
– and CNIDAH in particular – remain acutely short of technical skills. SAC did not
make any provision for training. Even if CNIDAH acquires the data from the LIS, the
systems and structures to use it for analysis or planning within CNIDAH are limited. 
CNIDAH needs training not only for operators in specific tasks of data entry and
management but also for senior management in data analysis. The precise skills
required are to be the subject of a study conducted by the Cranfield Mine Action Unit
from Cranfield University. Once the study is completed a decision will be needed on
who is to pay for it. Without such skills, the full potential of the LIS for planning and
prioritising mine action – in other words full value for the considerable expense – will
not be realised.
The problem is not confined to CNIDAH or its operations in the capital.
Responsibility for mine action tasking and prioritising belongs to provincial
administrations, specifically to deputy governors. But the skills deficit is even more
challenging outside Luanda. Provincial administrations now operate with only the
most rudimentary resources in terms of personnel and equipment. Most do not have
computers, much less staff who know how to use them for even elementary tasks. 
CNIDAH's mandate is to coordinate the measures to deal with mines and UXO taken
by nine ministries and other government departments but it does not extend to
provincial administrations which, under a government programme of
decentralisation, have been given responsibility for prioritising mine clearance tasks.
Provincial administrations, however, lack the experience or expertise to fulfil this
function. CNIDAH's mandate needs to be revised to ensure it also plays a
coordinating role in planning and prioritising.
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Conclusions and findings
Angola is among the least surveyed of countries exposed to severe mine
contamination so any well-conducted survey exercise will yield useful data. However,
it also presents a set of particular physical features: an enormous area of land, sparse
population and weak road and communications infrastructure. These give rise to
particular needs. In general, land and water are not in short supply and in much of the
country mine/UXO contamination does not pose a major obstacle to accessing these
resources. The poor state of roads and the disruption of transport by often small
clusters of mines, in contrast, is a major obstacle for the movement of people, the
delivery of humanitarian and other services, the recovery of commerce and political
stabilisation. 
Amid continuing debate about the availability of donor financing, the logical
approach for a country such as Angola and for the stakeholders in mine action would
be to identify what types of information about mines it most needs as it emerges from
three decades of conflict, and which of the available types of survey would most cost-
effectively provide it. After a decade of mine action, the decisions on survey activity
emerge from a more haphazard process, often shaped as much by what individual
organisations can find donor funding for as by the needs and priorities of the country.
Angola, which has recent experience of a general survey and is in the process of
undertaking an impact survey, will provide an interesting point of comparison for
weighing the relative merits of each. The 1995-98 General Survey, although
incomplete, proved a valuable resource to international agencies working in the
provinces. It included detailed reports of road conditions and surveyors' assessments
of the high, medium or low priority of hazards. And, although overtaken by four
years of war in which new mines were laid, it continues to provide a reference point
for operators because of the locational data it provides on mines and UXO. 
The Angolan LIS, the biggest and most expensive landmine impact survey undertaken
in the world so far, takes a community-focused approach and will have less precise
information on roads but will in some provinces collect technical data on hazard
locations that may preclude the need for technical survey before clearance. The
measure of its success will depend ultimately on the extent to which it provides – and
is used as – a reliable tool for planning and prioritising mine clearance and helps to
integrate mine action into the government's broader social and economic
development plans.
It would have been difficult for a single organisation to complete the survey in an
acceptable time frame and at an acceptable cost. But SAC's decision to employ
operators already active in Angola to carry it out has worked sufficiently to the
advantage of both the survey and the operators as to suggest the formula should be
adopted for subsequent impact surveys unless particular circumstances make that
impractical.
The timing of the LIS appears to have been dictated more by the availability of donor
funds than by a consideration of whether prevailing conditions in the country met
basic requirements for its implementation. The survey addresses an urgent need in
Angola for national baseline data. Moreover, SAC's “can-do” approach to making it
happen had the merit of helping to catalyse action that might otherwise have dragged
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on for years. Against this, it is questionable whether any institution in Angola is yet
equipped to make full use of the LIS. A delay of one to two years would arguably have
allowed time to better prepare the institutional infrastructure in mine action,
particularly in the provinces. It would also have allowed the survey to take place after
the population movements which are now under way. These can impair the quality of
collected data and can quickly render survey findings on the impact of contamination
out of date. Repair of roads and bridges in the interim would also have enhanced
access. 
The involvement of stakeholders in discussions on the questionnaire resulted in what
operators are satisfied is a much improved survey instrument compared with those
employed elsewhere. The Angolan survey also provides an opportunity to discuss
and amend the LIS scoring system, which has long been a subject of debate in the mine
action community but is a conspicuously weak tool for measuring socio-economic
impacts of mines/UXO in the environment and conditions that apply in Angola. 
Although SAC conferred with CNIDAH in the planning stages of the LIS, CNIDAH –
and other stakeholders among the international agencies and NGOs – felt insufficient
attention was paid to consulting it. This does not appear to have damaged the project,
which has received strong and effective support from CNIDAH president General
Petroff in particular, but attention needs to be paid to developing an Angolan sense of
ownership at national and provincial levels to ensure optimum use is made of the
product.
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Annex. A chronology of mine action in Angola
1991
Bicesse accords between the government and UNITA open the way for
both sides to start mine clearance but, poorly organised and resourced,
demining teams are able to make little impact.
1992 Humanitarian demining begins with Kap Anamur of Germany in Cuneneprovince
1994
Lusaka accords concluded. United Nations deploys 7,000 troops, including
engineers, who undertake some demining. 
NPA, HALO Trust and MAG begin working in Angola. 
The UN sets up a Central Mine Action Office to coordinate mine action.
1995
Mechem awarded a US$6.5 million contract by the UN to clear/check 4,500
kilometres of road.
Government issues a decree setting up INAROEE to conduct and
coordinate mine action.
UNAVEM opens a mine action training school.
NPA begins a general survey of Angola.
1997
Government signs an agreement with the UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs under which UNDP will undertake a US$25 million, two-year
programme to provide INAROEE with technical and management support. 
1998 War resumes forcing suspension of the NPA survey and leading to the layingof more landmines.
2001
Government sets up CNIDAH to take over from INAROEE the role of
regulator and coordinator. INAROEE'S demining teams are cut in size due to
lack of funds, some are absorbed into INAD. 
2002 UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi killed, the peace process resumes and mineaction gains fresh momentum.
2003 Landmine Impact Survey coordinated by Survey Action Center starts.
2004 Government signs an MoU with SAC for implementation of the LIS, which isnow to include INAD as an implementing partner in two northern provinces
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Chapter 3
The case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Laurence Desvignes and Jussi Hanimaki
General background
Background to the conflict, economy and society
Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic country, created after the 1914-18 War and composed of
ethnic and religious groups that had been historical rivals, even bitter enemies,
including the Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Catholics) and ethnic Albanians
(Muslims). During the 1939-45 War, Josip Broz Tito led a fierce resistance movement
against German occupation and, after Germany's defeat, created the Socialist Republic
of Yugoslavia by merging Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, and Slovenia, along with two self-governing provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
Tito's death in May 1980, and the consequent absence of strong leadership of the
country, led to economic and political chaos.
By 1991, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had reached an estimated
4.3 million, divided into three main ethnic groups: 44 per cent Bosniak (Bosnian
Muslim), 31 per cent Serb, and 17 per cent Croat. While ethnic communities in the
cities were intermingled, rural communities were more mono-ethnic (but often
sharing a border with a different mono-ethic community).
The economy of BiH was diversified, despite being one of the less-developed
Yugoslav republics, with industrial production built on substantial energy, mineral
and forestry reserves contributing around half the gross national product. Although a
significant proportion of the population was rural, agriculture remained poorly




In the early 1990s, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, a number of
Yugoslavia's constituent republics, including BiH, declared independence from the
Serb-dominated authorities in Belgrade, resulting in three years of inter-ethnic
conflict. During the war, hostilities were conducted mainly by three distinct armies:
the Bosnian government army (ARBiH), the Bosnian Croat army (HVO) and the
Bosnian Serb army (VRS). The war destroyed the country's economy and
infrastructure, caused the death of about 200,000 people and displaced half of the
population.
In 1994, Bosnian Croats and Muslims agreed to a cease-fire and established a
federation. This new alliance failed to stop the Serbs from attacking Muslim towns. In
response to a massacre of thousands of Muslim civilians in Srebrenica, the US led a
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) bombing campaign of Serbian artillery
positions across Bosnia. In November 1995, the General Framework Agreement for
Peace (GFAP, or Dayton Agreement), was signed by representatives of Bosnia, Croatia
and Serbia partitioning BiH into the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Serb Republika Srpska (RS). There is also a third,
independently administered entity, the District of Brcko, in north-eastern BiH.
After the Dayton Agreement, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London
in December 1995. It resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and international organisations sponsoring and
directing the peace implementation process.60
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The Agreement called for democratic elections and the prosecution of war criminals.
It also established the position of the High Representative representing the
international community. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) has been
designated as the final authority to interpret the agreement on the civilian
implementation of the peace settlement. Most recently, in December 2004, the OHR
intervened to jail several policemen in RS accused of protecting war criminals.
In 1996, the implementation of the military aspect of the Peace Agreement was being
carried out by the 60,000-strong, NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). Its
objective was to create a secure environment for political and civil reconstruction.
IFOR was succeeded by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR troop levels
were reduced to approximately 12,000 by 2002) whose mission was to deter renewed
hostilities.61 In early December 2004, the European Union took over the NATO-led
international peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and SFOR was
replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR). As of writing, EUFOR consisted of
7,200 troops. Although peaceful, the region remains ethnically divided and
economically depressed (official unemployment in the fall of 2004 was approximately
40 per cent).62
BiH has received a substantial inflow of international aid to rebuild the country and
implement economic reforms to transform BiH into a functioning, self-sustainable
market economy. Annual assistance flows averaged some US$750 million from 1996 to
2002, equivalent to around 10 per cent of GDP, bringing the total actual aid
disbursement to US$5.6 billion. Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) and
other foreign assistance accounts for 20-25 per cent of BiH's economic growth. As of
early 2005, BiH remained, to a substantial degree, dependent on external economic aid
and in the midst of transition from socialism to capitalism. This, in addition to general
recovery from the war, remains the main challenge for the country.
The nature of contamination and its impact
Bosnia and Herzegovina has the largest mine and UXO contamination problem in
south-eastern Europe. During the war the three armies relied heavily on the use of
mines as a deterrent against incursions. It is estimated that, at the end of the war,
combatants had emplaced more than 18,000 minefields,63 concentrated along former
confrontation lines and around housing, public buildings and key infrastructure.64 A
general needs assessment survey conducted in June 1994 by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 41 communities  revealed that landmine
incidents had occurred in 36 communities65 (87 per cent of those surveyed). It also
indicated that landmine contamination had severely affected agricultural production
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61 Blagden et al. (2004).
62 These figures are estimates and do not take into account the impact of a “grey economy”
that would probably reduce the unemployment figures to around 25 per cent. It should also
be noted that unlike the Federation, RS does not provide monthly unemployment statistics.
63 In 2001, the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) estimated that the total number might be as
high as 30,000. (ICBL, 2001).
64 These were sometimes for defensive purposes, but often laid to deny access to other ethnic
groups.
65 Nine regions of central BiH were targeted by the survey.
in 17 communities, and that access to land had been reduced by 20 to 50 per cent by
landmines.66
Under the Dayton Agreement, the armies were required to “lift” their mines from the
Zone of Separation67 and other areas from which their forces were withdrawn, to
mark other minefields, and to provide minefield maps and records. Mine lifting did
not meet international clearance standards and resulted in a reduced, but still
unacceptable residual hazard to civilians. Minefield maps and records were often
unreliable and a number of fields had never been properly mapped. As a result, BiH
was left with extensive but often low density minefields in urban, suburban and rural
areas, as well as considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).
Mine action in Bosnia thus faces special problems. First, few areas of the country were
and are deemed completely safe68 – including those in which mines had been lifted by
the militaries. Second, many of the approaches used elsewhere for technical survey
(TS) are not useful in BiH;69 as a result TS is a very recent activity in BiH (starting in
2003). Third, the decentralised political make-up of the country and continued ethnic
distrust between the two major entities (FBiH and RS), made it virtually impossible to
launch a coordinated nationwide mine action programme. 
Demining, by any standards, has been slow. By the end of 2001 only 34 square
kilometres of land had been cleared to humanitarian standards – less than 1 per cent
of the area initially suspected of contamination. In addition, a significant and,
apparently, growing proportion of clearance tasks that were undertaken had
discovered no landmines or UXO: a waste of scarce resources symptomatic of the
specific nature of BiH's landmine contamination problem. 
The most recent estimates provide a slightly more optimistic picture of the extent of
contamination. Still, the database at the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
(BHMAC) indicates that there are more than 670,000 mines and 650,000 items of UXO
spread over roughly 10,000 locations. The total contaminated area was estimated in
December 2004 to cover roughly 2,000 square kilometres, equivalent to more than 4
per cent of the territory.
More than 1.3 million people (roughly a quarter of the total estimated population of
the country) live in the impacted communities; of these, 100,000 reside in communities
identified by the LIS as high impact areas. Villages and smaller units, including many
farms and seasonal communities, make up 1,169 (85 per cent) of the total; many of
these rural communities are near the former front lines. Figure 1 indicates the nature
of contamination by district and region.
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66 The World Bank (1996).
67 A belt two kilometres wide on each side of the inter-entity boundary line.
68 This is due to the frequent use of landmines by militias for ethnic cleansing purposes, and
to their continued use after the war to discourage returning refugees. Landmines were
readily available as BiH had a number of munitions factories prior to the war, and there was
widespread knowledge about how to use landmines as this was taught at secondary school.
(Mitchell, 2004) Also, most young men had to perform military service during which they
would receive some basic training on deploying landmines.
69 For example, test lanes are unlikely to help in determining the boundary of the area that
should be cleared when there may be only a handful of mines or UXO per hectare.
Figure 1. Mine-affected communities in FBiH and regions in RS
The effects of landmine contamination are indicated by victim data. The LIS – using
data collected by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – reported that
most of the 129 victims (casualties in 2002 and 2003) were killed or injured during
agricultural activities and that non-agricultural land such as forest areas, pasture and
areas for food collection or hunting are the most frequently blocked resources.
Particularly in rural areas frustration levels are high and out of sheer economic
necessity people are willing to take risks that sometimes lead to serious, sometimes
fatal, accidents.
Still, there is some reason to hope that progress is being made. From 1992 to October
2004, 4,857 landmine and UXO casualties were reported by the ICRC (of which 56 per
cent were military). Of these, 1,511, including 424 fatalities, occurred after the
cessation of hostilities. The yearly number of victims has significantly decreased from
632 in 1996 to 72 in 2002 and 32 from January to October 2004. Thus, as can be seen in
Table 1, the average monthly number of victims has come down from more than 50 in
1996 to slightly more than three in 2004.










2004(to Oct. 1) 32 (12)
Total 1,511 (424)
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70 ICRC (2004), up to October 2004.
While landmine contamination continues to negatively affect the recovery of BiH from
a war that ended almost a decade ago, the BiH Mine Action Strategy has now been
revised. Instead of a country free of mines, the best-case scenario envisaged is that the
country will be “landmine-impact-free” by 2010.71
History of the mine action programme
According to a GICHD study,72 mine action in Bosnia has gone through three principal
phases:
1. The initial rush to respond, when a number of donors established programmes
to address humanitarian and priority reconstruction requirements, and to build
long-term capacity.
2. The first efforts by the donor community and local authorities to create Bosnian
structures to oversee and coordinate a more integrated mine action programme,
which ended in crisis.
3. The current status of the programme reflects a recent second effort to establish
an adequate legal framework and management structure, both to restore donor
confidence and to provide a foundation for devising and executing a strategy to
make Bosnia free from the worst impacts of mine contamination within the
foreseeable future.
1. The initial post-war period, 1995-1997
After the Dayton Agreement, mine action depended mainly on the international
community. The three entity armies conducted some mine lifting under the
supervision of IFOR while most of the other early initiatives focused on developing
basic capacities for humanitarian demining. Lacking a coherent overall strategy,
however, the early mine action in BiH consisted mainly of stand-alone initiatives.
In May 1996, the UN established its mine action centre (UNMAC) to coordinate mine
action, supervise the development of national bodies and develop local capacities. It
initially focused on directly managing clearance and survey teams as an emergency
response. The US State Department supported the initial establishment of UNMAC
and three regional MACs, survey and clearance training as well as a mine detection
dog programme by contracting RONCO, a commercial firm, at a cost of US$3.5
million. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) also established a large demining programme
and provided its own training. The World Bank, the European Commission (EC) and
other donors dedicated significant funding to survey and clearance operations as a
support to reconstruction and resettlement programmes. 
By 1997, the EC had provided equipment and training for deminers and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams,73 while the US was delivering a programme to train
personnel from the Entity Armed Forces (EAF)74 in demining. The number of persons
holding basic humanitarian demining qualifications rose from near zero at the start of
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71 Survey Action Center/BHMAC (2004)
72 “Chapter 2: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in GICHD (2005).
73 The EC contracted (a) BACTEC International to train and establish nine EOD teams (four
persons each) and (b) DSL to train and establish 18 demining teams (12 persons each).
74 After Dayton, the three armies were merged into two: one for FBiH (Croat-Bosniak), the
other for RS (Serb).
1996 to more than 1,200 by the end of 1998 (with the EAF in charge of the bulk of the
training).
Demining in BiH was partially commercialised at an early stage. The EC, for example,
contracted two commercial companies (BACTEC and DSL) to train and equip the
demining authorities in FBiH and RS. In July 1996, the World Bank approved the
Emergency Landmines Clearance Project (ELCP) that supported clearance,
reconstruction and resettlement projects.75 The ELCP was administered through
Project Implementation Units (PIUs) which worked with the MACs in both entities.76
The PIUs awarded contracts to commercial firms based on competitive tenders.
By 1997, BiH had, in effect, the first national mine action programme in which funding
came from abroad and clearance was to be done principally on a commercial basis
(through a series of competitive tenders).77 The US also issued a second contract to
RONCO in late 1996 to undertake full demining operations with three “brigades” of
deminers, which eventually evolved into three, ethnically separate, commercial
demining companies.
Immediately after the Dayton Agreement, mine action in BiH benefited from
widespread external interest and support but suffered from a lack of a coherent
strategy. Despite a plethora of activity, demining was done on a piecemeal basis, often
through private companies operating for profit. This was clearly not the best way to
deal with the scale of landmine and UXO contamination in BiH.
2. The search for a centralised structure, 1997-200278
The need for a more coordinated programme under the control of local authorities
was soon acknowledged. At its December 1996 meeting in London, the Peace
Implementation Council called for:
¾ The establishment of a national authority to channel donor resources to the entity
Mine Action Centres;
¾ A central database and mapping facility; and
¾ Clear standards for mine clearance operations. 
In January 1997, to meet the first of these challenges, the Council of Ministers
appointed a three-member Demining Commission (DC). In October of that year, the
State government and the Board of Donors79 agreed to replace UNMAC with the
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC).80 At the same time, the entity
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75 The World Bank and other major donors – notably the US – also included funds for mine
survey and clearance within the budgets of the large infrastructure reconstruction projects.
International companies generally managed the demining components of these projects, but
often sub-contracted specific tasks to local demining firms.
76 Initially, both the Federation and RS established mine action centres that reported to the
respective entity governments and not to the UNMAC. 
77 Most mine clearance was done by commercial companies in Kuwait's post-Gulf War
clearance programme, but this was financed by Kuwait. 
78 Much of the information in this section from the entry for BiH in ICBL (2004), available at:
www.icbl.org/lm/2004/bosnia.en.
79 This is the coordination body for donors supporting mine action in Bosnia.
80 The formal handover of responsibility from UNMAC to BHCD and BHMAC occurred in
July 1998.
governments agreed to integrate their Mine Action Centres and PIUs “within a
defined legal framework … acceptable to the Board of Donors.”81
Despite these steps, throughout the late-1990s mine action in BiH continued to suffer
from a number of problems, including:
¾ Many international organisations being involved with overlapping mandates but
often with very different objectives and motivations;
¾ The difficulty of establishing a civilian demining authority and programme
management structure in a country that lacked a constitutional framework for
effective governance or delivery of public service programmes, and that remained
profoundly divided along ethnic lines; 
¾ The difficulty of building a commercial demining capacity in a country that lacked
either (i) a sound public procurement system, or (ii) governance traditions that
distinguished between State institutions and the party in power;82
¾ Poor cooperation among the BH, FBiH and RS MACs;
¾ The high cost of mine clearance;
¾ Limited attention by the entity armies to demining; and
¾ The spread of corruption that turned off donors.
In 1998, a number of attempts were made to address some of these problems, as
follows:
¾ The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) was
established by the Slovenian government and became the principal vehicle for
channelling donor funds to Bosnia's mine action programme (the US also agreed to
match funds channelled through the ITF).
¾ UNHCR established six demining teams that surveyed, marked and cleared
minority return areas and worked to strengthen demining activities via existing
institutions (e.g. MAC, Entity Civil Protection Authorities (CP).83 UNHCR stopped
its demining programme at the end of 1999.
¾ The EU started providing equipment and training for the Entity CP Authorities. By
the end of 2000 the Civil Protection authorities in FBiH and RS were independent
government services reporting directly to the Entity Prime Ministers.
¾ BHMAC replaced UNMAC; however, the two Entity MACs and BHMAC were
expected to carry out coordination, including standardisation of policy and
procedures e.g. establishment of standards, accreditation, certification, etc., and
management of a mine action database without having effective authority. 
¾ The first phase of UNDP support to build MAC capacities was initiated and
extended into 2000.
¾ EAF started humanitarian demining under SFOR supervision.
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81 Demining in Bosnia Herzegovina after 1 January 98 – Agreed Principles (30 October 1997), cited
in GICHD (2005).
82 As GICHD (2005) reports, in many cases, the parties in power were also intimately
connected with jingoistic ethnic groups that wanted to force a break-up of the country, and
with criminal syndicates that financed the parties and the ethnic extremists in return for
virtual immunity.
83 Both FBiH and RS have their own Civil Protection (CP) Authorities; independent
government agencies that are charged with issues related to “civil protection” (including
participating in humanitarian demining). In 2002, for example, CP authorities cleared 11 per
cent of the total cleared area (Entity Armies, Commercial Companies and NGOs cleared 22,
30, and 37 per cent respectively).
However, the initial loosely-coordinated response, allegations of corruption, poor
coordination and management within the MAC structure, the lack of a coherent
strategy to build local capacity of the MAC, and the increasingly high costs of
clearance led to the early closure of the World Bank's Emergency Landmine Clearance
Project and the dismissal of the Demining Commission by the High Representative in
2000 (on suspicion of corruption).
A new Commission was appointed in 2001 and a Demining Law was finally enacted
in 2002 by the BiH Parliament, giving BHMAC authority over both entity MACs.
3. The current status of the programme
BHMAC and coordination
Since 2002, mine action in BiH has become far more centralised with the Ministry for
Civil Affairs having the leading role in mine action. BHMAC has established itself as
a State-level body and organises
¾ Training courses for staff members; 
¾Working groups with other organisations on daily activities and strategic planning,
revision of the national demining strategy, finalisation of SOPs and standards;
¾ A system moving towards coordination of all aspects of mine action. 
Meanwhile, other actors continued building local capacities, in particular for the EAF
(supported by SFOR, since December 2004 by EUFOR), and the Civil Protection forces
(supported by the EU and UNICEF). A training centre was established in 2002,
including UXO clearance training and, as of 2003, the Civil Protection initiated mine
risk education (MRE) training courses with UNICEF support. 
In 2003, a strategic plan and four different annual work plans (for BHMAC, the two
Entity MACs and Brcko district) were prepared and the quality assurance (QA)
system was changed and harmonised with the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) for all demining tasks (e.g. clearance, technical surveys). On 1 June 2003, the
Demining Commission adopted new national mine action standards and the first
SOPs for humanitarian demining. 
The replacement of a UN structure with a centralised national one has resulted in
significant improvement at policy and operational levels. By the end of 2004, BHMAC
was:
¾ In firm control of national planning through the production of a Demining Strategy
and annual plans;
¾ Regulating mine action through quality assurance mechanisms (national standards,
SOPs, basic and senior management training standards, etc.); 
¾ Acting as a resource information centre (information management, e.g. of surveys,
database, mapping, etc.); and had
¾ Established a system for determining priorities and guaranteeing the quality of
work (prioritisation, accreditation and certification systems). 
BHMAC's enhanced role and expertise is recognised by all stakeholders. Donor
institutions such as the ITF generally rely on BHMAC expertise or seek its approval
before funding a mine action project. The system is now working almost without
foreign technical advisers (only three remain out of an initial 47) and BHMAC profits
from a competent and skilled staff.
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National strategy
In October 2004, the Council of Ministers approved the revised Mine Action Strategy
for 2005-09, the original one having been approved in 2003. The strategy is a result of
an extensive review process involving two strategic planning groups and
representatives of all national, non-governmental and international stakeholders.84
The National Demining Strategy calls for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be free of the
impact of mines and UXO by 2009 and defines an integrated plan of mine action with
all the components – humanitarian demining, mine risk education and victim
assistance. The strategy for humanitarian demining is based on: (a) the results from
the LIS and Task Assessment projects (see below) and (b) on BHMAC's own
categorisation of suspect areas through systematic survey as:
Priority 1: land in regular civilian use or land required for refugees or IDP return,
infrastructure renewal or other economic projects (9 per cent of total suspect area); 
Priority 2: close to land categorised as Priority 1 as well as land in temporary use
such as agricultural and forestry land (28 per cent); and 
Priority 3: all other areas (63 per cent).
The cross-referencing of these results produced the picture of landmine
contamination in BiH set out in Table 2:




at start of 2005
(sq km)
Priority 1 area Priority 2 area Priority 3 area
Total suspected area








176.91 336.86 574.15 1,087.92
Low impacted





326.27 648.31 1,025.42 2,000.0
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84 Two groups were created to implement the review process strategy: 
1. A strategic planning group (with the Demining Commission as the chair and key decision-
makers as members, i.e. UNICEF, UNDP, OHR, OSCE, EU and BHMAC representatives.
2. A strategic planning working group defining strategic goals and objectives with relevant
organisations (Ministry of Education, InterSoS, NPA, Handicap International, Help (a
German clearance NGO) and others are members and the BHMAC serves as chair). Two
subgroups were created following the first meeting: one technical working group on MRE
and one technical working group on victim assistance (with mainly local organisations as
members and government representatives). 
85 According to BHMAC (2004c: 4).
In terms of demining (as set out in Figure 2 below), the strategic plan calls for the
reduction of suspect area by 716.39 square kilometres by the end of 2008. The plan
foresees that Priority 1 areas in highly impacted communities will be completely
eliminated in this period, while the reduction percentage in medium impacted
communities will be 47.97 per cent and low impacted communities 76.70 per cent. The
reduction will take place through systematic survey (see below), general survey,
technical survey, clearance and marking. 
Figure 2. BiH mine action strategy86
BHMAC has also included the Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) Process as a
major part of the national strategy for the future. Basically, the process calls for the
annual preparation of 25 community mine action plans – in high impacted areas – by
BHMAC. These plans integrate the three major aspects of mine action – humanitarian
demining, MRE and VA – at a community level which are then to be implemented by
the various actors (EAF, CP, NGOs). However, as of writing, only one such plan was
actually being implemented (in the Ulice Brcko district, by NPA).
Along with a more centralised national decision-making and planning structure, local
stakeholders have taken a slightly more important role in all fields of mine action. In
2003, for example, the Army and Civil Protection (CP) authorities were responsible for
approximately 29 per cent of humanitarian demining activities; in the first nine
months of 2004 this had risen to 33 per cent. The trend is likely to continue, partly as
a result of strategic decisions, partly due to the diminishing interest of donors. MRE
activities are conducted through the public education system, CP and various NGOs,
while victim assistance – the least developed area of mine action – remains
predominantly the purview of the social services, international organisations (notably
the ICRC) and NGOs (especially Handicap International).
BiH remains heavily dependent on international assistance for mine action funding.
In 2003 the ITF and UNDP were responsible for nearly US$13 million of international
funding. In the same year, 11 governments (as well as the EC and NATO) provided
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86 Task Assessment and Planning Process, Powerpoint presentation, BHMAC, November
2004.
about US$10.4 million for mine action, while BiH sources (national, entity level, local
and municipal) provided a total of US$7.46 million (an increase from US$5.06 million
in 2002).87
The continued dependence on external and non-governmental actors is also evident
at the operational level. In 2003, the total area cleared in BiH was 6,411,947 square
metres (i.e. nearly six-and-a-half square kilometres). CP and Entity Armies were
responsible for less than one third of this total; the rest was cleared by 13 NGOs and
17 commercial companies. 
Thus, on the one hand, mine action in BiH has become more centrally coordinated
under the firmer control of national authorities, which is reflected in the National
Strategy and BHMAC's increasingly pivotal role. On the other hand – given the
depressed state of the economy, the continued coordination problems posed by
political and ethnic divisions, the presence of numerous actors, as well as the
persistent (and projected) problems with external funding88 – the prospect that BiH
will, in fact, be “landmine-impact-free” by 2010 is far from certain.
Overview of surveys 
At the end of the war and under the Dayton Agreement, the armies in the country had
an obligation to submit all minefields records and maps to IFOR. Unfortunately, the
information covered only about 60 per cent of known minefields. Further information
had to be collected from a number of sources, particularly the local population living
close to minefields and those who had been involved in laying mines during the war.
Mine action in BiH, as described above, has gone through a series of organisational
crises and changes that have further contributed to the confused nature of attempts to
quantify the true extent of mine and UXO contamination. The sheer number of
stakeholders engaged in collecting information; the political, religious and ethnic
divisions of the country; and the nature of the problem – low density contamination
spread over a large geographical area – have all contributed to difficulties in making
a proper assessment of the nature of the challenge. These difficulties will become
apparent as we look in detail at some of the various surveys conducted in BiH (see
Table 3), starting with general surveys. Because of their relative significance for
present and future mine action in BiH, the LIS, the related Task Assessment and
Planning (see below), and technical surveys will be discussed more thoroughly than
other types of surveys.
General surveys
General surveys were initiated in 1997 to identify suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
in BiH and to improve overall control of technical field operations by the various
demining organisations (who were themselves conducting limited general surveys for
their own purposes). Since 1998, BHMAC has taken charge of the general survey
process. 
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87 See: www.icbl.org/lm/2004/bosnia.en.
88 The need for additional funds for the strategy rises from about KM2.5 million (approx. US$1.5 million)
in 2006 to KM25.2 million (approx. US$15 million) in 2008. (BHMAC 2004b: 18).
Date Type of survey Objectives
1997 General survey by demining
organisations.
Technical tasks (e.g. clearance) identification to
reduce suspected areas. Assessment of the overall
mine situation in country.
1998 Agreement for general survey
to be taken over completely by
BHMAC.
1999 Systematic survey by BHMAC
(can be related to the General
Assessment in IMAS) in the
Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Hazard area identification (polygons of suspected
areas). Broad overview of contaminated areas in
Bosnia and Herzegovina with more geographical
accuracy than general survey.
1999 General survey conducted by
BHMAC only.
2001 Task Impact Assessment by
NPA.
To ensure that tasks respond to NPA and local
authority priorities and have a positive impact on
communities.
2002/2003 Landmine Impact Survey (final
report August 2004) by
Handicap International/SAC.
To determine the impact of mines/UXO on
communities using socio-economic indicators.
2003 Systematic survey initiated in
Republika Sprska.
Hazard area identification (polygons of suspected
areas). Broad overview of contaminated areas in
BiH with more geographical accuracy than general
survey. Linkages with systematic survey in the
Federation.
2003/2004 Technical Survey by
organisations.
To confirm more finitely clearance tasks. To reduced
contaminated areas in a timely and cost-effective
manner.
2003/2004 Task Assessment and Planning
(TAP) by BHMAC/SAC.
To define Integrated Mine Action Plan for Highly
Impacted Communities.
2003 Knowledge, Attitude and
Practices (KAP) survey by ICRC
(based on the evaluation of
MRE programmes in Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo).
To increase the effectiveness of MRE programmes to
meet the needs of affected communities.
2003/04 Victim Assistance Survey by
Handicap International.
To provide information on victim assistance
resources and gaps in order to elaborate a
comprehensive long-term strategy for landmine
victim assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2004 MRE survey by Handicap
International.
To elaborate strategic options for integration of MRE
into the school curriculum in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and for the harmonisation of
curriculum.
2004 MRE survey by InterSoS. To assess the perceptions
2004 MRE survey by Genesis. To identify the current level of mine/UXO knowledge
and awareness among school children and
schoolteachers.To analyse local communities needs
and design and/or improve methodologies
2004 MRE survey by Proni. To assess the existing needs and capacities to plan
effective and integrated mine action intervention at
community level
Forthcoming Planned survey for media by
BHMAC/UNICEF.
To identify training needs for local media as regards
mine action issues with a view to ensure their
effective participation in the circulation of
information relevant to risk management.
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Table 3. Chronological list of surveys of BiH
A general survey identifies the nature of the technical task in each SHA (i.e. the need
for a technical survey or to start demining). If an organisation decides to conduct the
technical task, a Red Folder, prepared by BHMAC, is handed over to the relevant
organisation (including maps, photos, basic data on the location, an operational plan
and details on the socio-economic impact of the plan). 
BHMAC general surveys provide overlapping information with the LIS but, due to
limited capacity, have been conducted only in Priority 1 areas. There were around 20
surveyors in 1998 and this number increased to 40 in 2004. Surveyors in charge of
general survey also attended a demining training course so that they could carry out
“secondary” inspection when needed. (There are around 30 inspectors controlling
ground operations, and, in total, 70 staff members are familiar with the process of
general survey.) General surveys permit a good overall picture of the mine and UXO
situation, can be used to reduce suspected areas, and can help in defining a national
demining strategy. In BiH, it is the basic reference point for any mine action by the
Entity Armed Forces.
Some demining organisations, such as NPA, consider general surveys unreliable.
Thus, NPA conducts a short re-survey before starting technical survey, does its own
mapping (ordinary land measurement methods), and has its own database to keep
track of activities and tasks carried out.
Systematic surveys
Systematic survey started in the FBiH in 1999 and in RS in 2003. Overlapping with
general surveys, systematic surveys give more accurate information on SHAs and have
resulted in the reduction of the size and number of SHAs in the Federation by more
than 50 per cent. Systematic survey is the main method of reducing SHAs in BiH.
Systematic survey provides, through polygons of suspected areas, precise
geographical data on contaminated areas, and has contributed to the elaboration of
BHMAC's mine action strategy and the determination of operational plans. Much like
general surveys, systematic surveys provide some overlapping information with the
LIS (see below).
Technical surveys in BiH
Agency Demining organisations and institutions
Client BHMAC
Type Technical Survey
Objectives To determine the exact boundaries of contaminated areas. To reduce
contaminated areas in a timely and cost-effective manner)
Dates/duration 2003 to date (ongoing)
Scope National




Based on general survey, systematic survey, and LIS information from BHMAC
Cost Depending on agencies carrying out the task. Strategic Plan for 2005, approx.
US$8.5 million
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Expressed need for the survey
As clearance of all suspected areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina will take time and
availability of funds is limited, it was essential to find a way to reduce contaminated
areas to their real boundaries in a timely and cost-effective manner. Technical survey
was introduced in 2003 as a partial answer to this need. 
Objectives of the surveys
¾ To distinguish within SHAs between areas to be cleared and “Areas Without
Obvious Risk” (AWOR) that could be returned to civilian use.
Implementation
As part of the general survey process, surveyors go to the field and collect information
on contaminated areas. If one area is suspected to be dangerous but the presence of
landmines is unsure, it will be targeted for technical survey. A priority list for technical
surveys and for clearance tasks was established for 2004 (and for 2005) and adopted
by the Entity Governments and Brcko district. In general, the plan is to increase the
size of the area targeted for technical survey in the future, in part by integrating
technical survey into the community mine action plans being developed annually. The
first areas targeted are high impact communities (as defined by the LIS).
Usually, if there is a clear indication of mines during a general survey, then a technical
survey is conducted to reduce the size of the suspected area and to determine the exact
perimeter of the minefield. But in BiH, given the low density of mines and likelihood
of overlapping minefields, even if the general survey shows no indication of mines
(e.g. no visible mines, no accident etc.) in a suspected area, a technical survey may still
be necessary to avoid the potential of accidents from mines that were not detected
during general survey. BHMAC developed procedures on how to conduct technical
surveys (which could be called the final step or verification of general survey).
BHMAC has issued SOPs for technical survey (to cover differences in ground surfaces
and priority level) which are summarised in Annex 2.
Actual output
BHMAC's goal for 2004 was for 18.3 square kilometres to be cleared through technical
survey. As Table 4 demonstrates, the goal was nowhere near reached: less than 1
square kilometre had been “cleared” by technical survey during the year to October.
In addition to the nature of landmine contamination (low density, often located in
terrain that is difficult and time-consuming to survey), the main reason for the
shortfall is lack of accredited machines (16) within the seven implementing bodies and
organisations: technical survey has been conducted mainly by CP, the Entity Armies
and some NGOs (with NPA having the most significant TS capacity).
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Table 4. Size of technically surveyed areas in BiH, January-September 200489
Information management
Information from general survey, systematic survey and LIS is used to define the
technical tasks. Once the technical survey has been defined, then selected and
conducted by one organisation, the relevant data is entered into the BHMAC
database. A quality control certificate is then produced by BHMAC for the relevant
area, confirming to people which part of the land – declared as AWOR – can be used
for civilian activity and which part will be marked for clearance.
Post-clearance documentation will include the final report from the agency which
carried out the technical task, the technical project, minefields records, mine accidents,
mine lifting information, surveyed/cleared areas, relevant maps, the quality control
certificate, etc.
Outcomes – use of survey output
Ideally, at the operation level, technical survey, by reducing the contaminated areas,
speeds up the clearance process and therefore saves resources, time and lives. Given
the recent introduction of technical survey in BiH – and the shortfall in meeting actual
goals – it is difficult to estimate the actual outcome. Nevertheless, certainly in the
Brcko area where NPA is implementing the TAP, technical survey has successfully
speeded up the clearance process.90
Technical surveys are recognised as an increasingly significant part of the overall BiH
mine action strategy for the remainder of this decade. They will be conducted in two
ways:
¾ As part of integrated community mine action plans (e.g. Brcko/NPA); and
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¾ As individual projects that help eliminate high impact areas or enable access to (use
of) economically significant resources.
The shortfall in 2004 led to a revision of the size of technical survey areas within the
BiH Strategic Plan. Nevertheless, technical survey area is slated for an increase as
follows (in square kilometres):
¾ 2005: 6.5;
¾ 2006: 11.7;
¾ 2007: 16.5; and
¾ 2008: 18.0.91
While the use of TS makes eminent sense as a method of speeding up the continued
reduction of the size of the SHAs in BiH, the experience so far indicates that there are
two inter-related problems.
First, as already indicated, at the moment organisations active in BiH don't have
enough accredited machines necessary for conducting technical survey at an
accelerated rate. Thus, a major investment in such machinery is needed if the targets
set in the Mine Action Strategy are to be reached.  Given the expected outcome – more
land released for civilian use faster than through actual clearance – such an
investment seems worthwhile, particularly in areas where a partial release would
make a significant impact on the local economy.
Second, securing adequate funding may prove difficult. The BiH Mine Action Strategy
calls for an increase not only in the size of the area targeted for TS, but also – naturally
– for an increasingly sizeable proportion of resources devoted to humanitarian
demining to be devoted to technical survey. In 2006, the plan is to have more funds
devoted to technical survey than clearance. In 2005-2008 more than half of the
resources for humanitarian demining are to go to technical survey.92
However, from a donor perspective, technical surveys are less attractive to fund as
they do not directly result in the practical destruction of mines and UXO, but rather
in the confirmation that there are no mines or UXO in the suspected areas. Although
donors are aware that technical surveys will lead to good demining projects, they are
usually more interested in funding physical demining activities. A partial answer to
this problem may yet be offered by integrated community mine action plans that
include technical survey as one element.
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The BiH Landmine Impact Survey
Expressed need for the survey
The Survey Action Center has been implementing impact surveys worldwide since
1998 (a total of ten had been completed at the time of writing). In June 2000, SAC
conducted a fact-finding mission to BiH to study the feasibility of an LIS. SAC
developed a country plan and first presented the project to BHMAC in 2001. After an
SAC Advance Survey Mission to BiH in March 2002, an agreement to conduct an LIS
was reached between BHMAC and SAC. Through a tendering process, Handicap
International was selected to carry out the project and the LIS was formally initiated
in October 2002.
The agreement took time because of scepticism about the utility of the LIS for a
country that had already been covered by several surveys. But the need for an
authoritative dataset that could be used to refine the BiH mine action strategy – and
pressure from outside donors who wanted a comprehensive picture of the mine/UXO
problem and who were frustrated by the slow process of clearance – pushed BHMAC
to accept the proposal for an LIS. 
It is clear that the survey was not conducted for purely informational purposes but
also as a way of securing continued outside interest in mine action in the country.
(Indeed, ITF and NPA felt that the LIS should have been performed soon after the end
of the conflict and not seven years later, so that an adequate strategy could have been
implemented earlier.)93
This is not to say that the LIS did not respond to a real need for information. For
example, the NPA representative interviewed complained of the poor quality of
general surveys conducted in BiH. Others (e.g. members of SFOR) echoed these
sentiments maintaining that the LIS was “money well spent”.94
Agency Handicap International/Survey Action Center (SAC)
Client BHMAC
Type Landmine Impact Survey (LIS)
Objectives To define the socio-economic impact of mines/UXO at communitylevel; to improve national planning and effectiveness of mine action.
Dates/duration October 2002-December 2003 (and four-month extension). Finallyreleased August 2004.
Scope National
Focus Socio-economic impact of mines and UXO within communities.
Information
management





(Co-funders: US – US$999,000; EC – US$852,000; Canada – US$156,000)
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Objectives of the survey
¾ Define the scale and socio-economic impact of landmine contamination in BiH;
¾ Provide a reliable national database to be used in future mine action planning; and
¾ Establish baseline data for measuring the overall performance of the mine action
programme.95
Planned outputs
The major planned output of the LIS was a comprehensive study of the socio-
economic impact on communities of mine/UXO contamination, with three general
components: 
¾ Information on mine and UXO victims and general behavioural patterns;
¾ General information on topography, infrastructure, conflict history and threat; and
¾ Information on the socio-economic impact of mines and UXO on affected
communities.
The LIS was to provide the three major partners of mine action – national authorities
(mainly BHMAC), donors and implementing agencies – with a common database of
the needs of the primary stakeholders: the local communities. The database would
give national authorities the ability to manipulate data in a transparent way
responsive to national priorities. Donors (via the ITF) would have data conforming to
international standards, and implementing partners (e.g. NPA) would have detailed
information for tasking resources and measuring progress across all areas of mine
action. 
Handicap International implemented the survey in accordance with the principles
and operating protocols established by the Survey Working Group (SWG). Data
collection  started in March 2003 and was completed in October 2003.96
HI established five regional offices in regular contact with the regional MACs. Sixty
people worked on the project, including two SAC international staff members. Five
regional coordinators, supported by five assistants, supervised and monitored the
project. Sixteen two-person surveyor teams implemented the LIS at field level and
were supported by an operational coordinator, a data quality officer and nine other
support staff in Sarajevo.  A total of 23 vehicles supported the operations. 
BHMAC and Civil Defence/Civil Protection (CD/CP) provided the HI team with
extensive support, including coordination and liaison at regional and municipal level.
Four meetings were organised with the Demining Commission during
implementation. Meetings were also organised with the ITF and US representatives.
More than 2,900 (out of a total of 6,146) communities in BiH were visited by HI. A total
of 1,366 were identified as affected by mines and UXO.
The survey had four phases: (1) a preliminary expert opinion collection phase to
define the number of communities to be surveyed; (2) the actual surveying of
communities selected; (3) a smaller-scale complementary survey phase; and (4) a
negative sampling phase. 
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Phase I: Expert opinion collection.
Seven sources of expertise were contacted: BHMAC, mine action coordinators at
municipal level, Civil Protection, NPA, the ICRC, the Landmine Survivors Network
and the OHR. The list of 6,146 communities was handed to them and the
“experts”were requested to provide feedback on which communities were affected.
The responses were used to select the communities to be visited by the LIS teams.
Phase II: Survey implementation by LIS teams.
Phase III: Complementary survey.
To ensure that all affected communities were targeted (the villagers might not always
know everything), HI used BHMAC maps and overlapped them with selected
communities: 668 additional communities were identified and 10 per cent were
selected and visited (67 communities).
Phase IV: Sampling.
In the last phase, a sampling of non-suspected (and non-visited) areas was made. Of
3,211 non-suspected areas, 312 were visited and 10 communities were found to be
affected.
A four-month extension was required to complete the project (with US$156,000 of
funding from the Canadian International Development Agency – CIDA). This resulted
in a delay in the production of the report, which was finalised in the spring of 2004.
UN certification was received in August 2004 and the final version was then
distributed to stakeholders.
In addition to the four phases above, a Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) pilot
project was incorporated into the LIS. With fieldwork conducted in two phases in
August and September 2003 by BHMAC, the TAP project provided more detailed
information on eight high-impact communities (and 38 SHAs within such
communities). TAP is discussed in detail below. 
Actual output
According to its executive summary, the major conclusion “relevant to mine action” of
the Landmine Impact Survey, Bosnia and Herzegovina was that the impact of mine
contamination was particularly severe on communities engaged in agricultural
pursuits near the former frontlines. This was hardly a new finding but rather
confirmed the general facts already known. The LIS results are indicated in the map
below.
To define the scale, type, location, hazard and social/economic impacts of mine
contamination in BiH, the LIS categorises individual communities – based on the level
of the socio-economic impact of contamination – into high, medium or low impact. To
do this the LIS used the “mine impact score” to take into account:
¾ The nature of munitions in the SHA (presence of mines/UXO);
¾ The types of livelihood and institutional areas to which mines are blocking access
(cropland, community's pasture, water points, non-cultivated area, housing area,
roads, other infrastructure such as schools and hospitals); and
¾ The number of “recent” victims of mine incidents (i.e. those killed or injured in the
previous 24 months before the passage of the survey team in the community).
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The presence of any of the above gave a community a score of 1 (in most categories)
or 2 (presence of mines, blockage to irrigated cropland, recent mine victims – 2 for
each victim). These scores were then tabulated to arrive at the categorisation of
communities as high (score of 11 and above), medium (6-10), or low (1-5) impact.
In the final stage of the LIS (and in accordance with protocols set by the SWG), the
generic scoring system was modified to meet the country-specific needs of BiH by
allowing local authorities – BHMAC and its regional representatives, the Demining
Commission, CP/CD – to set specific “weights” to most of the indicators used in
calculating the mine impact score.97
In the end, the LIS identified 1,366 mine-impacted communities in 128 municipalities
of the total of 148 in BiH. Contamination amounted to 2,134 distinct mine- and UXO-
contaminated sites. The survey covered 92 per cent of all suspected communities in
BiH (the other 8 per cent had been excluded after phase I) and 10 per cent of non-
suspected communities as a false negative sample. 
Of the 1,366 affected communities, 154 (11 per cent) were categorised as high impact,,
696 (51 per cent) as medium impact and 516 (38 per cent) as low impact. Before the
national authorities' weighting the number of high and medium impact communities
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Landmine Impact Survey, Bosnia and Herzegovina
was lower (3 per cent high impact, 45 per cent medium, and 52 per cent low) than it
was thereafter.98
Information management
Once collected, the data was coded and entered into the IMSMA database for analysis.
All data entry was carried out at BHMAC offices. BHMAC has the IMSMA database
as well as its own database but both databases have not been integrated, an issue
which is still being addressed.
The Quality Management System included internal quality control based on the ISO
9000:2000 Standard and external UN Quality Assurance Monitoring (there were two
QAM interventions in 2003, one before data collection began and the other during the
collection phase).
Outcomes, potential outcomes, and shortcomings
The LIS ranking into high, medium and low impacted communities is key information
for national and strategic planning purposes. While the LIS hardly challenged any of
the well-known general facts about the nature of land contamination in BiH – e.g. that
the country suffers from a low density of mines spread over a wide area – BHMAC
used LIS data to revise the BiH National Demining Strategy for 2005-2009. This
process started in August 2003 and SAC subcontracted Cranfield Mine Action and
GeoSpatial International to assist BHMAC.99 The work was completed in October 2004
when the Council of Ministers formally approved the Revised Mine Action Strategy.100
The LIS provided, though, only part of the information used to refine this strategy.
For example, the humanitarian demining part of the revised Demining Strategy is
based on cross-referencing the LIS results (high-, medium- and low-impact
communities) with the BHMAC prioritisation of clearance (first, second and third
priority areas). Logically, high-impact communities in first priority areas will be
targeted first – the long-term goal is to eliminate contamination in such areas in BiH
by 2009.
In terms of macro-level planning, the timing of the LIS was in fact fortuitous: the new
demining law of 2002 centralised mine action planning into the hands of BHMAC,
and the LIS gave an additional means of devising short-, medium- and long-term
strategic plans at the national level. By acting as an important element for the revision
of BiH mine action strategies and assisting BHMAC to refine its priorities, the LIS was
also extremely useful for enhancing coordination of mine action in BiH. All
stakeholders interviewed expressed satisfaction with the results and with the follow-
up towards integrated community mine action. The results of the survey also
rekindled the interests of donors in supporting mine action in BiH. Thus, according to
the ITF, donors who had been disillusioned in the late 1990s were showing a renewed
interest in BiH in 2004.101
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In practice this means that the LIS has proved useful. But was it worth the cost of more
than US$2 million?  Two points should be stressed: first, the information provided by
the LIS was not entirely new; second, the information overlapped with previous
findings. At best, one can conclude that the LIS helped refine mine action strategy in
BiH; at worst, one can characterise at as unnecessary and costly effort that overlapped
with already existing surveys. Either way, the LIS's practical significance is marginal
rather than decisive for the future of mine action in BiH.
In this context, the following serious shortcoming, as described by BHMAC, is worthy
of note:
¾ Comparison of the results of the systematic survey and LIS results, led to overall
conclusion that… LIS did not identify all impacted communities… Final
examination shows that 70.13 per cent of suspected area is inside the impacted
communities, or 29.87 per cent is outside the identified communities.102
This is a serious shortcoming representing almost one third of the suspected area in
BiH and calls into question the actual reliability of the LIS. AS BHMAC puts it: “LIS
results are a representative sample of the distribution of suspect area according to
impacted communities and categories of priority in 1,366 identified communities.”
But, as noted above, the LIS “missed” a large number of suspected communities
(potentially as many as 600).  Representative does not, in short, mean comprehensive.  
The map below identifies the overlap between BHMAC data in 2002 and LIS findings.
Mine Survey Comparison 2002-2003103
A summary of results from the LIS is set out in Table 5. The method of negative
sampling used in the survey further undermines the claims to comprehensiveness.
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Roughly 3 per cent of communities not suspected to have landmines were actually
found to be contaminated. Because only a proportion of non-suspected communities
were sampled, it is possible that there may be close to 100 similar (falsely assumed not
to be contaminated by landmines) communities in BiH.
The explanation for the “missing” communities is that they were not selected in the
expert opinion collection phase of the LIS. To achieve 100 per cent accuracy, these
results would therefore need to be reviewed.
Table 5. LIS summary of results, including negative sampling
Such shortcomings notwithstanding, the representatives of all stakeholders
interviewed for this study expressed at least lukewarm satisfaction with the LIS as an
important and authoritative tool for prioritising the future use of resources available
for all aspects of mine action in BiH.
But while the LIS proved useful for strategic purposes – it was, one authority put it,
highly accurate on a “strategic level” – the survey was relatively meaningless on the
micro “operational” level.104 In other words, the LIS did not generate sufficiently
precise geographical data to be used to devise specific mine action plans at the
community level.
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Task Assessment and Planning
Expressed need for the TAP
During the LIS, BHMAC acknowledged the need to establish more links with the
affected communities in order to better target mine action interventions. A Task
Assessment and Planning (TAP) pilot project was subsequently undertaken in order
to link the results of the LIS with operational mine action in BiH, and to use this as a
basis for developing a more advanced mine action assessment and planning model
at the micro-level. The TAP was considered necessary, as one BHMAC representative
put it, to make the LIS “real”.105
Objectives of the survey
¾ To link the results of the LIS with operational mine action in BiH and to use this as
a basis for developing a more advanced mine action assessment and planning
model at the micro level;
¾ To provide better planning information at community and SHA levels to define
what kind of mine action activities should be conducted in targeted communities
(initially in high-impact communities); and
¾ To provide information in order to reduce the level of impact of mines and UXO on
affected communities.
Planned outputs
¾ Pilot project report;
¾ A Community Action Plan for each community visited including: basic information
on community (from the LIS); information from the general survey on the relevant
targeted high-impacted community, systematic survey's map and boundaries of
local community; mine action plan; expectations from the plan; estimated costs to
carry out the plan, etc.; and
¾ Evaluation report at the conclusion of the project.
Agency Survey Action Center (SAC)/BHMAC
Client BHMAC
Type Task Assessment and Planning (TAP)
Objectives To determine appropriate mine action activities in
impacted communities
Dates/duration Summer 2003-January 2004: Pilot Project: 2004
onwards: implementation
Scope (national provincial etc.) National but targeting 154 high impacted
communities initially
Focus Integrated mine action plan according to
communities' needs
Information management BHMAC database; SAC for pilot project; Information
analysis along with LIS, general survey and systematic
survey data.
Cost The pilot project funded from the overall budget for
the LIS (ca. US$16,000); the cost of subsequent
community projects unknown at the time of writing 
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Implementation
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in May 2003 between BHMAC and
SAC to carry out the TAP. In July 2003, BHMAC selected 15 communities for the pilot
project – all defined as high-impact communities in the LIS – in cooperation with
Handicap International and from a review of available data obtained through the
various surveys. Also in July a preparation seminar was held for operational officers
from BHMAC regional offices who then returned to their posts to train the survey
teams.
Fieldwork took place in two phases, the first (August 2003) in eight selected
communities (with a total of 38 SHAs as defined in LIS), the second (September 2003)
in seven selected communities (with 16 SHAs).
During the first phase, however, almost twice as many surveys were actually
conducted in the eight affected communities as had been originally planned. As a
result, the first phase was extended and it was agreed that only eight high-impact
communities would be targeted in the pilot project. A total of eight mine action plans
were completed, translated into English, and sent to the SAC which approved the
pilot project and produced a final report in January 2004. Simultaneously, however,
BHMAC went ahead and conducted TAPs in the other seven communities,
independent of its contractual obligations to SAC.
Two evaluation meetings were held, in September 2003 (to present the results of the
TAP in the eight affected communities) and in November 2003 (to focus on project
methodology with an emphasis on population classification, problems with
estimating the likelihood of minefields, definition of potential benefits, and ways of
integrating mine action components). 
Actual output
The final TAP pilot project report was included as an annex to the LIS.106
A total of 25 community mine action plans based on the TAP model were in the process
of being produced for high impact communities in 2004 and another 25 annually
thereafter. NPA started implementing a TAP in the Brcko District in 2004 (see below).
Information management
Information from systematic survey, LIS, general survey, BHMAC database, etc. was
initially used to select the high-impact communities in which the TAP pilot project
was conducted.
The MAC operation officers at regional level – the TAP focal points – coordinated the
collection of data and data analysis to prepare community mine action plans (from
initially eight impacted communities).
Those plans and related information were sent to the SAC, which analysed the
information, approved the pilot project and produced a final report in January 2004.
In August 2004 TAP, along with LIS, received UN certification.
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Outcomes and potential outcomes – the use of survey results
TAP has become the basis for a new BiH-wide model of priority-setting in mine action
at the community level and is the prototype for future similar surveys in high-impact
communities. TAP represents the general move of BiH mine action strategy towards
integration of all mine action components at the community level. Flowing from the
LIS, TAP focuses on the socio-economic impact of mine risk and potential benefits for
the at-risk community. Moreover, rather than focusing on the pure clearance of risk
areas (risk elimination), the focus is shifting to risk reduction and risk impact
reduction. 
In 2004, NPA commenced its TAP project in Brcko district and another six have so far
been approved for implementation starting in 2005. BHMAC prepared 24 TAPs – also
referred to as Community Mine Action Plans – in 2004 and another 25 are slated for
preparation in 2005. In short, TAP is used to connect all mine action components
(survey, reduction, clearance, mine risk education, marking, victim assistance) and
integrate them into a series of micro-level plans.
From 2004 onward, the TAP procedure has been adopted for other impacted
communities. BHMAC is standardising the TAP, training operational and
management staff, and continuing with fieldwork and integration of all mine action at
community level. Initially, the TAP will focus on the 154 high-impact communities
defined by the LIS. 
Task Assessment and Planning Process, 2004-2005107
One (and so far the only) “living” example of a TAP (at least four others were due to
be initiated with the start of the demining season in 2005) is the NPA's TAP project in
the community of Ulice in the district of Brcko. Independently administered, on the
front lines of the three armies during the war, and a site of relatively frequent
landmine incidents (due to a high rate of returnees), Brcko remained heavily
contaminated after the war (in 2003 BHMAC estimated that mines/UXO covered
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about 12 per cent of Brcko – in comparison to 1.6 per cent in RS and 6 per cent in
Federation).108
NPA's Integrated Community Mine Action plan in Brcko, initiated in May 2004 and
expected to be finished in 2005, includes, as set out below: 14 technical survey projects
(covering ca. 1,807,780 square metres), eight mine clearance projects (300,271 square
metres), permanent marking and MRE.  The total area covered by the project is
2,107,051 square metres.
Brcko district NPA TAP project
Given that only one TAP is currently under way and none have been completed, it is
difficult to measure the success of the TAP process at the moment. One can safely
assume that, based on NPA experience in Brcko, TAP will have a positive impact at the
community level. However, while progress towards the reduction of landmine
contamination in BiH will undoubtedly be more focussed it will not necessarily
proceed any faster. 
While the TAP model is a worthwhile and relatively inexpensive process, making the
actual selection process will be difficult and depend often on the “attractiveness” of
each project to donors. Thus, the TAP/Community Mine Action projects will be
divided into two tiers: 
¾ Communities where success is relatively easier to “prove” and achieve – for
example, in much of Brcko the terrain is flat, making the district relatively easy for
demining activities – and will attract donors.  
¾ Other communities that do not attract outside funding as easily and will become
the “domain” of local government actors (entity armies, CP).
Mine risk education surveys
From October 2001 to April 2002, there was an external evaluation of ICRC's mine
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awareness programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.109 The
evaluation included a survey on the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) of people
towards mine/UXO dangers.110 A manual analysis of the survey results of 1,546
respondents was produced by ICRC Sarajevo and presented to all relevant
stakeholders in the country in 2003. 
The data from the ICRC evaluation – along with the LIS – became the baseline for
BHMAC and other MRE bodies to define target groups, types of activities and areas
where MRE should be implemented. The first annual MRE national plan was
approved in mid-2003 by the Demining Commission and integrated into the national
strategy in 2004.
In 2004, Handicap International, InterSoS, Proni and Genesis – all supported by
UNICEF – carried out a number of specific MRE surveys: 
¾ Handicap International's survey, in April to August 2004, assessed previous
experiences in MRE and measured awareness and knowledge among pupils, school
directors and teachers. Based on the LIS categorisation of communities, the MRE
Survey covered 166 primary and secondary schools in high (1/3), medium (1/2) and
low (1/6) impacted areas. MRE questionnaires were filled by 2,692 pupils, 530
teachers and 59 school directors.
¾ The Genesis (a local NGO) MRE survey also targeted schoolchildren and teachers. 
¾ The Proni (a local NGO) and InterSoS (an Italian NGO) surveys focused on mine
awareness at the community level. Former Handicap International staff members
employed to carry out the LIS were hired to carry out the InterSoS MRE survey so that
skills and experiences in conducting interviews were not lost.
The information from these surveys is being used to define the best strategies for
Community Mine Action Plans. According to Handicap International, their survey
indicated a generally good level of awareness about mines and UXO, but found that
this did not translate into risk-averse behavioural patterns.111
MRE surveys have focused on activities within the educational system. But relatively
little is known about the MRE needs, successes and activities outside the educational
sector. The LIS devoted little attention to MRE, yet one of its findings was that less
than one quarter of the 1,366 impacted communities reported MRE activities outside
schools (and only 26 per cent in schools). There is a need for information of the MRE
needs of adult populations (particularly in rural areas where most landmine incidents
take place) and the best methods of reaching such populations.
Victim assistance survey
Victim assistance has been the least focused mine action activity in BiH. Direct
support to mine victims has been established by international organisations (notably
the ICRC) on an ad hoc basis while the two entity governments' social and healthcare
policies are to provide assistance to persons with disabilities (including landmine
victims). 
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Since 2002, a consistent effort has been made to define a coherent nationwide victim
assistance strategy. In September 2003, BHMAC initiated regular landmine victims'
assistance meetings. Simultaneously, Handicap International (with UNICEF support)
conducted a survey of resources and long-term needs for victim assistance on behalf
of BHMAC. The initial report was presented at a workshop in Sarajevo in November
2003 and distributed in printed form in December 2003. The report – essentially a
“desktop survey” of the state of victim assistance in BiH that built on information
from, among others, the LIS and the ICRC – analysed the legislative framework,
existing programmes and information sources. It recommended: 
¾ Establishment of a Landmine Victim Assistance Information and Research System; 
¾ Improved coordination between stakeholders; 
¾ Strengthening BiH's rehabilitation care system; 
¾ Harmonisation of access to that care system; and 
¾ Promotion of employment to mine victims. 
These recommendations were included in the revised BiH Mine Action Strategy
adopted in October 2004.112
Other surveys
UNICEF and BHMAC are planning a media survey to identify the training needs of
local media with a view to improving community access to information on mine risks.
As of writing, this survey remained in the planning stage.113
Conclusions
BiH is probably the most intensely surveyed of the countries included in this study.
Although some surveys are overlapping (e.g. elements of the BHMAC general and
systematic surveys and the LIS survey) BiH does not suffer from a lack of easily
accessible survey data. Yet, despite millions of dollars spent on uncovering the extent
of landmine contamination in BiH, the progress of actual landmine clearance and
reduction of the size and number of SHAs has been slow. Roughly 2000 square
kilometres remains contaminated at the beginning of 2005; in 2002 the total suspected
area was 2,089 square kilometres.
This – inevitably frustrating – situation is a result of a combination of factors. First,
data remains incomplete. No survey has provided 100 per cent coverage of the
country. Moreover, continued survey efforts have identified new SHAs over the past
few years – in other words, better information has often increased the size of the
suspect area.  Second, data is in some cases redundant: the LIS, for example, did not
unearth “new” information but rather pinpointed areas of greater need for
humanitarian mine action.  So, instead having “priority” areas/communities (as was
the case prior to the LIS results) there are now also areas defined by the “level of
impact”. Third, some surveys seem to have produced contradictory results; about 30
per cent of areas defined as “dangerous” by BHMAC, for example, do not have
“impacted” communities according to the LIS. But, presumably, the dangerous areas
(unless cleared) are no less dangerous today than they were prior to the LIS. In
addition, there is a problem of resources. Numerous interviewees expressed a
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112 Handicap International 2003.
113 Interview with Nathalie Provost, UNICEF/BHMAC, November 2004.
sentiment that can be summed up as follows: “We (roughly) know where the mines
are, but we don't have the capacity to clear them.”
Of the surveys discussed in detail above, the LIS stands out as the most
comprehensive effort to grasp the entirety of the impact of landmine contamination.
Given the recent changes in BiH Mine Action Strategy it is tempting – and several
interviewees echoed this sentiment – to argue that the LIS (or something similar to it)
should have been conducted years earlier. Indeed, one of the essential shortcomings
in the post-Dayton mine action in BiH was a lack of accurate data that resulted in ad
hoc demining efforts and, often, a waste of resources. However, while a nationwide
survey in the immediate post-war period would probably have resulted in a more
effective demining programme, it would have been virtually impossible to overcome
the many obstacles – political and ethnic divisions chief among them – that remained
from the conflict.
But the fact remains that by 2002 when the LIS was started, the mine action
community in BiH was not enthusiastic about expending more money on surveying.
The main push for the LIS came from donors looking for a “neutral” assessment of
priorities. In the end, while LIS produced some new information its main impact has
been to boost outside interest in BiH landmine problem that has waned over the past
few years. In short, the LIS was undertaken as much, if not more, for strategic rather
than informational purposes, making the expense of more than US$2 million for the
LIS a questionable undertaking.
Somewhat ironically, the LIS categorisation of communities according to impact also
highlighted the need for more individualised surveys in order to address the specific
and varied needs of the many communities (in short: the 154 high-impact
communities may have very different priorities). In short: while the LIS used
“community” as the basic survey unit, it did not provide sufficiently accurate
information on the exact location of mines within those units.
The TAP process, begun in 2003, has been adopted as part of the national strategy to
answer this need. This raises another question about the validity of the LIS within BiH:
if it is necessary to proceed through yet another series of surveys at community level
before mine action can proceed, would it not have been more cost effective to skip the
LIS altogether? TAPs and Community Mine Action Plans could have been based upon
already existing general and systematic survey information lodged in the BHMAC
database.
All of the above is not to argue that the LIS was simply an expensive way of boosting
donor interest and highlighting the more central role of BHMAC in national planning.
For most of the post-war period, surveys in BiH focused on trying to map out the
actual locations of mines and UXO. Thus, information about the socio-economic
impact of landmines remained relatively sparse until the LIS. What the LIS has
provided is a reasonably reliable dataset of the socio-economic make-up of affected
communities. 
Despite a wealth of survey data, BiH still lacks a comprehensive post-clearance
evaluation system. At present, such surveys have been conducted infrequently, as
with  the Task Impact Assessments by NPA.  In fact, one of the findings of the pilot
TAP was that even the estimation of potential economic benefits of humanitarian
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demining for communities lacks adequate assessment criteria. More information is
needed about whether or not the land cleared is actually used for the benefit of the
local community in question.
In terms of MRE and Victim Assistance surveys, BiH has seen increased activity in
recent years. Yet, the surveys conducted so far have yielded only a partial picture of
the situation. In terms of MRE, surveys have focussed mainly on schoolchildren, thus
leaving the most risk prone part of the population (adult males in rural areas) largely
untouched. In victim assistance, the only nationwide survey was a desktop study
completed in December 2003.
Recommendations
In general, the major lesson from BiH has to do with the timing and execution of
nation-wide surveys. The only such survey in BiH is the 2002-3 LIS. Conducted seven
to eight years after the end of the conflict, the LIS was undertaken rather late and
provided often overlapping data with already existing surveys. While the BiH LIS
clearly addressed a strategic need, a chief (and obvious) recommendation for other
post-conflict situations is that nationwide survey should be conducted as soon as after
the end of hostilities.
As the LIS did not cover 100 per cent of the suspected areas, there is also a need to
revisit the first – expert opinion collection – phase of the survey.
In terms of specific recommendations for BiH, the following stand out:
1. The future focus of BiH survey activity relative to humanitarian demining should
be at the community (micro) level. This is, in fact, already being implemented
through the TAP process and the design of community mine action plans. However,
the methodology used seems to vary between communities and regions. Thus, a
review of such methodologies and additional training for local actors if necessary
should be conducted.
2. Technical survey capacity needs to be developed further. As technical survey is
designed to become an increasingly important part of BiH mine action in the future,
it is necessary that the capacities in this area are developed further. Already in 2004 it
was evident that the actual size of the area cleared by technical survey fell far short of
the declared goal. This is largely due to the lack of equipment and the relative novelty
of TS in BiH (since 2003).
3. BiH needs to develop a consistent post-evaluation strategy.
4. An MRE survey of non-school age (rural) population is needed. MRE is currently
being focused on by BHMAC. But based on what we know about the risks to different
portions of the population, the focus of survey (and general MRE) activity should be
on a different group of the population. With demining continuing at a slow pace, this
need must be addressed urgently.
5; BiH needs to develop a centralised victim data network. 
The recommendations are summarised in the following table.
80 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
SURVEY NEEDS/ SHORTCOMINGS RECOMMENDATIONS 
Landmine Impact Survey 
Some impacted communities were missed
(based on negative sampling)
Review “expert opinion” (phase 1) used to
exclude 3207 communities from the survey
Task Assessment and Planning (TAP)
Reliability of some results questioned due to
lack of consistency in methodology
applied
Standardisation of the methodology used
for TAP
Additional training and quality control 
Technical Survey
Capacity for technical survey is lacking
while its significance for BiH mine action is
increasing




Establishment of a central database system
(under BHMAC)including consistent follow-
up of the rehabilitation of mine victims 
(NB. As of 2005 assistance was to
coordinated by BHMAC and the first task
was to develop a centralised database)
MRE Surveys
Have mainly focused on the educational
system,  more data needed on adult
populations
A national review of MRE outside the school
system
A media survey (planned but not
conducted)
Post Clearance Evaluation
No systematic post-clearance evaluation
There is a persistent need to review the
effectiveness – particularly the socio-
economic impact – of demining activities.
(NB. A Post Clearance Evaluation is to be
incorporated in future Community Mine
Action Plans)
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YEAR MAIN EVENTS
1995 November – Signature of the Dayton Agreement, requiring removal of mines bywarring factions and exchange of minefield records.
1996 May – Creation of UNMAC and regional offices.
US State Department contracts RONCO to assist in set-up of MAC and regional
MACs, training of local personnel in clearance and survey, launching of an
Explosives Detection Dog project, establishment of a training school.
World Bank (PIU) and EC support clearance and survey for reconstruction and
resettlement programmes:
¾ Emergency Landmine Clearance Project established by the World Bank in July
launching competitive contracting and institutional development through PIU
¾ EC support to demining activities in both entities.
Other donors provide technical advisors to MAC or support international NGOs,
e.g. NPA and HELP, to start humanitarian demining.
Entity Armed Forces (EAF) conduct mine lifting under IFOR supervision (and with
US State Department support).
The Ministry of Education initiates MRE, along with the Red Cross, UNICEF and
some NGOs. Adhoc victim assistance activities initiated.
1997 Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in
December.
UNDP Trust Fund established to support capacity development.
A three-member Demining Commission is appointed by the Council of Ministers.
UNMAC/Board of Donors/Government agree to establish BHMAC.
Transfer of equipment and personnel supported by US/RONCO into 3
commercial companies (from each region).
1998 1 July – UNMAC transfer into a National MAC (BHMAC) with two Entity
MACs.Demining Commission under the authority of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
UNHCR six-team demining programme in support to refugee return programme.
First phase of UNDP support to BHMAC capacity development (until 2000).
EAF start humanitarian demining under SFOR supervision. EAF provide basic
training for all deminers.EC support to capacity building of Civil Protection
Authorities in both entities through HELP.
ITF established (US matching funds mechanism).
1999 1 March – Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a State Party to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention.
End of UNHCR demining project.
Second phase of European Union support to Civil Protection: transfer of
operational responsibility from HELP to Civil Protection.
General survey taken over entirely by BHMAC.
2000 Early closure of World Bank PIU due to allegations of corruption and otherproblems.
Dismissal of the Demining Commission by OHR.
Direct agreements established between the EC and the Civil Protection.
March – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process initiated by the
Government through the creation of a state-level joint coordinating body.
2001 New Demining Commission appointed.
Second phase of UNDP capacity development programme (2001-2003).
June – First draft of Bosnia and Herzegovina Development Strategy (PRSP I).
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Annex. Chronology of the mine action programme
Annex (continued)
2002 Demining Law endorsed by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government.
New BHMAC structure established with regional MACs under BHMAC authority.
National Demining Strategy being produced.
Capacity Building of Civil Protection (training centre for EOD) and EAF
strengthened.
Municipal/cantonal coordinators appointed in the Federation.
April – PRSP process began with BHMAC Deputy Director and RS MAC Director
coordinators of the Working Group on mine action (as part of the Medium-
Term Economic Development Strategy).
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) initiated.
December – Task and Planning Assessment (TAP) pilot project supported by
SAC.
2003 MRE capacity of Civil Protection supported by UNICEF/BHMAC.
BHMAC strategic planning and annual plans produced.Standards and SOPs
for clearance activities adopted by the Demining Commission.
National Demining Strategy (mine impact free by 2010) adopted by the CoM;
revision process started in August.
LIS implemented and extended into 2004.May – PRSP II drafted.
2004 LIS completedIMAP – phase 3 of UNDP support will run until 2008.
SOPs and standards for MRE and victim assistance being produced.
Technical survey process.
PRSP approved by CoM (February 2004), Presidency (March 2004) and
Parliament.
Revised National Demining Strategy adopted by CoM, 1 October .
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History of the conflict
The independence drive for the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) began in
the French colonial era, continued under Japanese occupation during the 1939-45 war
and thereafter when the French attempted to re-establish control over Indochina. The
1954 defeat of the French at Diem Bien Phu in
Vietnam, however, effectively signalled the
end of colonial aspirations in the region. 
In the absence of the French, an internal
power struggle in Lao PDR developed
between the Pathet Lao (PL), supported by the
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and the
Royal Lao Army (RLA) and Hmong
irregulars, sponsored by the United States of
America (US). Ground battles between these
forces were particularly intense in Luang
Phrabang and Xieng Khouang provinces,
which bordered the Pathet Lao stronghold
provinces of Phongsali and Houaphan,
though campaigns were waged throughout
the country – as far south as the provinces of
Champasak and Attapeu – and were often
accompanied by intense US air support for the
Hmong and RLA.
In addition to the civil war in Lao PDR, the
country was also drawn into a wider conflict
Figure 1. Air-strike data over
Indochina from US National Archives
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as the PAVN used a network of paths and roads through eastern Lao PDR to by-pass
the demilitarised zone in neighbouring Vietnam and bring supplies to support the
communist war effort in southern Vietnam. The US responded by conducting one of
the heaviest aerial bombardments in the history of warfare in an effort to stem this
logistical artery, known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The neutrality of the country, supposedly guaranteed by the 1962 Geneva Protocol,
was violated by both the Vietnamese and the Americans. For six years, the US termed
all its air operations over Lao PDR “reconnaissance flights”, even though Lao PDR,
between 1965 and 1973, was the recipient of two million tonnes of explosive ordnance
delivered in 580,344 bombing missions. Today, access to US combat activities reveals
that ordnance was dropped in vary degrees in most provinces covering an area of
87,213 square kilometres – out of a countrywide total of 236,800 square kilometres.114
In addition to air strikes, Southern Vietnamese troops with US support also invaded
eastern Lao PDR to confront North Vietnamese troop movements and to block supply
routes. The largest ground battle took place in the province of Savannakhet and
reportedly involved 60,000 South Vietnamese and 100,000 North Vietnamese army
troops.115
Explosive remnants from ground battles from the Indochina War, such as mortars,
artillery shells, grenades, rockets and landmines, remain a considerable problem in
many areas, but it is the unprecedented scale of the air-delivered ordnance such as
cluster bomblets and general purpose bombs that most contribute to the nationwide
contamination affecting the country today. Estimates of the percentages of air-
delivered ordnance that failed to detonate during deployment range from 10-30 per
114 UXO LAO (2003a).
115 Case Study Lao PDR in GICHD (2001). 
Figure 2b. 500lb bomb prepared for low
order demolition (Photo: UXO LAO)
Figure 2a. Blu 63, Phine District,
Savannakhet (Photo: UXO LAO)
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cent, which, considering the sheer magnitude of bombs dropped, leaves a
considerable legacy of the war. Clearance teams have found at least 120 different types
of ordnance scattered across Lao PDR, including 13 types of cluster bombs alone.116
Since the end of the 1975 war, other more localised conflicts have contributed on a
small scale to contamination in some areas of Lao PDR. A disputed border with
Thailand in Boten District of Xaignabouri led to intense fighting over the ownership
of three villages in the late 1980s. Other clashes have occurred as part of a long-
running dispute between the government and ethnic Hmong. Contamination in these
instances, however, is negligible compared to that caused by the fighting between
1964 and 1973, which gives Lao PDR the distinction of being the most heavily bombed
country in the world, per head of population.
According to a national socio-economic impact survey conducted by Handicap
International Belgium (HIB) and published in 1997, ten of the country's 18 provinces
are described as being “severely affected” by the presence of unexploded ordnance
(UXO),117 and a further five are considered to have “significant UXO contamination”. 
The HIB survey identified 2,861 villages, or 25 per cent
of all villages nationwide, that still contained items of
UXO. Anti-personnel bomblets were the most common
type of UXO reported in the survey, present in more
than half of the contaminated villages. Other ordnance
such as large bombs, varying from 100kg to 1,000kg, was
reported in 40 per cent of the villages, and mortars were
reported in 25 per cent of the villages.
The survey identified the presence of landmines in 214
villages, though mine contamination is typically
dwarfed by the extent of the UXO problem. This is
reflected by the UXO LAO 2003 operation statistics,
which show that mines only contribute to about 1 per
cent of the total number of items cleared.
US bombing data, released in the late 1990s, was used to calculate that 36.8 per cent of
the country's land area is affected by UXO, and 12,427 square kilometres, or 5.2 per
cent of the country, is considered high risk.118
In human terms, a figure of at least 11,000 accidents since 1975 is widely used with an
ongoing victim rate of about 140 casualties reported per year. Most observers, though,
believe that victim numbers are under-reported due to the limited surveillance system
existing today. 
The nature of UXO contamination
The nature of UXO contamination in Lao PDR presents considerable challenges for the































117 Identified as having one or more severely contaminated districts.
118 UXO LAO (2003b: 6).
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This relates to the characteristics of UXO contamination resulting from intense aerial
bombardment, which differs markedly from that caused by landmines.
“Standard” approaches to mine action tends to assume that contamination exists in
more or less discrete packages (e.g. minefields), that ordnance is present at or close to
the surface of the ground,119 and that much of its socio-economic impact can be
described in terms of “blocked access” or “land-denial”. These assumptions are not
necessarily applicable to Lao PDR – a fact that helps to understand both the context of
survey activities and the development of broader aspects of mine action in the
country.
Mapping of contamination
Physical boundaries of UXO contamination can rarely be defined into “discrete
packages” in the same way as many minefields. While high concentrations or hotspots
of contamination may occur, they typically exist within lower-risk areas of residual
contamination that are an artefact of the blanket bombing during the war. An inability,
in most instances, to effectively delineate or even estimate the boundaries of
contamination undermines the fundamentals of several traditional survey
approaches.
Depth of contamination
The depth of contamination as a result of air-dropped ordnance can be significantly
greater than typical depths of landmines, and hence contamination in Lao PDR can
exist up to several metres below the ground. Such buried ordnance complicates
standard approaches used in mine action – particularly since the impact of UXO on
current or planned land use activities is a function of the depth to which such
activities disturb the ground. 
For example, typical clearance approaches to support agriculture normally remove
only surface and shallow contamination. The same piece of land, however, may not be
119 Detectors are typically calibrated to 20 centimetres.
* Although this photograph was taken in Vietnam it illustrates the potential depth of UXO
contamination also present in Lao PDR.
Figure 3a. Cultivation activities typically disturb only the
top 30 centimetres of soil 
(Photo: Handicap International Belgium)
Figure 3b. UXO recovered
from a depth of four metres
(Photo: BOMICO *)
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deemed clear for any future development activities requiring greater ground
excavation, such as construction of irrigation channels, house-building, or
strengthening the transport system.
Contamination and land-denial 
The social and economic impact of landmines, particularly in terms of land-denial, has
been relatively well documented, but it is difficult to assert that analogous effects
result from UXO contamination.120 Although, in some places, UXO may also present
full blockages for development activities, the potential for partial use of land, such as
in cultivation around items of ordnance, is greater than in a minefield. 
Age of the contamination
Lao PDR today is described as being in a phase of “assisted development”; this is
characterised by a country receiving international assistance that is focused on longer-
term reconstruction and development programmes. Lao PDR is not in a period of
humanitarian emergency – indeed it is some 30 years since the end of the conflict and
10 years since internationally supported mine action was initiated in the country. This
period of time has wide-ranging implications for the “survey setting” – that is, one
where most of population cannot recall living in an environment free from ordnance.
This fact is reflected in the title of the 1997 national impact survey report “Living with
UXO”.
UXO and risk management
In general terms, items of UXO are less dangerous than landmines and survey
approaches can be adapted to allow personnel to enter contaminated areas for
mapping and planning – activities that could not be undertaken to the same extent in
a landmine setting. The reduced threat posed by most UXO is currently reflected in
several areas of UXO LAO operations, particularly technical survey, for which
personnel commonly walk around contaminated areas identifying boundaries for
follow-up clearance activities. Furthermore, villagers are often tasked to remove
vegetation from planned demining or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) sites ahead
of clearance tasks – an activity that is seldom undertaken on land affected by
landmines.
Ordnance as a resource
UXO and scrap metal are considered a valuable commodity in many rural
communities as they generate income for a sector of the population. The industry is
well-established with a regional network of dealers and smelting facilities stretching
from Thailand to Vietnam; in these countries, scrap metal typically fetches 2,000-5,000
kip (US$0.20-US$0.50) per kilogram for high grade material and 10,000-15,000 kip
(US$1-US$1.50) per kilogram for explosives.121
NGOs working in areas along the former Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Lao PDR find
large numbers of foragers, including children, hunting for scrap metal; many use
Vietnamese-made metal detectors that are sold in local markets for as little as US$16.
120 Bottomley (2003) and Moyes (2004).
121 Laos Country Report in ICBL(2004).
Recently constructed roads allow greater access into areas of contamination and easier
access to markets where metal and explosives can be sold. 
The history of the mine action programme122
For almost two decades after the end of the war, formal UXO clearance operations
were usually undertaken by the Lao army in support of activities such as the
resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), or to facilitate infrastructure
improvements. Several projects were supported by external funds, including the
presence of foreign advisors and in some cases direct foreign clearance assistance.123
From 1992, Western commercial companies became engaged in clearance contracts for
private developers, mineral exploration firms, and civil engineers, as well as for aid
contractors building roads and bridges. The leading international commercial
clearance company in Lao PDR is Milsearch Defense Pty. Ltd., which operates a joint
venture with a company under the Ministry of, Defence, Bolisat Phathana
Khetphoudoi (BPK). Since 1992, Milsearch/BPK has undertaken some 30 clearance
contracts.
In the early 1990s, the Mennonite Central Committee raised awareness of the UXO
problem in Lao PDR and joined forces with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in
Xieng Khouang Province, where MAG initiated clearance activities in late 1994. By the
end of 1995, after discussions between UNDP, UNICEF, MAG and the Lao
government, the UXO Trust Fund was established, followed in 1996 by the creation of
a national Trust Fund Steering Committee and the UXO LAO programme. 
Two key responsibilities of the UXO LAO office were the coordination of UXO-related
activities and the preparation of work plans – with the goal of reducing UXO
casualties and clearing land in support of food production and other development
activities. To this end, UXO LAO commissioned a national survey to assess the extent
of UXO contamination and its socio-economic impact in Lao PDR. The contract was
awarded to Handicap International Belgium, which published its findings in 1997.
While the HIB survey project was underway in 1996, UXO LAO opened provincial
offices in Xieng Khouang, Houaphan and Savannakhet, and instruction began at a
newly acquired training facility with support from the US. The same year, Gerbera
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122 See Annex 1 for a chronology of the mine action programme.
123 Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese assistance has been reported on, both during this early
period of clearance operations and more recently.
Figures 4a and 4b. A scrap metal dealer collects UXO and other war debris on the Lao
PDR-Vietnam border (Photo: VVAF)
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initiated a clearance programme in Houaphan Province and UNICEF assumed a lead
role in the coordination of community awareness activities, establishing a technical
working group for the topic. In addition, three US NGOs created a UXO awareness
curriculum under the umbrella of an association known as Consortium, which
worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Education.
In the two years following the completion of the national survey, mine action activities
in Lao PDR entered a period of considerable expansion. UXO LAO enlisted further
external assistance to support provincial operations from Norwegian People's Aid
(NPA), the Belgium military and MAG. Furthermore, HIB and Gerbera expanded
their provincial office responsibilities. A year later, in 1999, World Vision (WV) moved
into Khammouane province and set up the ninth provincial office for UXO LAO.
Between 1999 and 2001, the Lao government pursued a strategy of nationalising all
NGO operations under UXO LAO. While most NGO-supported operations since 1997
were already within the framework of the UXO LAO programme, some operations by
MAG and Gerbera, for instance, engaged local personnel directly. Those operations
where UXO LAO did not yet have managerial responsibility were handed over to
them and international partners assumed the role of advisors and capacity builders
with a goal of eventually being phased out entirely.
In 2002, a cash-flow crisis of donor support to UXO LAO Trust Fund forced a
temporary reduction of more than half of UXO LAO's operational staff. The same
year, a UNDP programme review recommended a multi-year strategy plan and a
separation of regulatory and operational activities in the mine action sector. Over the
following two years UXO LAO returned to a role close to the one that it had played
previously. 
The “formal” clearance efforts of UXO LAO, NGOs, commercial companies and the
Lao military, however, must be set against the backdrop of “informal” clearance
undertaken by villagers. This informal clearance aimed at expanding land for
agriculture and construction, and profiting from the value of items of UXO for scrap
metal and their explosive content, has gone on for three decades and although it is not
documented, the number of UXO items cleared thereby is substantial.
Current status of the mine action programme
The full complement of national staff in UXO LAO numbers 1,134 according to the
organisation's 2004 work plan. This total includes staff at the headquarters in
Vientiane and across nine provincial operations, where 1,032 are directly involved in
operations, 63 hold provincial office staff positions, 32 are employed at the national
headquarters, and seven work at the National Training Centre. National staff are
supported by 15 international advisers, five of whom are located at the national
headquarters in Vientiane. Technical advisers are provided by UNDP and the
following implementing partners: MAG, HIB, Gerbera, NPA, and the Belgium
military.124
The organisational charts of each provincial UXO LAO team are not identical.
Numbers of personnel and the arrangement of operational teams can vary based on
funding levels and operational conditions in a province. But although the
124 Statistics from UXO LAO (2003b).
92 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
configuration may vary, UXO LAO capacities typically consist of the following
components:
Community awareness teams 
¾ Providing awareness in rural communities of the continued danger of UXO; and
¾ Educating villagers on ways to minimise the hazards caused by UXO and reduce
risks through behaviour change.
CA resources typically consist of six-person teams supported by a truck and
communication equipment.
Survey teams (technical)
¾ Gathering technical (and socio-economic) data ahead of clearance projects in order
to accelerate clearance activities.
Survey teams typically consist of two-person teams supported by motorcycles and
survey equipment.
Clearance teams (operating in two distinct capacities)
¾ Roving Teams undertaking clearance of scattered surface UXO.
Resources typically consist of a five-person team (sometimes not a permanent unit but
drawn from sections of the area clearance capacity). 
¾ Area Clearance Teams – undertaking clearance of larger areas (typically 2-3 hectares).
Standard teams are composed of four section leaders and four sections of five
deminers each.
UXO LAO represents perhaps only about half the overall clearance capacity in Lao
PDR.125 Outside the UXO LAO structure, some NGOs have again established
independent operations, such as MAG's support for CARE International in Savanakhet
or UNESCO on the Plain of Jars. A significant programme of clearance support for the
World Food Programme (WFP) is also currently being planned with the Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). In addition, the Lao military and commercial firms
such as Milsearch and MineTech operate direct contracts with support from The World
Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Milsearch alone has
approximately half the staff numbers of UXO LAO today and considerably more were
employed in 2003 when the company cleared an estimated 600 hectares of land126
compared to the 880 hectares cleared by UXO LAO for the same period. 
UXO LAO continues to be one of the major agencies conducting mine and UXO risk
education, visiting 512 villages in 2003. Outside UXO LAO two other projects focus on
awareness activities: Consortium and UNICEF. Consortium is an NGO working in
four provinces implementing a UXO education curriculum in primary schools in
conjunction with the Ministry of Education, Youth Union, Women's Union and
UNICEF. UNICEF also operates an independent project “Sport in a Box” with the
Youth Union in six provinces. This project focuses on children up to 18 years of age,
targeting especially those who may become involved in the scrap metal trade.127
Survivor assistance is a component of mine action in Lao PDR on which both the
Government and international donors have placed a low priority. Medical care for
125 GICHD (2001: 137).
126 ICBL (2004).
127 Sport in a Box, A Project for UXO Safety Education in the Lao PDR, Project Brochure
(undated).
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victims is typically provided through district and provincial hospitals with some cases
referred to a national level, especially where complex surgery is required.
International NGO support for UXO survivors includes HIB, Garneau International,
Consortium and COPE128 (a partnership between the Ministry of Health, POWER,
World Vision, the Cambodian School of Prothetics and Orthotics, and the Association
for Aid and Relief Japan). 
National Strategic Plan (NSP)129
In 2004, the mine action operational environment in Lao PDR was transformed by the
approval of the ten-year strategic plan, “The Safe Path Forward”. The plan redefined
the role and structure of the national UXO programme by removing the coordination
role of UXO LAO and transferring these responsibilities to a National Regulatory
Authority (NRA).
The implications of the plan are that UXO LAO becomes an operator alongside other
national and international agencies, all of which report to the NRA. Agencies are
grouped into three sectoral components: community awareness, clearance
(humanitarian, commercial and military) and survivor assistance. UXO LAO retains
operations in nine provinces and the current international implementation partners
are free to continue to work in support of UXO LAO and/or engage in their own
independent activities. Other agencies are also encouraged to enter the sector. 
Also of note, the NSP calls for UXO LAO to transfer its community awareness teams
to other organisations and for the Ministry of Culture and Information to provide the
oversight for mine risk education (MRE) programme, although the curriculum will be
developed through the Ministry of Education. The NSP goal for MRE is to reach all
impacted communities identified in the 1997 national survey.
128 Of the 1,048 people assisted by COPE in 2003, 400-500 were reported to be UXO/landmine
survivors.
129 This section draws on three documents: NRA (2004) and UXO LAO PDR Prime Minister's
Office (2004a) and (2004b).
Box 1. National database facility
The UXO LAO database was established in 1997 to store UXO and mine
information collected from the Socio Economic Impact Survey: “Living with UXO”.
The database has a Microsoft Access application and ArcView GIS function. The
original database, though, is now being used in parallel with IMSMA and a
conversion is in progress. 
Routine work of the database includes:
¾ Collating work plans from provinces for submission to National Regulatory
Authority and subsequent plans for the monitoring of activities; 
¾ Collation of monthly progress reports from provincial operations into monthly
Progress Summary Reports and distribution to key management staff; and
¾ Provision of bomb and impact data to UXO LAO field operations and Lao
Government Agencies, international organisations and NGOs engaged in
development planning.
It is planned that the database facility will be transferred to the National
Regulatory Authority (NRA) when it is fully established.
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Besides determining the structure of mine action activities in UXO LAO, the ten-year
plan has an overall goal to address the most highly impacted communities and allow
people to live free from the impacts of landmines and UXO. 
Priority I (High) Agricultural tasks, roving tasks, public service utilities and 
educational facilities
Priority II (Medium) Grazing land and forested areas, communal facilities and 
government facilities and offices
Priority III (Low) Public infrastructure work, communal “profit-making” areas, 
tourism sites, commercial/private business sites.
The NSP provides broad categories to govern (clearance) task prioritisation by agency
type whereby “humanitarian UXO/mine clearance operations will focus strictly on Priorities
I and II, with a marked preference for Priority I tasks. By the end of year 2013, all Priority I
tasks will have been dealt with”. The NSP goes on to state: “Few, if any, Priority III tasks
will be addressed in the context of this plan by operators funded through humanitarian
assistance programmes. These will be dealt primarily by commercial operators.”
In addition to the framework of the NSP, national clearance priorities for activities
funded through humanitarian programmes are becoming more “mainstream”
through developmental programming that considers national priorities such as
poverty reduction as further frameworks for planning. The 2004 Work Plan for
instance, considers the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) as a strategic
framework. 
UXO LAO work plan130
In 1998, UXO LAO devised a system of annual work-planning that would address the
decentralised nature of governance in Lao PDR and provide some standardisation and
130 See Annex 2 for an example of a provincial work plan.
Box 2. The work of the National Regulatory Authority
The National Regulatory Authority is the official civilian institute of the Government
of Lao PDR responsible for the coordination, regulation and oversight of all
UXO/mine action activities. The NRA reports directly to the Prime Minister and
consists of representatives from all concerned government ministries. In brief, the
The NRA is intended to provide: 
¾ Periodic review of the strategic plan;
¾ Accreditation, licensing and oversight of all UXO/MA operators: including UXO
LAO, NGOs, commercial companies, and other government bodies;
¾ Management of the database, prioritisation and tasking of all UXO/mine action
operators and activities, including preparation and monitoring of annual work
plan; and
¾ External quality assurance (QA) of all UXO/mine action activities, including Post
Clearance Impact Assessments.
The principal planning objective of the NRA is to reduce the number of victims
from UXO, and to support socio-economic development by remaining sensitive to
both National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP) objectives, and to local
level priorities expressed by affected communities.
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cohesion in a programme implemented through six international partners. It also
formed an important basis for measuring performance and accountability.
UXO LAO follows a “bottom-up” planning process where district authorities compile
a short list of priorities based on task requests from villages. These are submitted to
the province level where they are combined with provincial priorities and evaluated
by the Provincial Steering Committee against UXO LAO national priorities and
strategic guidelines. A detailed operational plan is then developed considering the
available time and resources – allocating community awareness, roving and clearance
teams to specific tasks over the following calendar year.
The draft work plan is then signed off by the governor, UXO LAO provincial
coordinator and a representative of the implementing partner. The signed work plan
is currently submitted to the UXO LAO national headquarters where it is reviewed
and subsequently approved by the National Steering Committee. These final steps of
the approval process are to be transferred to the newly formed NRA. 
Overview of surveys in the Lao PDR mine action
programme131
Table 2. Overview of survey activities
Desk Survey US Air Combat Data (MSTI/FRC)* 1998-2000






Socio Economic Impact Survey (HIB)*







¾ “Traditional” – area reduction
¾ Preparation/reconnaissance
n/a
UXO LAO Technical teams*
n/a
2000
Post Clearance Documentation Various operators: UXO LAO, NGOs,
Commercial
~1992




Survivor assistance and mine risk
education surveys
(or needs assessments)
Accident/Victim data compiled by
UXO LAO, Consortium, COPE, LDPA,
MOH




Supplemental or not otherwise
classified
Psychosocial Impact Survey (HIB) 2004
(* denotes surveys that are a particular focus of the Lao PDR case study)
131 UXO LAO Annual Report and Work Plans from 1996 to 2004 reviewed.
According to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) glossary,132 a General
Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) is “the process by which a comprehensive
inventory can be obtained of all reported and/or suspected locations of mine or UXO
contamination, the quantities and types of explosive hazards, and information on
local soil characteristics, vegetation and climate, and an assessment of the scale and
impact of the landmine problem on the individual, community and country.”
The GMAA relates to a continuous process of collecting, evaluating and analysing
data to assist and update strategic planning and provide support to mine action
authorities. In Lao PDR it has been 30 years since the end of the second Indochina War
and about ten years since humanitarian organisations started to become established in
mine action. It is difficult to assess the extent of survey activities that took place in the
intervening period, however while systematic surveys of UXO hazards or victims are
unreported, ongoing survey activities of a technical nature would have been an
integrated component of some commercial clearance and military operations.
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the general mine action
assessment in Lao PDR
Figure 5 illustrates various activities that have improved the knowledge and understanding
of the geographic extent and impact of UXO and landmines in the country. Pink shaded
areas are considered humanitarian mine action activities undertaken by UXO LAO, UN
agencies and NGOs. Orange areas represent military and commercial activities.
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132 UNMAS (2001), IMAS 04.10.
For the purpose of this study, three survey projects are reviewed in greater detail in
the next section of the report: the Socio Economic Impact Survey (1997), the Indochina
Bomb Data Project (1998-2000), and the technical surveys carried out by UXO LAO
since 1998. In the remainder of this section, however, a brief overview of these three
surveys is provided against information of other notable survey activities that have
been undertaken or are currently active in Lao PDR.
Systematic general surveys
By far the most significant contribution to understanding the impact and geographic
extent of the UXO problem in Lao PDR came from the community-focused socio-
economic impact survey “Living with UXO” completed by HIB in 1997. This still
remains the baseline for UXO data in the country. 
Desktop surveys
A desktop survey, commonly referred to as the Indochina Bomb Data Project, made
records available from US archives of combat activities on a national scale to UXO
LAO between 1998 and 2000. 
Technical surveys
The nature of UXO/mine contamination in Lao PDR has limited the application of area
reduction as a means to define the boundaries of contamination. As a result, technical
surveys according to traditional terminology are not widely reported. The technical
survey capacities of UXO LAO and others operating in Lao PDR are mostly associated
with clearance planning and reconnaissance similar to the definition contained in the
International Mine Action Standards glossary (IMAS 04.10).133
Post Clearance Documentation
According to the IMAS, Post Clearance Documentation (PCD) is a comprehensive
group of documents relating to a clearance activity provided during the handover
process of a cleared site to a recipient authority, organisation or individual. A critical
item in the documentation is a map of the completed clearance site. 
PCD in UXO LAO uses the terminology Level 3 Completion Report to describe the
documentation at the end of clearance tasks. The report has sections to be completed
by the Area Clearance Team Leader, the relevant UXO LAO provincial office, and
representatives of the local authority responsible for receiving the land. Copies of the
report are then submitted to UXO LAO headquarters and registered in the database.
One objective of the database work plan for 2004 is to further the “development of area
clearance report formats for the database system” to include the recording of clearance
site perimeter details in the database. Currently, perimeter details are kept in hard
copy only.
PCD relating to clearance undertaken by commercial companies does not follow UXO
LAO formats but reflects the terms of the clearance contract and is often more detailed
than the UXO LAO documentation. Similarly, where NGOs operate independently
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133 IMAS defines technical survey as “the detailed topographical and technical investigation of
known or suspected mined areas identified during the planning phase”.
from UXO LAO they may also use their own internal organisational PCD approaches.
MAG, for instance, is integrating computer-based mapping using ArcView into the
PCD process. To date, clearance site maps in UXO LAO have been completed by hand.
Post Clearance Evaluations
Although a definition of Post Clearance Evaluation (PCE) does not exist in IMAS, it is
generally understood to be an assessment that is undertaken sometime after cleared
land has been handed over to beneficiaries in order to determine whether land is
being used as envisaged. PCE may consist of qualitative and quantitative approaches
– including activities such as cost-benefit analysis of completed tasks. In Lao PDR,
PCE activities have been limited and although there have been some general reviews
of mine action expenditure and projected economic benefits of UXO LAO
operations,134 no comprehensive study has systematically re-examined past clearance
sites. 
A Post Clearance Impact Assessment (PCIA) of the UXO LAO programme was
formerly scheduled to begin with UNDP assistance in 2003. As of writing, no detailed
plan for the PCIA had yet been developed although it was expected that the PCIA
would take place in 2005. 
Survivor assistance and mine risk education surveys135
The socio-economic impact survey completed in 1997 remains the most
comprehensive collection of data on victims and the circumstances surrounding
accidents in the country. Accident data records during this survey documented the
age and gender of the victim, the type of UXO involved, the outcome of the accident
(death or type of injuries), and the date, location and cause of accident. In addition, the
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Figure 6. Example of a completion map for a site in Savannakhet 
134 Fisher (2001); GICHD (2001).
135 Draws on findings from the feasibility study into a National Network for UXO Accidents
in Lao PDR UNDP/HIB (2004a).
survey data also provided a broader view of accidents by analysing the type of
injuries, the affected groups, and the activities at the time of the accident. However,
since the survey did not cover all communities, the data remains incomplete.
In addition to the 1997 survey, there have been ongoing efforts within UXO LAO to
update the victim database. Several other organisations such as Consortium, COPE,
the Lao Disabled Peoples Association (LDPA), as well as the Ministry of Health
include the collection of data on UXO victims and survivor needs in their own
programmes (see below) and some attempt has been made to share this information.
The updating and monitoring of accident information on a national scale, though,
have not been fully successful and a concerted effort to readdress the collection of
accident data is overdue.
UXO LAO
In the event of an accident being reported to the UXO LAO provincial office, a survey
or community awareness (CA) team is dispatched to complete a UXO LAO accident
report form, which is then faxed to UXO LAO headquarters. 
Although reports are received by UXO LAO and summary tables of accidents are
updated monthly it is widely believed that the total number of accidents is
considerably under-reported. In practice, UXO LAO only work in nine provinces, and
even within these only in certain districts. In those provinces where UXO LAO
operate, comparison of data received at a national level compared to information
retained at a provincial level indicates failures in the effectiveness of information
transfer. 
It is also clear that a reliance on a passive reporting mechanism for villagers to
communicate with UXO LAO has limitations (as opposed to an active reporting
mechanism where all villages are periodically visited). A study by HIB in 2004
concludes that “this system of reporting does not seem to work. Village Leaders do not
complete forms, or forms do not make it back to UXO LAO District/Provincial offices.
Moreover, not every village has been visited by CA or Survey Teams so no form is available in
these villages. Finally, Village Leaders have to be literate in Lao to complete it, which is not
always the case.”
Consortium
Consortium is an NGO operating in four provinces providing survivor assistance and
MRE. In 1996, it initiated a War Victims Medical Fund and keeps a simple Excel
spreadsheet on victims treated at district or provincial hospitals and whose medical
costs have been supported by Consortium. While this is a source of accident
information it is far from complete, as it is limited to four provinces and does not
include fatal UXO accidents, or victims that did not receive treatment through the
Consortium programme.
Cooperative Orthotics and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE)
COPE provides technical support to five rehabilitation centres in five provinces that
provide prostheses, orthoses and wheelchairs to persons with disabilities (PWDs),
including mine and UXO victims. Data on patients arriving at the five centres is
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entered into a Visual Dbase database and central data kept in Vientiane is updated by
email regularly. While the database contains thousands of patients, it does not record
UXO victims who died from their injuries or who have not been admitted into a
rehabilitation programme supported by COPE.
Lao Disabled Peoples Association (LDPA)
LDPA is active in six provinces and comprises 1,600 members of whom 70 per cent are
estimated to be UXO victims. New members complete forms that include cause of
disability and, if relevant, the date of accident, which is entered into an Access
database in Vientiane. The database does not include all disabled persons, nor does it
capture victims who died as a consequence of injuries suffered from UXO.
Ministry of Health (MOH)
The Ministry of Health, through its provincial departments, does not systematically
collect information on UXO victims but some hospital admission and referral registers
indicate UXO as a cause of injury and, in the event of death, registers the cause.
Summary statistics are forwarded from district to province and then on to Vientiane.
MOH data is typically limited to recognition that an injury or fatality is a result of a
UXO accident. It does not provide much insight into the activity at the time of the
accident or the location of the accident.
Other surveys
In 2003 and 2004, a study on the psychosocial affects of mines/UXO accidents on
children and their families was undertaken in Lao PDR. The survey was conducted by
HIB in conjunction with the Lao Youth Union (LYU), the LDPA, and the National
Rehabilitation Center (NRC) in response to a request from UNICEF. The project
targeted five of the nine most affected provinces: Savannakhet, Xieng Khouang,
Champassak, Luang Prabang, Saravan or Kamouane and used the victim data
provided by UXO LAO and others.
The study targeted around 500 respondents, including:
¾ Children injured by mines or UXO;
¾ Adults who had been victims as a children;
¾ Children whose parents had been a victim of a mine/UXO accident; and
¾ Families (parents and siblings) of children who had been killed or injured by a mine
or item of UXO.
The objective of the project was to “determine the long-term psychosocial affects of
accidents on children and their families and to make recommendations for future
programme development. The study addressed issues of traumatisation both
psychologically and socially, services provision and access to education, health care
and community support mechanisms.”136
Study findings are intended to supply data to help target MRE programmes and to
tailor messages for children and adolescents, who make up about 40 per cent of
accidents in Lao PDR. They are also expected to “provide local communities,
100 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
136 HIB proposal “Psycho Social Support to Child Victims of UXO” (2002).
government agencies, NGOs and INGOs, with a more nuanced appreciation of the
main effects of mines and UXO on children and adolescents and their care givers.”
The project duration was proposed as 12 months, to be initiated in mid-2003 and to be
completed in mid-2004. As of writing, the final report for the psychosocial survey had
not been released.
Socio Economic Impact Survey ‘Living with UXO’
Expressed need for the survey
A decree issued by the Prime Minister in 1995 authorised the establishment of a
nationwide programme for UXO/mine action. The following year, the UXO LAO
Office opened with one of its first activities to request bids to conduct a survey to
obtain a national understanding of the presence and impact of UXO. In June 1996, HIB
was awarded the contract to implement the survey project.
Table 3. Summary sheet of Socio Economic Impact Survey 'Living with UXO'
Agency Handicap International Belgium 
Client UXO LAO/UNDP
Type Socio Economic Impact Survey137
Objectives Conduct a national survey to:
¾ Determine the scope of UXO/mine contamination in Lao
PDR;
¾ Access its socio economic impact on various sectors;
¾ Identify local attitudes, responses and adjustments towards
UXO;
¾ Prioritise communities and districts for UXO/mine clearance;
¾ Provide data to help define an awareness approach and
strategy; and
¾ Assist UXO LAO in fundraising activities.
Dates/duration 13 months: June 1996 to July 1997
Scope
(national/provincial)
National – 15 of 18 provinces (three provinces were excluded
through an “expert opinion” process). Village-level data was
collected in 7,675 villages in 86 districts (out of a total of
11,000 villages and 142 districts in Lao PDR)
Focus Community Impact 
Information Management Project created the national database in UXO LAODatabase
application: 
¾ Microsoft Access
¾ GIS functionality: ArcView
Cost US$696,000; Donors were Government of Sweden and UNDP
Additional funds were received that increased the budget by
some 25 per cent (final amount undetermined)
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137 The Lao PDR survey did not follow a standard SAC/Landmine Impact Survey
methodology. The project was undertaken prior to the establishment of the Survey Action
Center and the Global Landmine Survey initiative.
The requirement to undertake a survey was a matter of urgency as UXO LAO was
developing fast with provincial offices being established, community awareness
activities starting, and training and procurement underway. It was imperative that a
national survey be completed to help shape the development of the UXO programme
in Lao PDR.
Objectives established for the survey
The objective of the project was to conduct a national survey to assess the scope of
UXO/mine contamination in Lao PDR and its socio economic impact in the country.
The project findings were envisaged to be used as a framework for the prioritisation
of communities and districts for UXO/mine action, including the analysis of the
victims of UXO, to help define MRE strategies and approaches to survivor assistance.
Outputs planned
¾ Establish a survey database with GIS functionality populated with survey data;
¾ Rank villages, districts and provinces based on the severity of the UXO impact; and
¾ Provide national, provincial and district reports and maps for dissemination to
appropriate stakeholders.
Implementation process with activities
HIB implemented the survey as an independent sub contractor providing
administrative and logistical support direct from its office in Vientiane. Data collection
was undertaken in close collaboration with the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
(MLSW) and the provincial and district authorities.138
The survey was conducted in four phases: a Preparatory Phase, including the review of
existing data; Phase 1, collection of data at a provincial and district level; Phase 2,
village level survey; and an Analysis and Reporting Phase. The following activities were
identified for each phase:139
Preparatory Phase
¾ Review existing datasets
¾ Refine methodology and training curriculum
¾ Develop and test a questionnaire
Phase 1
¾ Collect information on the scope and scale of the UXO/Landmine problem at the
national, province, and district levels;
¾ Identify criteria for measuring the impact of UXO/landmines on the society and
economy 
¾ Analyse the information collected to determine which provinces and districts are
most severely affected by UXO/landmines; and to 
¾ Identify five priority provinces and the most severely impacted districts within
those provinces for the purpose of planning a follow-up socio-economic impact
survey at the village level (Phase Two). 
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138 Approximately two thirds of the data collectors used in the survey had been involved in
the March 1995 National Census.
139 Taken from Handicap International Project Proposal, (1996a; 1996b).
Phase 2
¾ Collect information on the type of impacts that UXO/Landmine have on the social
and economic activities of affected villages;
¾ Establish criteria for identifying priorities for UXO/landmine clearance and
community awareness activities.
Analysis and Reporting Phase
¾ Consolidate and process data
¾ Analyse information collected to identify priority sites for planning of future
UXO/landmine marking, clearance and community awareness activities.
¾ Generate reports at a national, provincial and district level
Actual outputs
In accordance with the planned outputs, the survey results populated a database at
the UXO LAO central office and a comprehensive set of reports at a national,
provincial and district level were generated. These ranked villages, districts and
provinces based on the severity of UXO impact. The number of villages actually
visited, however, far exceeded that estimated in the original proposal, which had
estimated that after the Phase 1 district-level survey, village-level data would be
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Figure 7. Summary map of villages impacted by UXO in Lao PDR
focused in five provinces, 30 districts and 2,700 villages.140 The actual number of
villages visited was more than double this figure, totalling 7,675 in 86 districts and 15
provinces. 
Initially it was believed that the survey would harness several criteria to measure the
socio-economic impact of UXO by using a combination of indicators such as:
It soon became apparent that such an approach was too ambitious and a ranking
scheme was introduced that essentially focused on the main variables: accident
information, land use in contaminated areas and the history of the conflict (Box 3).
The outcome of the classification was that the impact categories for villages (“severe”,
“high”, “medium” and “low”) were less of a measure of the socio-economic impact of
UXO than of exposure to risk. 
The ranking of districts considered “severely” impacted were those that had more
than 35 per cent of the villages reporting contamination. Districts in this category were
then used as a benchmark to determine the most affected provinces, where the 10
most affected provinces contained at least one severely impacted district. 
In September 1998, the original categorisation scheme was adjusted further, similarly
focusing on risk reduction but by ranking affected villages by a single datum – the
location of UXO. This was justified based on the analysis of accidents where 40 per
cent occurred within village centres themselves or along main thoroughfares and thus
it was considered that the location of UXO was a good indicator of accident risk. In
this scheme the category “severe” was dropped and “high” impacted villages were
considered those where UXO are present in the village centre; “moderate” impact
where UXO exist in cultivation areas; and “low” impact where contamination exists in
forested or grazing land. 
In addition to the UXO impact-ranking of various administrative units in Lao PDR,
the full extent of survey findings were well presented in reports that were widely
distributed to facilitate the integration of data into end-user planning and
operations.142 An output of the project that was not highlighted in the original
proposal was the recommendations section contained in the final report that provided
guidance to help use the survey data and to assist with the development of the UXO
LAO programme. These recommendations remain central to the Planning Assumptions
of the 10 year National Strategic Plan approved in 2004.
¾ Types of UXO ¾ Land denial & UX0 location ¾ Economic activities
¾ Human Accidents ¾ Population density ¾ Development priorities
¾ Livestock accidents ¾ History of fighting ¾ Development plans141
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140 “Unexploded ordnance in Lao PDR, Socio-economic Impact Survey”, Project Proposal
(1996)
141 Taken from a PowerPoint presentation to UXO LAO by HIB in 1996.
142 Refer to HI report “Living with UXO” (1997), and provincial reports for details of findings
including examples of maps down to district level.
105The case of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Box 3. ‘Living with UXO’: methodology used to calculate a
nominal socio-economic impact score [GLOBAL].Handicap
International – Belgium (HIB) during 1996 and 1997
GLOBAL = 3 * UXOACC + 2 * LANDUSE + 1 * HISTORY
Values ranging from 0 and 24, reassigned nominal values (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 6 (1) Low impact 
7 to 12 (2) Moderate impact 
13 to 18 (3) High impact 
18 to 24 (4) Severe impact 
(9) Unknown – if the major indicator or 2 minor indicators are UNKNOWN
1. UXO Accidents [UXOACC]
The human impact of the UXO is obtained by the weighted mean of the period and the
number of accidents, the location of the accidents and the percentage of all victims on
UXOACC = 3 * ACTUALIT + 2 * WHEREACC + 1 * GPTXVIC
1.1 How recent are the accidents [ACTUALIT]?
This information is obtained from the Accident questionnaire.
ACTUALIT = 1 * Number of victims between 1973 and 1976
+ 2 * Number of victims between 1977 and 1986
+ 3 * Number of victims between 1987 and 1997
Values obtained between 0 and 63, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No victims. 
1 to 5 (1) Very few victims or victims in immediate post-war years only.
6 to 10 (2) Few victims or victims in immediate post-war years only. 
11 to 15 (3) Several recent victims. 
16 to 63 (4) Many victims and/or recent victims. 
(9) Unknown- if the number of accidents reported in the village is positive, but
the number of accident forms equals zero. 
1.2 Location of UXO accidents / incidents ? [WHEREACC]
This information is obtained from the Accident questionnaire.
WHEREACC = 3 * number of accidents inside the village
+ 2 * number of accidents just outside the village 
+ 1 * number of accidents in the forest or grazing lands
Values obtained between 0 and 58, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No victims 
1 to 5 (1) Very few accidents and accidents occurred in the forest 
6 to 10 (2) Few accidents or accidents occurred in the forest 
11 to 15 (3) Several accidents and/or accidents occurred outside the village only.
16 to 58 (4) Many accidents and/or accidents occurred inside the village 
(9) Unknown – if the number of accidents reported in the village is positive, but
the number of accident forms equals zero.
1.3 Numbers of victims as a percentage of the actual population of the village
[GPTXVIC]
This information is obtained from questions 1 and 22 of the Village
questionnaire.
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Box 3 (continued)
Values obtained between 0.0 and 1.0, reassigned nominal values of 0 to 9 (in parentheses):
0 to 0% (0)
0.0 to 0.5% (1)
0.5 to 1.0% (2)
1.0 to 2.0% (3)
2.0% (4)
(9) Unknown – if the total population of the village is unknown.
2 Limits of land use due to UXO? [LANDUSE].
This information is obtained from questions 24 and 16 of the Village questionnaire.
LANDUSE = 2 * DANGER + UXOLAND
Values obtained between 0 and 12, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 3 (1) Low impact 
4 to 6 (2) Moderate impact 
7 to 9 (3) High impact
9 to 12 (4) Severe impact
(9) Unknown – if DANGER = (9) Unknown
2.1 Presence of UXO / Landmines and how many (question 24) ? [DANGER]
Values obtained between 0 and 200+, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses) 
(0) No UXO / Landmines reported
(1) Yes UXO reported, number of UXO is Unknown 
(2) Yes UXO reported still today, at least one item of UXO still present
(3) Yes UXO reported, number of UXO is more than 10 items
(4) Yes UXO reported, number of UXO is more than 150 items
(9) Unknown- if the answer to the question was left blank.
2.2 Location of UXO / Landmines (question 16) ? [UXOLAND]
+ 6 In village centre
+ 2 Along path or road
+ 2 In irrigated rice fields
+ 2 In low land rice fields
+ 1 In upland rice fields (“hai”)
+ 1 In grazing land
+ 1 In near forest (woodlots near village)
+ 1 In far forest (forested areas far from the village)
+ 1 Other types of land
+ 16 Everywhere (throughout the village and land used by its inhabitants)
Values obtained between 0 and 17, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 4 (1) Low impact
5 to 8 (2) Moderate impact
9 to 12 (3) High impact
> 12 (4) Severe impact
(9) Unknown – if no answer was provided to question 16.
Box 3 (continued)
3 Impact of the war on the village? [HISTORY]
This information is obtained from questions 10 and 11 of the Village questionnaire,
about the history of ground battles and air bombardment.
HISTORY = INDEXBMB + TYPEARTIL
Values obtained between 0 and 8, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 2 (1) Low impact 
3 to 4 (2) Moderate impact 
5 to 6 (3) High impact
7 to 8 (4) Severe impact
(9) Unknown – if the answer to both indicators is missing (blank). Note – if one of
the two indicators is missing. HISTORY takes the value of the other indicator. 
3.1 Was the village bombed during the war (question 10)? [INDEXBMB]




+ 1 One time 
+ 2 Two to five times 
+ 3 Six to 50 times 
+ 4 More than 50 times 
+ 1 Other types of land
Presence of small craters?
+ 1 One to 150 small craters 
+ 2 More than 150 small craters
Presence of large craters?
+ 1 One to five large craters 
+ 2 Six to 20 large craters
+ 3 21 to 100 large craters
+ 4 More than 100 large craters.
Duration, in years?
+0.33 per year  One to twelve years, up to maximum score of 4.0
Values obtained between 0 and 15, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses)
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 4 (1) Low impact 
5 to 8 (2) Moderate impact 
9 to 12 (3) High impact
13 to 15 (4) Severe impact
(9) Unknown – if no answer was provided to question 10.
3.2 Intensity of ground battle near village (question 11)? [TYPEARTIL]
+ 0 No, ground battles not reported
+ 2 Yes, ground battles reported
+ 2 Artillery used
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Information management
The HIB survey provided the first national Geographic Information System (GIS) in
Lao PDR. Information collected by the survey was entered into an information
management system that used a Microsoft Access database application with ArcView
GIS functionality. Initial geographic data used a 1:200,000 map scale, though, as part
of the development of the database; this has since been significantly upgraded with
many geographic features now available on a 1:50,000 scale. A conversion of the
database to IMSMA is also currently in progress.
The coding system used by the survey to identify provinces, districts and villages was
that of the National Statistics Centre for the 1995 National Census and thus village and
accident reports from the HIB survey have a coding reference that facilitates analysis
and integration of additional datasets. 
Outcome143
Planning, operations and coordination
The principal objective of the survey was to identify the most affected areas of the
country in order to target a national response to the UXO problem. While the criteria
for assigning relative “impact” of villages, districts and provinces is quite simplistic,
the impact ranking of administrative units in Lao PDR by the HIB survey has defined
the UXO programme today. 
The survey concluded that UXO operations should concentrate on the ten most
Box 3 (continued)
+ 2 Anti-aircraft artillery used
+ 1 Mortars used
+ 2 “Big guns” used
+ 2 Tanks used
+ 2 Military camp in vicinity
+ 1 Administrative office in vicinity.
Values obtained between 0 and 15, reassigned nominal values 0 to 9 (in parentheses):
0 to 0 (0) No impact 
1 to 4 (1) Low impact 
5 to 7 (2) Moderate impact 
8 to 11 (3) High impact
12 to 14 (4) Severe impact
(9) Unknown – if no answer was provided to question 11.
Source: Ms. Christiane Vellin, former survey statistician (HIB internal memorandum, 1997).
The information in this box was prepared by Michael Sheinkman, former survey adviser for
GIS/database.
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143 At the time of researching this case study the HIB survey had already been completed for
seven years. It is important to appreciate that while such a period of time allows a better
evaluation of the medium-term value of the survey project, such an assessment can suffer
from a lack of informants remaining in key positions to elaborate benefits of the project in the
years immediately following the completion of the survey.
affected provinces – including the Saysomboune 'special zone'.144 Apart from
Saysomnoune, the UXO LAO programme has followed these recommendations and
provincial offices were established in the remaining nine provinces.
At a district level, the UXO LAO programme also followed the severity of the impact
identified by the survey and today there still remains a considerable correlation
between severely impacted districts and the targeting of operations today (see Table 4).
Furthermore, at a village level, the ranking of communities has generally formed the
basis for deployment of UXO LAO resources with adjustments made for operational
considerations such as accessibility and the clustering of activities within target
districts. The degree of integration of survey data into operational planning at this
level, though, varies between provinces and implementing partners. Increasingly
there has been a greater influence of other factors for planning purposes as more
information is obtained and UXO activities progress. 
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Table 4. Correlation between districts targeted for UXO LAO activities in 2004 against the




square metres) targeted at
“severely affected”
districts in 2004
Roving Tasks & Survey





Percentage  of planned
resource deployment in
“severely affected” districts in
2004
Attapeu 100 100 60
Sekong 100 100 100
Saravan 100 100 57
Champassak 61 (+2 other districts) 100 (+6 other districts) 100 (+1 other district)
Savanakhet 74 (+1 other district) 83 (+1 other district) 86 (+1 other district)
Khammouane 79 (+1 other district) 75 (+1 other district) 25 (+1 other district)
Xieng Khouang 100 100 100
Luang Prabang 48 (+3 other districts) 100 (+7 other districts) 100 (+7 other districts)
Houaphanh 20 (+2 other districts) 50 (+6 other districts) 0 (+5 other districts)
Notes: 
¾ In Attapeu and Sekong, all districts of the provinces are severely affected and have targeted
operations 
¾ A divergence of activities from “severely” impacted districts would be expected based on
severely impacted villages existing in other districts and an incorporation of moderately affected
villages into operational plans. In addition, progress of UXO LAO activities over seven years will
have addressed many operational goals (especially with respect to progress of CA teams).
Furthermore, additional information has been acquired since the survey and operations often
support development plans that warrant the review of contaminated 'areas' as opposed to
'villages' as a targeted unit.
¾ The criteria used to determine degree of impact between that used in HIB survey report and those
adopted in September 1998 may vary marginally. 
¾ Some inaccuracies may exist in the table due to inconsistencies between maps and text in the
2004 work plan.
¾ The '+' symbol signifies the number of additional districts of operation outside those severely
affected according to the HIB report.
144 The special zone is under the direct administration of the national government and
remains a sensitive area due to instability caused by the Hmong ethnic resistance.
The study team visited the province of Savannakhet where HIB has been responsible
for providing the technical support to the UXO LAO programme since 1997, and
where it was envisaged that the survey data may have been understood and used
more readily in operational planning. The HIB survey also ranks Savanakhet as the
most affected province.145
The study team learnt that the use of the survey data in the UXO programme in
Savannakhet has been a function of time. According to HIB, village data from the
survey was fully used for three years following the survey: to support planning of
clearance, roving, and community awareness activities. The focus on the survey data,
however, for prioritisation of clearance activities appears to have diminished and the
mechanisms for generating an annual work plan also focus on priorities presented by
districts and provincial administrations that support development plans146 and
respond to requests from village authorities. These may or may not follow the impact
ranking of the HIB survey. Furthermore, other frameworks and factors are now
considered during prioritisation, such as the NPEP that highlights 46 districts (seven
of the 15 districts in Savanakhet) as national priority development areas. 
In addition to the geographic targeting of UXO LAO operations, the survey findings
document in detail accident circumstances and village attitudes and behaviour
towards UXO. This information has been used extensively by all MRE actors present
in Lao PDR.
Some sources contend that the HIB survey findings could have been integrated into
planning and operations even more effectively147 and that today, decisions are often
made without reference to the survey. Irrespective of the apparent loss of focus on the
survey findings in some areas, the use of the HIB survey has been remarkable
compared to the degree of use of national survey data in other mine action
programmes.148
While several key elements of the survey have become dated,149 and the degree of
coverage of the survey has been questioned,150 the HIB survey findings remain the
baseline for UXO information in Lao PDR. This is reflected in the National Strategic
Plan approved in 2004 that uses the 1997 survey as a starting point for the ten-year
plan. The NSP references the HIB survey fours times using it as a benchmark for MRE
activities and “stepped-up” technical surveys activities.
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145 HIB (2002; 2004b).
146 For instance, clearance is support for the following beneficiaries in Savannakhet Province
were cited: BTC, HI, World Food Programme, CARE, MOE, MCTPC.
147 For instance, HI village level reports have not been fully used in all provincial UXO LAO
offices – an observation highlighted in a UNDP external evaluation mission to Laos PDR (van
Ree et al., 1998).
148 The success of the integration of data from the HI survey was facilitated by the quality
and extent of the distribution of maps and reports (national and provincial) at the end of the
project. See, for example, HIB (1997a-d).
149 Particularly accident information.
150 Based on information acquired since the survey it appears that the “expert opinion” that
governed the targeting of the provinces and districts for the survey had shortfalls in some
geographic areas. The survey coverage is thus referenced as incomplete in the UXO LAO
Annual Report 2003.
Planned follow-up/additional survey
The recommendations of the HIB survey report included the establishment of a
secondary project to collect supplementary information to improve socio-economic
impact assessments and to establish an ongoing system for monitoring UXO
accidents. A discrete follow-on project did not, however, materialise.151
A considerable focus on CA teams in the aftermath of the HIB survey provided an
opportunity to collect further general survey data as an ongoing activity.152 At the end
of 2003, CA teams had visited a total of 4,484 villages with a target to reach another
542 villages in 2004. To date however, the CA survey data has not been incorporated
into the initial HIB dataset, but rather entered into the national database using a
separate table. The amalgamation of these two datasets remains a pending activity
which must be carefully managed, particularly as UXO LAO begins to concentrate
more on clearance.153
While recommendations of the impact report called for an ongoing mechanism for
recording accident data, a recent study by HIB154 concludes that this has not been
achieved, irrespective of efforts undertaken by UXO LAO and others (see above
section Overview of Surveys in Lao PDR). Accident numbers continue to be
significantly under-reported and it is likely that a project based on the
recommendations of recent HIB feasibility study (2004) will be implemented in the
near future. 
US Air Combat Data155
Expressed need for the project
Most of the UXO contamination in Lao PDR originates from US air-delivered
ordnance dropped between 1965 and 1973. Details of these combat missions were
recorded in a data system developed by IBM in the early 1960s that provided
information daily to the US Joint Staff via the National Combat Command
Information Processing System (NIPS). While the vast majority of ordnance
detonated, the provision of these records to UXO LAO offers a valuable oversight of
where remaining contamination may exist today and provides information on
expected types of UXO.156 Data of this nature can assist the planning of UXO clearance
and economic development projects by complementing the HIB survey and
improving the spatial understanding of expected contamination in the country.
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151 An initiative that the Lao authorities did not approve.
152 General survey data forms a section of the UXO LAO standard “Village Visit Report”.
153 It is planned in the NSP to contract out CA activities, though a mechanism to support this is
not yet clear
154 Feasibility Study into a National Network for UXO Accidents in Lao PDR (2004b)
155 This project has been referenced by various other names such as the MSTI Project, South
East Asia Air Combat Data Project, and the Indochina Bomb Data Project. Much information
in this section is taken from the DSCA Statement of Work (1994) and a report “South East
Asia Air Combat Data” (Smith, 2004).
156 In addition to the bombing data this project also provides information on the deployment
of defoliants – known as herbicide mission data obtained from the US Armed Services Center
for Research of Unit Records (CRUR) which is the source for the substantiation of veterans'
claims of herbicide contact.
Objectives established for the project158
The project (see Table 5) called for the recovery of data from three major US databases
of bombing missions and one database of herbicide missions between 1965 and 1973. 
The recovered data was required to be geo-referenced and incorporated into a
geospatial database for ease of analysis and to allow a Geographic Information System
to support future surveys, development plans and clearance activities. An end goal
was for Lao national capacities to be capable of managing data and printing maps to
support the wide range of UXO mitigation efforts.
Outputs planned
¾ Provide UXO LAO with geo-referenced data from the following databases:
1. SEADAB SE Asia Database (Air Combat Aircraft January 1970 to June 
1975);
2. CACTA Air Combat Activities (Air Combat October 1965 to December
1970);
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157 The original project proposals included details of collaboration with agencies and
departments in the US such as DSCA, NIMA, host nation institutions, provision of GFI, and
much technical specifications for the development and revision of topographic maps, data
GIS tools, consolidation of codes, ordnance descriptions, host nation training requirements
etc. For the purposes of this study detail is omitted from this section with a focus placed on
final product and value of outputs to the UXO programme in Lao PDR.
158 The provision of US combat data to Laos is part of a regional project whereby bomb data
has also been provided to Cambodia (2001) and Vietnam (2002/3).
Table 5. Summary sheet of US Bomb Data Project
Agency Contractors: Management Support Technology Inc (MSTI), later Federal
Resources Corporation (FRC), Fairfax Virginia. 
Donor: Defense Security Cooperation Agency – Humanitarian Assistance
and Mine Action (DSCA-HAMA) 
Client UXO LAO/Government of Lao PDR
Type Desk top – review of US records of combat activities from the US NationalArchives and Records Administration (NARA)
Objectives157 ¾ Provide geo-referenced records of US combat activities to UXO LAO:¾ Provide assistance with mapping and geospatial information
management to assist the display of combat records and further data
analysis
¾ Train UXO LAO staff in management of data and map production
Dates/duration From 1994, DSCA in conjunction with MSTI/FRC developed aninformational/ relational database from the separate declassified tapes of
US air combat activities. Relevant datasets were released to UXO LAO
between 1998-2000
Scope National
Focus US Records of combat activities 
Information
Management
MS Access with data stored and queried using ESRI shape files
Cost Donor: US Department of Defense – funding level undisclosedExpressed
need for the project
3. SACCOACT Strategic Air Command B-52 Missions (June 1965 to 
August 1973);
4. Herbicide files Herbicide missions (July 1965 to February 1971);
Including provision of:
¾ Location of ordnance drops;
¾ Ordnance category and specific type;159
¾ Ordnance number expended;
¾ Target and bomb damage assessment, and
¾ Mission information such as date and types of aircraft used;
¾ Provide assistance to upgrade geographic data used by UXO LAO including 
improved map scales;
¾ Training to ensure that UXO LAO is capable of querying, displaying and 
printing/plotting ordnance data to support information requirements.
Implementation process and activities160
Supported by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DOD) a contractor,
Management Support Technology Inc (MSTI), later Federal Resources Corporation
(FRC), was used to implement the project. Activities were broken down into three
phases: Requirement/Definition, Production, and Delivery.
Actual outputs
The four databases and most of the required information outlined in the proposal
were recovered and provided to UXO LAO over a period of two years according to
the following timetable:
¾ SEADAB: Completed October 1998;
¾ CACTA: Completed March 1999;
¾ SACCOACT: Completed November 1999;
¾ Herb & Ranch Hand:   Completed February 2000.
The UXO LAO database at the time of the US Air Combat Data Project operated a
1:200,000 scale spatial database. The bomb data project improved geospatial
information to help display bomb (and herbicide) data from the war. Data shape files
of some features, such as roads and rivers, to scales of 1:50,000 scales or better were
provided though full spatial information for UXO LAO operations at a scale of
1:100,000 remain incomplete.161 In addition, the project provided satellite imagery
from LandSat 7 with national coverage to a resolution of 15 metres in black and white
imagery and 30 metres in colour.
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159 For example: Cluster Bomb: e.g. CBU 24/29, CBU 2A, CBU 12; General Purpose Bomb: e.g.
500lb GP Mark 82; GP bomb with delay action fuse: e.g. Mark 36 destructor; rockets, missiles;
projectiles, ammunition; flares, sensors.
160 The detailed activities of this project are technical in nature and have been deliberately
excluded here.
161 An objective of a VVAF supported project approved for 2004/2005 aims at supporting the
continual upgrade of the national database including provision of complete spatial
information at a 1:100,000 scale – and ultimately a 1:50,000 scale.
Outcome 
Planning, operations and coordination
The value of the bombing data must be understood in the context of its limitations.
First, UXO LAO estimates that 70 to 90 per cent of the ordnance detonated as
intended, thus the bomb data identifies ordnance that was expended from aircraft, not
the number that remained in tact. Second, there has been three decades since the end
of the war and a considerable amount of ordnance has been removed through formal
and informal clearance activities. Third, the bombing database contains inaccuracies
and it is not complete – some codes or descriptions of ordnance are confusing and the
coordinates of ordnance drops recorded may differ appreciably from actual impact
locations. Fourth, and perhaps the most important aspect of the bomb data, is that it
only reflects US air-delivered ordnance and does not represent UXO originating from
ground battles such as mortars, rockets and artillery, nor the presence of landmines.
In many areas of the country it is UXO from ground battles and landmines that
contribute most to the impact of the contamination felt today.
In sum, the bomb data maps do not have the same value as minefield maps in regard
to definition of boundaries of contamination or the nature of items remaining,
however the importance of the bombing data as a resource to assist planning of
operations and development activities should not be underestimated. 
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Figure 8. National map of Lao PDR illustrating a summary of US Air Combat Data where
bomb and herbicide data is superimposed on the HIB village impact data 
The HIB survey was an impact assessment using the village as the unit of
investigation. The national summary map presented for the project illustrates a colour
scheme of “dots” of relative impact based on the location of communities visited
during the field assessment phase of the project. The survey however falls short of
providing a national map representing the spatial distribution of contamination. In
the absence of a map that identifies the extent of the contamination between
communities surveyed, or indeed contamination in areas not surveyed, the bombing
data goes some way to address this shortfall. 
Consider Figure 9: this map of Savannakhet province illustrates village impact data
superimposed on bombing data. The additional bomb information significantly
improves a spatial appreciation of the likely location of contamination than does the
impact survey alone. Furthermore, the bombing data may actually be more valid than
it would at first seem since there is likely to be a fair correlation between the location
of ordnance originating from ground battles and the targeting of US air strikes. 
Several stakeholders of survey data value bombing records above community impact
data, for example, where their projects are associated with population relocation, or
are undertaken away from communities or where the scale of the task, such as a major
infrastructure project, is above a community unit. In such cases, the lack of geographic
data on contamination between communities exposes the limitations of a survey
based on village impact alone.
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Figure 9. Savannakhet provincial map: showing UXO impact data from the
1997 HIB socio economic survey and bombing data from records of US air
combat activities.162
162This figure illustrates the relationship between the HI impact data and US bombing data
for the province of Savannakhet. Earlier in the case study an example of a work plan for
Savannakhet is provided this includes a map of poverty by district for the province. This
information and guidelines set out in the NSP form the overarching macro data and strategic
frameworks for the mine action sector in Lao PDR.
Tailored maps and ordnance details generated from the bomb database have been
provided to support a number of development initiatives. Of note, UXO LAO
provided the Asian Development Bank with maps and information from bombing
records along Route 9 – a major road development project through Savannakhet
improving communication links with neighbouring Vietnam. Further examples
include data customised for the German demining company Gerbera working along
Route 7, and the Australian company Milsearch to support clearance at the Nam
Theun 2 dam hydroelectric project in central Lao PDR. 
At the time of the HIB socio-economic survey the bombing data was not available. It
would, however, have been a valuable component of the “expert opinion” and
planning phase of the project. In hindsight, the bombing records reveal several areas
where appreciable contamination fell outside the districts targeted by field operations. 
In Oudomxay Province for instance, the authorities provided HIB with information
that excluded the province from the 1996 field assessment, but the bomb data
identified expected contamination in the eastern districts of the province. 
In addition to direct operational and planning support the value of bombing data as a
simple resource to provide visuals for reports, proposals and donor presentations in
the UXO sector is considerable. Maps of US air combat activities can best illustrate the
extent and intensity of bombardment that Lao PDR witnessed over the nine years
between 1964 and 1973 and it is often these images that have greatest impact when
presenting the case for funding requirements in the UXO programme.
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Box 4. Royds Consulting Engineers in Houaphan Province163
A project undertaken by Royds Consulting firm in Houaphan province is a good
example of problems caused by UXO contamination. Royds was contacted to
build irrigation schemes on the Nam Pheun and Nam Et rivers, work starting in
1994. Royds subcontracted the work to John Holland, only to be forced to halt
work due to the discovery of UXO.
An initial reconnaissance survey was followed by extensive clearance of the
project site by the commercial firm Milsearch. In all, this cost the company
US$1.2million – half of this going to pay for UXO clearance and the other half to
pay John Holland while they waited for clearance to end. This made the whole
project economically much less viable for Royds and delayed the project for
many months. 
While the precise location of UXO could not have been determined, the provision
of bombing data and tailored maps of the development project area could have
significantly assisted initial project planning of Royds Consulting. 
163 Example taken directly from the HI survey final report “Living with UXO” (1997b).
UXO LAO technical surveys
Expressed need for the survey
In the late 1990s, UXO LAO had amassed village level data from two main sources:
the HIB socio-economic impact survey and through community awareness teams that
collected data as part of their ongoing activities. The sources of information were
typically general in nature – collecting village statistics and describing the impact of
UXO on a community – but lacked a concerted effort to focus on potential clearance
sites to provide technical information to support clearance operational planning
directly. In order to address the lack of focus on potential clearance sites as opposed to
broader community data it was considered necessary to incorporate technical
knowledge into the data gathering process. 
Established survey objectives
The objectives of the technical survey capacity in the UXO LAO programme was
initially to strengthen links between information gathering and clearance operations
by providing technical and impact data that supports the development of more
accurate work plans and better targets both roving and area clearance capacities. 
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Table 6. Summary sheet of UXO LAO technical survey programme
Agency UXO LAO
Client UXO LAO (Roving & Area Clearance teams)
Type Technical Survey164
Objectives (1) Technical survey for roving teams
Provide inventory of spot tasks and maps for mobile roving teams to
assist the work planning process, prioritisation of tasks and to facilitate
quick and effective EOD activities
(2) Technical survey for area clearance teams
Provide details of area clearance sites (including socio economic
data) and necessary resources required to assist the work planning
process, task prioritisation and to facilitate quick and effective
clearance. 
Dates/duration165 2000 to date
Scope Nine provinces (national total: 18 provinces, of which 15 are
considered contaminated)
Focus Technical investigation of sites prioritised for clearance
Information
Management
Reports are currently not returned to UXO LAO in Vientiane – typically
remaining in paper format in the provinces and are used in the
generation of the provincial work plan
Cost Estimated at US$17,000 per annum for equipment purchase, salaries
and running costs per two-man team for first year
164 The “traditional” terminology for technical surveys (formerly known as Level 2 surveys)
described an activity of area reduction whereby the boundaries of reported areas of
contamination were delineated and marked. The technical survey implemented in Lao PDR is
more attuned to the current terminology of IMAS 04.10 – considered a reconnaissance and
preparation activity prior to clearance. Level 2 terminology is, however, still used by UXO
LAO.
165 Not a discrete project but an ongoing activity as part of the overall UXO LAO programme.
A secondary objective was to update level one data in villages where CA teams had
not been active. 
Outputs planned
¾ Complete Level 2 questionnaires for each potential clearance site investigated.
¾ Facilitate the annual work plan process through improved assessments of resource
and time requirements for planned clearance tasks.
¾ Increase in the operational output of clearance capacities, measured in numbers of
ordnance disposed (roving teams) and square metres (area clearance teams).
¾ Improved targeting of resources based on beneficiaries, development plans and
land ownership.
Implementation process with activities166
Survey teams work as a provincial asset and are usually tasked by the provincial HQ
based on the framework of the work plan and in conjunction with district authorities
and sometimes village authorities as a result CA team visits.
Work practices of the surveys teams differ depending on whether the survey is
undertaken in support of roving team tasks or area clearance tasks. The principal
differences are that roving clearance tasks are mainly concerned with surface UXO at
one or a number of discrete sites, while area clearance tasks require clearance of
surface and subsurface ordnance over expansive areas. 
The same survey report is completed for both roving and area clearance tasks though
certain fields may not be applicable to surveys in support of roving tasks. The so-
called Level 2 reports include information on: 
¾ Land ownership, land use/planned land use, development plans, beneficiaries;
¾ Type of clearance required, estimated timeframes and resources;
¾ Ordnance types, numbers, conditions;
¾ Impact data (blockage);
¾ Physical attributes: vegetation cover, terrain, soil conditions etc;
¾ Accident information – human/animal;
¾ Other (including access information, previous clearance details, marking);
¾ Attachments: Location maps, site maps, technical UXO data sheets.
In addition, according to the UXO LAO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),
technical teams should also complete a Village Visit Report if CA teams are not
visiting the community.
Survey activities in support of roving tasks
¾ Conduct a village meeting to complete appropriate fields on Level 2 report (and
Village Visit Report where necessary) – including accident details if applicable;
¾ Locate UXO;
¾ Inspect and identify UXO;
¾ Mark a trail to UXO;
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166 The procedures here apply to the survey of UXO, not for surveying of mined areas. For
further details see UXO LAO SOP Section 3 Part 3.
¾ Survey a trail to the UXO and record information on a map;
¾ Submit reports and maps to district/province.
Survey in support of Area Clearance tasks
¾ Conduct a village meeting to complete appropriate fields on Level 2 report (and
Village Visit Report where necessary) – including accident details if applicable;
¾ Accurately define the boundaries of the area to be cleared and the clearance depth
required to support the planned land use;
¾ Mark reference points – to include start point and turning points for clearance
perimeters;
¾ Determine average clearance rate of one deminer at the site (see SOP for
methodology);
¾ Obtain information on accidents.
Actual outputs
Although other changes in UXO LAO occurred at the same time as the introduction
of technical survey teams into the UXO programme, the considerable increase in the
productivity of clearance activities is attributed in part to better information provided
by the technical survey. Furthermore, timeframe considerations used to generate the
annual work plan draw largely on the results of the technical survey. According to the
UXO LAO Director, in 2003 more than 10 million square metres of land was surveyed,
with about 80 per cent of this selected for clearance in the UXO LAO work plan. 
The extent to which technical surveys have led to improvements in targeting
appropriate beneficiaries or the tying of clearance priorities to suitable development
plans is difficult to ascertain. While considerable variation between provinces occurs,
it appears that in most situations technical surveys are simply conducted as a
precursor to clearance and not in a function where the prioritisation of tasks are
appreciably adjusted based on further impact data collected at the time of the survey.
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Figure 10. Physical marking of a trail
to help teams locate UXO 
(Photo: UXO LAO)




To date, technical survey reports are not submitted to UXO LAO headquarters. It is
considered that the turn-around time between technical survey and clearance
activities is too short and thus only clearance information is entered into the database.
Technical reports therefore typically remain as hard copies in the provinces used to
support the work plan process. However, with a conversion of the database to IMSMA
and a greater emphasis on technical survey activities in UXO LAO it is envisaged that
technical survey information will also be available and managed at a central level –
particularly data from the technical survey initiative outlined in the NSP.
Outcome 
Planning, operations and coordination
The information that technical surveys provide on the location of ordnance for roving
tasks, and the delineation of boundaries, physical conditions and clearance
requirements for area clearance tasks has contributed to a significant increase in the
operational output of UXO LAO clearance capacities. 
The maps and inventories of UXO sites generated by surveys for roving teams have
led to a greater efficiency of mobile EOD activities by maximising time spent on UXO
removal rather than on locating UXO and task planning. For large-scale area
clearance, the technical reconnaissance activities of the survey teams determine
resource requirements and mark perimeters to facilitate clearance operations. The
boundaries identified by survey teams are then generally followed strictly by
clearance teams.
While the annual work plan for UXO LAO operations appears to function relatively
well, with technical survey data supporting the planning process, international NGOs
are concerned about the transparency of the task selection and how much the wishes
of local villagers contribute to planning decisions. 
Planned follow-up/additional survey 
There is an ongoing debate on the purpose/capacity/objectives of survey teams and a
strong element within the advisory capacity of UXO LAO advocates for survey teams
to take additional steps to evaluate the presence of ordnance and reduce the number
of tasks that yield no UXO during clearance from the annual work plans.167
The current debate is fuelled around issues such as cost benefits, risk management,
and the conflict between humanitarian and developmental priorities. The debate is
particularly contentious where some operators advocate that technical survey teams
be tasked to release land if survey investigations suggest sites are UXO-free or of such
low risk that deployment of scarce UXO LAO resources are not warranted. It is
particularly the lower risk posed by UXO compared to landmines168 that provides an
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167 See ‘Minutes of Technical Strategy Meeting’ June 2004
168 It should be noted that landmines are more prevalent than first assumed. In Xieng Khouang
province, for instance, the provincial coordinator maintains a map marked with 30 minefields
of which 18 have been marked, and two fenced off. MAG has retrained surveyors to address
mines as well as UXO settings.
opportunity to review different approaches to technical surveys – an activity that
should be fully explored to help speed up clearance work and to better target
operations. 
The ten-year strategic plan (2003-2013) for the UXO programme calls for a
strengthening of the technical survey capacity in Lao PDR to allow areas of
contamination to be better defined across the country and for tasks to be categorised
according to a prioritisation scheme outlined in the NSP. An ambitious plan calls for
technical teams to revisit 2,636 villages from the HIB national survey project by July
2005 and to confirm impact data and collect more data of both technical and
operational relevance. It is envisaged that the exercise will provide a clearer picture of
the total area of land to be dealt with based on the pressing needs of each community
and ultimately the total resources required to address the problem. The assets to
support this “stepped-up” focus on technical survey activities are to be drawn from
area clearance resources in each province.
Current unmet information needs
In order to explore information needs for the UXO programme it is necessary to have
an appreciation of the limitations of the existing data that is currently available. The
National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO, which is considered the
baseline data for UXO in Lao PDR, presents a summary of findings that essentially
categorise villages on the basis of exposure of the population to accident risk.169 While
the risk of accidents is arguably the leading indicator of impact from a humanitarian
perspective, it is misleading to consider the scheme an appreciable measure of the full
socio-economic impact of the UXO contamination. 
The end users of the HIB survey data should be aware that the ranking of villages,
districts and provinces according to land types that pose greatest accident risk to
communities lacks deliberation on the extent of the UXO contamination,170 and is
indifferent to critical development considerations that are vital for planning
purposes.171 It is perhaps unrealistic within the limitations of the HIB project resources
and timeframes to expect a ranking scheme based on a more complex socio-economic
model but the shortfalls of the end product must be understood. 
The National Survey therefore provides a framework of villages to use as guidelines
for targeting resources at a strategic level. The effective prioritisation of clearance
tasks, however, requires survey data at a greater resolution, focusing on areas of
contamination or areas of development where potential clearance sites are identified.
Additional tools and criteria for effective task selection should incorporate factors that
capture the projected socio-economic benefits of each clearance activity. 
Initially, the UXO LAO technical survey teams were introduced to fulfil the role of
additional data collection to support task prioritisation – as well as to collect technical
data for clearance planning. In practice, the tools in place to capture the benefits of a
clearance task are poorly organised and it appears that any socio-economic
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areas contaminated.
171 Such as numbers of people affected, development plans, land ownership, beneficiaries, etc.
information currently collected is largely unused in the work plan process. This
weakness in the prioritisation process is understood by UXO LAO and a review of the
methodology and approach of the technical survey capacities is currently a focus of
the organisation. Furthermore, a review of past clearance activities – the objective of a
planned PCIA project – is overdue. Findings from the PCIA can also be used to further
adjust data collection and prioritisation schemes. Both these initiatives are discussed
further in the following section in the context of an established NRA.
Some stakeholders question the geographic coverage of the HIB survey which,
although extensive, excluded some geographic areas where appreciable
contamination has since been identified. It would be valuable to determine the extent
that the database represents a full national picture of the UXO problem and to what
degree additional data collection activities have addressed shortfalls in the coverage
of the 1997 survey. 
The HIB survey data on victims is outdated and although several reporting channels
have attempted to update victim data, the current under-reporting of the number of
victims is widely recognised as a major data deficiency in the UXO programme. An
improved understanding of victim numbers, the activities leading to accidents and the
status of survivors will better define the humanitarian problem in Lao PDR today and
significantly improve the MRE and survivor support programmes. For appropriate
targeting of clearance activities at high risk sites more accurate information on the
circumstances of accidents and better precision of the location of current accidents will
also be of considerable benefit for clearance planning. An initiative to address
deficiencies in the victim data and to install mechanisms to update accident data is
also discussed in the following section.
Although further data collection activities are necessary, stakeholders also identified
an appreciable weakness in the current data management systems at the national
database. Mechanisms for encouraging access to, and use of, data from the database,
and a review of the required resources to facilitate an effective response to data
requests should be implemented. Improvements to the database unit will increase the
extent that stakeholders are able to capitalise on existing data – in addition to future
data collected.
Conclusions and recommendations
In general, the consensus expressed by stakeholders is that the UXO programme in
Lao PDR has a wealth of data to use for strategic and operational planning on a macro
scale. The two principal projects that have contributed to this data pool are the
National Socio-economic Survey and the desk top survey that provided US Air
Combat Records to UXO LAO. In addition, other data that is not mine action specific,
such as poverty mapping (undertaken as part of a Lao PDR development plan)
provides valuable national strategic frameworks in which to link mine action
priorities.172
National coverage of survey information
The extensive coverage of the impact survey served the main purpose of defining the
UXO problem to help shape the development of the UXO clearance programme in 
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highly affected areas, and inject valuable information into MRE and survivor
assistance activities – as well as facilitate fundraising. 
Although the HIB survey visited 7,675 villages of a total of some 11,000 in Lao PDR,
data coverage is referenced as incomplete in some literature.173 It appears that the
“expert opinion” that governed the targeting of the provinces and districts for the
survey had shortfalls in some geographic areas based on review of bomb data archives
and knowledge that has been acquired in the years following the HIB survey.
Although CA teams have collected additional information within the framework of
the HIB survey and have also visited areas outside the targeted HIB villages, coverage
is not complete and data from CA teams has yet to be entered into the same data table
as the HIB survey information. 
It is recommended that UXO LAO174 integrate the data from the HIB survey and CA
teams into a single database and review the geographic scope of survey data at a
village level across the country based on the increased quality of expert opinion
available today. Such an exercise, in conjunction with appropriate action, would
address concerns by some stakeholders that the geographic extent of UXO data is
limited. 
Socio-economic impact data
A recommendation of the HIB survey was that further refining of the socio economic
data for villages be undertaken in order to better define factors that contribute to
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Figure 13. Examples of data at a macro-level: (a) UXO community impact data,
bombing data from US records of combat activities and (b) national poverty maps
National coverage of survey information.
173 For example: UXO LAO Annual Report 2003.
174 This recommendation applies also to the NRA who will inherit the database facility from
UXO LAO.
“impact”. Apart from a greater focus on victim data, capturing socio-economic data at
a village level on a wide geographic scale is complex, timely and may prove to have
limited value when reviewed against the pressing needs of improving the current
work plan process. 
Rather than spending resources further developing the fabric of village data to better
define areas of contamination175 and to develop more complicated socio-economic
modelling, perhaps the HIB survey and additional CA data collected at village level
may serve as an appropriate baseline of data. Although work at this level should be
continued, a greater concentration of efforts must now be focused on the work plan
process and the need to incorporate more transparent criteria and prioritisation
schemes for selection of clearance tasks based on socio-economic benefits at a site level
rather than that at a village level. 
At a site level planners will profit from a greater understanding of the expected level
of contamination, the risk of further accidents, details of future land use plans and
importantly, the nature and number of beneficiaries that result from clearance
activities. Such factors can be reviewed against strategic frameworks and expected
costs of clearance activities proposed. In order to achieve this, the technical survey
methodology and approach must be further developed and actually used (and
monitored) to strengthen justification of work plan priorities. 
The NSP calls for a technical survey of 2,636 contaminated villages from the HIB
national survey in order to confirm land use and impact data and to collect additional
information on proposed development activities and undertake more specific
technical investigations. While this will provide enhanced data to support
prioritisation it is a daunting task – complicated by the nature of the UXO
contamination, the dynamic development environment and the timeframes proposed.
In addition to this “national” technical survey, a technical follow-up will still be
required at each task proposed for clearance in the work plan. This study recommends
that a focus is placed on the task level of site investigation and evaluation – building on
the existing work plan process – rather than on tying up considerable assets in a
national programme which may not provide the value of data anticipated.
Victim data
The difficulty of assessing the socio-economic impact of UXO contamination puts a
greater emphasis on the level of deaths and injuries as an indicator of the
humanitarian problem. The victim data currently available in Lao PDR is outdated
and the incidence of accidents is believed to be considerably under-reported. In order
to assist the targeting of MRE, survivor assistance and clearance resources, a priority
should be given to update victim data and to install an active mechanism to ensure
that data remains current. 
A feasibility study conducted by HIB, under contract from UNDP, has recommended
that a system similar to the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS)
be set up in Lao PDR. A clear understanding of accident data will significantly
enhance information available for planners – particularly the NRA, the repository of
the proposed Lao PDR UXO/Mine Victim Information System (LMVIS). An expanded
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especially over a large scale – is a daunting task.
national victim programme has broad support amongst operators, authorities and
donors but implementation of the plan is awaiting the full establishment of the NRA,
which will determine how the project should proceed.
Defining areas of contamination 
The HIB impact survey is based on the community as the survey unit and therefore
only provides limited information on hazard-based location data. The UXO
programme therefore suffers from appreciable geographic control of actual
contaminated areas, apart from a general picture provided by the records of US
bombing. 
A priority of the NSP is to obtain a better understanding of the geographic extent of
contamination in the country to assist the effective targeting of UXO LAO resources.
The nature of the UXO contamination in Lao PDR however is considerably more
complex than contamination in a typical minefield setting176 and thus the delineation
of areas of contamination presents considerable challenges. The UXO problem is
poorly defined in three dimensions – characterised by irregularly scattered ordnance
on the horizontal plane and a highly variable subsurface component of contamination
on the vertical plane. It is hard to envisage how a quality hazard-based survey could
be devised and implemented on a large scale at a realistic cost and in an appropriate
timeframe, however desirable it may be. 
Targeted technical surveys177 in high priority areas, or focused on tentative lists of
clearance tasks is perhaps more realistic, addressing two main concerns: first, that
prioritisation of clearance site occurs according to clear socio-economic and
humanitarian criteria, and second, to ensure that resources are deployed effectively in
contaminated areas. 
Aspects of priority setting 
The HIB data and information collected by CA teams remains an important reference and one
that should be used more in planning activities of the UXO programme. Aprioritisation scheme
for clearance activities, though, should not be determined solely by a ranking scheme of villages
based on risk reduction, but must be responsive to shifting strategies and projects at a local level
as well as to national development plans.
The work plans devised by UXO LAO provides a framework which gives top-down
strategic direction from a central level while allowing provinces and districts to
identify bottom-up solutions to UXO problems within the national context. In order for
the work plan process to function in a clear manner, however, every clearance request
at a local level should be accompanied by a technical and socio economic assessment. 
An example of an appropriate humanitarian intervention would be one located in a
district identified as a national priority development area according to NPEP, at a site
where accidents are occurring, and where a credible development project is planned.
In the Lao programme today the identification of priorities is not undertaken in a fully
transparent fashion, and there is a need to develop criteria to support a logical
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176 In other countries predominately affected by minefields, national technical surveys –
though desirable – are rarely completed due to the scale of the required task.
177 “Clearance” in this context refers to area clearance activities as opposed to roving teams.
assessment of tasks. To strengthen this critical component of the programme,
adaptations to the technical survey are required (accompanied by further training),
together with better instruction provided to UXO LAO provincial coordinators. A full
review should be undertaken to ensure that the implementation of a rational task
selection process actually occurs, and that relevant justification of work plan priorities
are documented and scrutinised.178
Minefield versus UXO
The focus of this study has been on survey approaches to UXO whose presence and
degree of impact overwhelm the contribution of landmine contamination when
viewed on a national scale. In some areas of the country, however, landmines have
greater prevalence and approaches to survey must be more conventional. 
The scope of this study did not include a detailed review of the relative impact of
landmines and UXO in the Lao context, or adaptations to survey approaches between
landmine- and UXO-affected areas. The British NGO, MAG, however has been
particularly active in this regard and has adjusted the configuration of field teams and
working procedures to address landmine contamination. 
It is generally assumed that mines pose a greater human risk than UXO. Furthermore,
the nature of areas contaminated by landmines can usually be more readily described
in terms of blockage or land denial than corresponding areas of UXO contamination. In
such instances, economic benefits of clearance activities are more easily determined and
if supported by additional accident data or appropriate development plans, the
prioritisation of landmine clearance above UXO in some affected areas may be justified.
Review of past activities to help shape future work
During the period between 1996 and late 2004, approximately 5,000 hectares of land
and 600,000 items of unexploded ordnance were cleared by UXO LAO. A
comprehensive review of past clearance activities, however, has not been undertaken
and thus an evaluation is now overdue to assess the effectiveness of the UXO
programme and the degree to which intended benefits have been accrued to the
intended beneficiaries. 
The importance of a comprehensive evaluation of UXO LAO operations has been
identified as a priority activity and is expected to take place in 2005. Until the NRA is
in a position to conduct these activities UNDP will oversee the PCIA project. The PCIA
offers an opportunity to improve the tools available for prioritisation of clearance
tasks at a micro level – by defining a better list of criteria against which the expected
benefits of future clearance can be evaluated. In other words, the PCIA should identify
well-targeted and successful clearance projects that have taken place since 1996,
review the factors that have made them successful, and develop guidelines in the
UXO LAO programme to help replicate them.
UXO programme national database
Many stakeholders view the national database facility as an underused capacity and
identify a need to improve the integration of existing information into planning
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processes more effectively. Data requirements for some stakeholders may be
addressed by greater understanding of the available resources and through greater
encouragement and success at accessing tailored information in a timely fashion. 
The database will better respond to information needs by a restructuring of the
existing facility through a completion of the conversion to IMSMA and improvements
in the geographic information available. Specific tasks that should be undertaken or
completed are listed in Table 7.
A UNDP evaluation mission in 1998 identified the UXO LAO database as a capacity
that needed to be strengthened – including consideration for more staff and resources.
Although the responsibility of the database will be moved to the newly established
NRA, the recommendations for the facility remain current. It is suggested that more
deliberate efforts should take place to move the information management systems
from a predominantly static repository of information into a more dynamic capacity.
This would maximise a two-way sharing of information between the database and
end users. This should include an outreach to UN agencies, NGOs, commercial
enterprises and other potential beneficiaries of data that operate outside the UXO
LAO structure.
Table 7. Suggested technical improvements to the national database179
¾ The conversion of the following databases to IMSMA structure: 
¾ Monthly Progress Reports of the Roving Clearance Teams;
¾ Monthly Progress Reports of the Area Clearance Teams;
¾ Impact Survey (1996-97) and UXO Accidents (1996-97)
¾ An update of information by combining existing databases:
¾ Impact Survey (1996-97) combined with Community Awareness Village 
Visit Reports
¾ UXO Accidents (1996-97) combined with Monthly Report of UXO 
Accidents.
¾ Creation of new databases to:
¾ Record Area Clearance Task Completion Reports using IMSMA.
¾ Record Technical Survey reports for Area Clearance Tasks using IMSMA.
¾ Improve geographic data:
¾ Expand 1:100,000 scale spatial database to include UXO contaminated 
provinces of Houaphan, Xiengkhoang, and Luang Prabang (not 
covered by earlier projects).
¾ Research and conduct GPS observations to permit calculation of 
accurate datum transformation parameters from Indian 1960 datum to 
WGS 1984 for 1: 50
¾ Replace 1:100,000 scale feature data in the national spatial database 
with 1: 50,000.
¾ Additional datasets
¾ Recent population and agricultural census data should be obtained to 
complement UXO data and strengthen demographic and economic 
data to support planning. 
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currently underway).
It is further recommended that a review of the database facility should include an
assessment of how data from the US combat activities has been used. Stakeholders
may be unaware of possibilities of manipulation of data sets, for instance, the ability
to rank villages or districts based on munitions that have the greatest humanitarian
impact. It would seem that there is considerable value in providing a greater number
of tailored maps of specific locations and associated tables of ordnance types and
numbers and distributing them more widely. 
The role of the National Regulatory Authority 
The NRA establishment in Lao PDR serves to separate regulatory and operational
activities in the mine action sector. Some of the main objectives for establishing a
national authority were to improve the effectiveness of the mine action sector through
better data management, a broadening of considerations to enhance prioritisation
mechanisms and provision of greater transparency and stakeholder involvement in
the processes. 
The NRA when fully established will have a considerable portfolio of information to
support effective management of the UXO programme in Lao PDR. Specifically, the
NRA will inherit the UXO LAO database providing access to the HIB impact data, CA
reports from some 5,000 villages, national bomb data from records of US combat
activities and the NPEP strategic framework. In the near future, further upgraded
victim data from the planned LMVIS, expanded technical survey data from 2,636
villages and the findings from the PCIA will also be available. Additional databases,
such as recent population and agricultural census, could also prove valuable tools in
placing mine action priorities in a broader development context – complementing
UXO data and strengthening demographic and economic data for planning purposes. 
The mandate of the NRA includes prioritisation and tasking of all UXO/mine action
operators. Even with the considerable data available, the NRA should be careful not
to compromise the essential input from districts and provinces. The NRA should thus
use the information available centrally to define frameworks for the prioritisation
process and to provide operators with necessary data to allow appropriate detailed
plans to be generated from the field – while ensuring that procedures are in place to
validate the bottom-up planning recommendations. 
Survey terminology 
The current SOPs and survey report forms used in the UXO LAO programme
continue to use outdated terminology for several survey types. In October 2001, the
first edition of the International Mine Action Standards removed all reference to the
original Level 1, 2 and 3 terminology and although they still remain in common use
today the numerical reference for a survey level is now officially obsolete.180
It is recommended that when SOPs and survey forms are next reviewed in the UXO
programme, terminology be updated to reflect the current international mine action
standards.
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Table 8. Summary of survey data needs reported by stakeholders and recommendations 




HIB survey not fully







today is based on a risk
reduction model alone
Review the “expert opinion” used in the original survey to
exclude data collection in some areas of the country. 
US bomb data was not available at the start of the HIB
project but provides further information on the expected
extent and impact of contamination together with improved
knowledge of the UXO situation gained since 1997. UXO LAO
could consider sending teams to additional areas outside the
scope of those covered by HIB and subsequent CA team
activities to address some stakeholder concerns that the
geographic extent of the survey is limited. 
CA teams have contributed considerable amounts of
additional village level data which complements the work
undertaken by HIB. Currently the databases are stored in
separate tables and they should be combined. 
Indicators used to rank villages are rarely questioned by
stakeholders today although a recommendation of the HIB
survey was to explore impact criteria further. The UXO
programme has matured and research/adjustments to
impact criteria could be further reviewed and updated. The
recommendations of this study however are to concentrate
more on socio economic and humanitarian criteria to
prioritise clearance at a “site” level as opposed to “village”
level and to incorporate better tools into the technical survey
methodology and approach.
VICTIM SURVEY
Victim data for Lao PDR is
out dated and
incomplete. Mechanisms
to report victim data are
inadequate and current
victim rates are under-
reported.
Victim information is arguably the most important
humanitarian impact indicator for UXO contamination, and
accurate data is crucial in the planning and implementation
of an effective MRE and survivor assistance response. For
effective risk reduction strategies through clearance there is
also a need for better data on the circumstances, and
where feasible, better precision regarding the location of
accidents. A focus to provide mechanisms to keep national
victim data current is also required.
A successful UNDP-HIB feasibility study was completed in
(2004). An expansion of the project is planned to create a
national victim database and support an “active” process of
collecting and updating accident information. It is envisaged
that a system similar to the CMVIS will be developed.
RECORDS OF US
BOMBING ACTIVITIES
Underused in the UXO
programme
As part of an effort to revitalise the 2-way sharing of
information between database and various stakeholders the
value of records of US bombing activities should be
reviewed. This study concludes that the bomb database,
despite its limitations as a measure of current contamination,




are currently only used as
a precursor to clearance.
They play a minimal role,
if any, in prioritisation of
tasks based on impact or
other criteria.
Technical teams should be used in a more integrated fashion
to determine priorities based on agreed criteria with
particular attention given to areas of confirmed
contamination and with clear socio economic benefits.
Current technical survey tools should be reviewed in
conjunction with necessary training for survey teams.
Additional instruction would also be required at a
province/district level to better use the data and improve
the transparency in the work plan process. 
TECHNICAL SURVEY
(continued)
Future role of technical survey is currently being reviewed in
UXO LAO.
The NSP calls for expanded technical surveys of 2636 villages
identified as contaminated from the HIB national survey – to
classify land use, review development plans and collect more
data of technical and operational relevance.
It is anticipated that the technical survey initiative outlined in
the NSP will not fully satisfy the requirements for planning and
justifying specific clearance tasks in future work plans. As the
UXO programme develops additional technical investigations
will be required for specific tasks to define clearance
boundaries, identify resource allocation and gather updated









IMSMA allows the convenient recording PCD information –
particularly location of clearance and perimeter details and a
conversion clearance records to IMSMA will facilitate
monitoring of clearance activities.
Task Completion Reports are currently being entered into





conducted in Lao PDR
to date. 
There is a need to review the effectiveness of the UXO
programme by revisiting former sites of clearance to review
past prioritisation of clearance activities and the socio
economic impact of the entire programme. A “sidebar” to
the main objective of the evaluation should be to refine a list
of criteria against which future clearance activities can be
assessed as part of the work plan process.






The mine action authority should oversee the completion of
the on-going conversion to IMSMA, the update of geographic
data and the integration of databases to optimise the ability
of the database unit to address stakeholder demands (see
Table 7).
A strategy should be developed to strengthen the database
as a proactive information provider – maximising the 2-way
information flow between the central level and provinces
(and other stakeholders).
A strengthening of the technical aspects of the database is
due to start in late 2004 although a review of human resources
and mechanisms to support data provision to and from
stakeholders should also be prioritised in conjunction with this
initiative.
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Note: Considering that existing data could be further exploited, it is important to assess the
value of additional information gathering activities and to identify mechanisms to ensure
that data from new initiatives is successfully incorporated into the planning decisions of
stakeholders. There is little value in collecting further data if it is not readily used.
Table 8 (continued)
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War 1964 -1974 ¾Lao army cleared vital transportation routes during the war period. 
1975-1990s
¾Lao army and Vietnamese advisors support some clearance of
roads, schools, wats (temples), and various construction sites for public
buildings. Battle area clearance was also conducted in some villages
in the north. Lao army continues to support clearance efforts –
primarily in support of infrastructure projects financed by the
government.
¾In the late 1970s, an agricultural area in Xieng Khouang was cleared
through a Russian aid programme.
¾Chinese Army undertake some clearance ahead of Chinese-funded
road construction projects.
1992
¾An Australian Company, Milsearch, started operations – operating in
a joint venture with an army company, Bolisat Phathana
Khetphoudoi.
1994
¾Mennonite Central Committee/Mines Advisory Group UXO project
starts in Xieng Khouang (community awareness, May – and
clearance, October).
1995 ¾Lao PDR Trust Fund for UXO established under Prime Minister's Decree49/M, with UNDP and UNICEF where UNDP administered the fund.
1996
¾Establishment of UXO LAO Head Office & Training Centre (PM
Decree 49/M).
¾Established UXO LAO provincial offices in Xieng Khouang
(MAG,1994), Houaphan (Gerbera, 1996).
¾Contract for National Socio Economic Impact Survey awarded to
¾Handicap International and field activities undertaken.
¾UXO LAO Community Awareness (CA) activities initiated – UNICEF
assumed a lead role in a CA Technical Working Group.
¾US and Lao PDR sign a MOU for US training support and in-kind
assistance (equipment, vehicles and equipment).
¾A group of 3 US NGOs, formed an entity, Consortium, and
developed a UXO awareness curriculum for primary schools – tested
in Xieng Khouang.
1997
¾Publication HIB National Socio Economic Impact Survey report.
¾Field operations start in Savannakhet with Handicap International.
¾Proposal for NPA to provide technical assistance in Champasak,
Sekong and Attapeu accepted.
1998
¾NPA initiate support programmes in Sekong and Attapeu 
¾Belgium military start technical advisory responsibilities in
Champassak.
¾Field operations begin in Luang Prabang with Gerbera technical
support.
¾Work Plan process, Community Awareness strategy finalised
¾General expansion of operations.
¾Nationalisation of equipment and resources initiated.
¾Independent review of programme conducted (van Ree et al.,
1998).
¾POWER joined with other Survivor Assistance NGOs and Government
agencies to form the Co-operative Orthotic and Prothetic Enterprise
(COPE).
1999 ¾Operations in Khammouane Province initiated with World Visiontechnical support.
Annex 1. Chronology of mine action in Lao PDR181
181 Information mainly complied from UXO LAO (2003b); ICBL (2004); GICHD (2001:  Laos





































¾Transfer of field staff from implementing partner to UXO LAO
contracts
¾Start of Progressive Team Leader Course at the National Training
Centre
¾UXO LAO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) finalised
2001 ¾Continued nationalisation of operations¾UXO LAO staffing targets achieved
2002
¾First Senior Explosive Ordnance Disposal (SEOD) course initiated
¾Cash flow crisis of donor assistance – most provinces scale back
operations significantly
¾UNDP mission review undertaken
2003
¾Return to full team strength in most provinces (donor support secured
to enable Champasak and Khammouane to return to full strength in
2004)
2004
¾10 Year National Strategy: 'The Safe Path Forward' approved by the
National UXO Steering Committee. The plan redefines the role and
structure of the national UXO programme
¾Decree 32/PM approved authorising the establishment of a National
Regulatory Authority
¾Swiss Foundation for Mine action (FSD) partner with World Food
Programme


























Annex 2. Example of a UXO LAO Provincial Work Plan,
2004: Savannakhet182
Savannakhet is considered the most severely contaminated province in Lao PDR with
UXO covering an estimated 75 per cent of the land area. This results from both intense
bombing of the east and centre of the province between 1964 and 1973 and ground
battles, the largest being in Sepone District in 1971. 
Six of the seven districts that are identified as “poor or very poor” from national
poverty mapping have targeted mine action activities in 2004. Only one district,
Atsaphang Thong, is targeted for UXO LAO operations and not categorised as “poor
or very poor” according to the National Poverty Eradication 2004 Plan. 
Of note 35 per cent of the planned area for clearance supports the following
development projects:
¾ Poverty Eradication Project in Phine District funded by Lao Government, 440,000 m2;
¾ Road construction in Xepon district, funded by Belgium and implemented by NGO BTC,
150,000m2;
¾ Road construction in Nong & Phine Districts funded by the EU, 100,000m2.
















To visit 290 villages



















































6 Districts 36 8,644 1,858,000
182 Adapted from UXO LAO (2003b: 33-34).
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Chapter 5
The case of Mozambique
Nick Cumming-Bruce
Introduction
This case study looks at the use of survey in mine action in Mozambique. It reviews
the appropriateness of the surveys conducted as well as their utility in planning,
managing and evaluating mine action operations. It is based on fieldwork in-country
in August 2004 and discussions before and since with key informants, particularly the
National Demining Institute, demining operators, donors and the UN.
The origins of Mozambique's landmine problem
Thirty years of conflict ending in the 1990s left Mozambique severely contaminated by
landmines in all of its ten provinces, inflicting casualties and posing a serious obstacle
to post-war recovery and rehabilitation. Even now, the government estimates 1.7
million people are directly affected by landmines,183 but after a decade of
humanitarian mine action, landmines now claim only a few victims each year. Given
competition for donor funds, the government and aid agencies are under growing
pressure to identify the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO and to
establish the priority and appropriate level of funding that mine action should be
accorded in Mozambique's wider development agenda.
Mozambique's slide into conflict started in 1964 when the Mozambique Liberation
Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or FRELIMO), set up two years earlier in
Tanzania, launched an armed struggle to end Portuguese colonial rule. Within a year,
FRELIMO had started infiltrating and setting up bases in northern Mozambique and
laying both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. By the late 1960s, Portuguese forces
had nicknamed the north “Minas Gerais” or “General Mines”. Portuguese troops also
laid extensive barrier minefields in northern Cabo Delgado province near the
Tanzanian border to try to check FRELIMO infiltration.
By 1970, FRELIMO had launched operations further south into central Tête province
menacing the Cahora-Bassa hydroelectric dam, at that time still under construction.
Portuguese forces responded by laying substantial numbers of mines around it, albeit
far fewer mines than military commanders intended because of inadequate supplies.
183 Information provided by Faduco Mavie, National Demining Institute (IND), 9 August 2004.
FRELIMO meanwhile continued laying mines along major roads and paths to try to
limit troop movements and productivity in the districts. These roads and paths were
also used by civilians.
Landmines from this conflict, however, constitute only a small proportion of the
contamination that remains today. The pro-independence struggle ended in 1974 after
a military coup d'état in Portugal gave power to officers who favoured independence
for all its African colonies. Mozambique set up a transitional government and in 1975
declared full independence under a FRELIMO government led by President Samora
Machel. Within two years, however, the FRELIMO government became embroiled in
a war with armed groups financed and equipped by hostile neighbours.
In 1976, Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in line with UN sanctions and
in support of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). It also
backed the African National Congress, which used bases in southern Mozambique to
launch attacks into South Africa. The following year the FRELIMO government
declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and turned to the Soviet Union for
support. In the same year, Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Office created the
Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO), launching operations in
central Mozambique. 
From the outset of this war, Rhodesian military instructors trained RENAMO in the
use of landmines, which its units used to block major roads and supply routes as well
as against airstrips. FRELIMO, like the Portuguese colonial government before it, now
actively employed mines to defend key economic installations and strategic positions
such as military bases. From 1980, this conflict sharply escalated.
In 1976, the Lancaster House Agreements signed in London had ended civil war in
Rhodesia and paved the way for a majority-based government. The new regime
promptly signed a security agreement with Mozambique providing for defence of the
land corridor linking Zimbabwe to the coast and for support in the destruction of
RENAMO. By then, however, the former Rhodesian Intelligence Organization had
transferred management of RENAMO to South Africa's Military Intelligence
Directorate and the more militarist government led by P.W. Botha now embarked on
a more aggressive strategy of destabilising Southern Africa's frontline states. 
In Mozambique, this entailed building up the strength of RENAMO, which soon
started to expand the scope of its military operations in the strategically crucial central
provinces – Gaza, Inhambane and the richest province, Zambezia. FRELIMO's
response included laying large minefields along the border with South Africa and
indiscriminate mining elsewhere in the country as protection for temporary positions
used by patrols or to deny insurgents access to food and water sources. In the later
stages of the war, the government dropped mines by air over parts of Zambezia
province as part of their counter-insurgency operations. 
By 1986, famine and intensifying RENAMO operations, including the killing and
mutilation of civilians, sent thousands of refugees fleeing across the border into
Malawi. The government launched a major counter-offensive along the Zambezi river
in 1987, helped by Zimbabwean paratroopers and Tanzanian troops. This helped turn
the tide of the war but also caused hundreds of thousands more refugees to flee to
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. FRELIMO's position in central Mozambique became
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precarious and it suffered another blow in 1986 when President Samora Machel died
in a mysterious plane crash over South Africa. Foreign forces added to the problems
of landmine contamination. Zimbabwean forces mined the Limpopo and Beira
transport corridors, Malawi troops put down mines along the Nacala railway and
Tanzanian troops laid mines defensively around their military camps.
By 1988 the war had reached a stalemate and pressures on both sides prompted a
number of initiatives to bring about peace talks. Mozambique, facing economic
disaster, had dropped its socialist economic programme in 1987 and adopted a harsh
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme. In 1990, the
government adopted a constitution that allowed a multi-party political system. In
South Africa, de Klerk's assumption of the country's presidency in 1989 led to a
curtailing in support for RENAMO. 
Peace talks started in 1990, leading to the Rome Peace Agreement signed in October
1992. This provided for an immediate cease-fire, demobilisation of both armies and
the holding of legislative and presidential elections. To oversee the transition to
elected government, the UN deployed a 6,400-strong peacekeeping force, ONUMOZ,
with a mandate that included coordinating clearance of landmines. Peace, however,
did not immediately halt the laying of landmines. Sporadic, albeit increasingly rare,
use of landmines by disgruntled military personnel, poachers and bandits continued
to be reported until the mid-1990s.
History of mine action in Mozambique184
By the end of the war, Mozambique was initially assessed as one of the world's most
severely mine-contaminated countries and it appeared in urgent need of
humanitarian mine action to allow social stabilisation and economic recovery.
Mozambique's early post-war priorities included resettling an estimated 6.7 million
people displaced by conflict, including some 1.7 million refugees who had fled to
Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania. Moreover, by the end of the war
Mozambique was ranked by the UN among the world's ten poorest countries and
landmines clearly posed an obstacle to both resettling and cultivating land and to
developing the country's infrastructure. However, mine action got off to a slow start
and it never, either then or now, appeared to figure high in the priorities of national
leaders. 
The major obstacle to initial mine clearance efforts was political infighting, both
between FRELIMO and RENAMO and between a number of UN agencies. The Rome
peace agreement had made no explicit reference to the issue of landmines and
responsibility for initiating the programme lay with the UN's Supervisory and
Control Commission, which in turn needed the agreement of both the FRELIMO
government and RENAMO. By January 1993, they had approved the Commission's
proposal to hire Gurkha Security Guards, who were assigned to clear roads north of
the central city of Beira under a contract that ran to February 1994. By then GSG had
cleared 160 kilometres of road at a cost of US$1.7 million and had found only six
mines. As a result of political obstacles, however, no other professional demining took
place until mid-1994.
184 See the Annex for a chronology of mine action in Mozambique.
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The UN had produced a demining plan for Mozambique in January 1993. The first
stage aimed to identify 2,000 kilometres of road as priority for clearance to support the
delivery of food to feeding centres for drought-affected populations, the
establishment of transit centres to receive refugees returning from neighbouring
countries and for setting up assembly areas for demobilising soldiers. The second
stage called for identifying and clearing the routes needed to repatriate refugees from
neighbouring countries and to facilitate economic recovery. A third stage foresaw the
setting up of a school to train deminers who would clear remaining areas and who, in
the long term, would become available for mine clearance work elsewhere in Africa.
But objections from FRELIMO and RENAMO stalled implementation. Only after a
UN ultimatum threatening to withdraw support for mine clearance did they give their
consent, clearing the way for the first nationwide survey conducted by HALO Trust.
In the meantime, both the government and RENAMO carried out some clearance,
although RENAMO remained unwilling to open access to some areas it considered
strategically sensitive and the quality of its clearance work was judged to be poor. It
was not until early 1995, more than two years after the peace accords, that a company
of soldiers of the joint Defence Armed Forces of Mozambique, which incorporated
former FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers, and trained by the French military, began
clearance in Maputo province. 
The UN proved little more effective at expediting mine clearance as a result of rivalry
between UN agencies. UNDP, which had control of mine clearance funding, would
not back projects proposed by the UN's Office of Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination (UNOHAC), and was slow to act on requests by any projects which
were not operating through the UN Trust Fund. Despite the availability of ample
donor funds, spending on mine clearance by April 1994 had totalled only US$1.4
million. A month later the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs decided to take
US$7.5 million away from UNDP and put it under UNOHAC's control. 
However, UNOHAC's performance did not help. It drew up a short list of five
companies to engage in clearance in 1993 but reached no decision on which to engage
until May 1994. At that point it awarded a US$4.8 million contract to clear 2,000
kilometres of road to a consortium that included Mechem of South Africa and Royal
Ordnance of the UK. The operation, named Project Caminho, stirred international
controversy among human rights groups and donors for employing firms that
designed and manufactured mines and was acknowledged by the UN as a mistake.185
Six months later, UNOHAC was replaced by UNDP. 
At this point, most mine clearance work was taking place outside the UN system.
HALO Trust, after completing the initial nationwide survey, had concentrated since
1993 on training mine clearers, focusing on the northern provinces of Zambezia and
Niassa where it started clearance from early 1994. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) also
began training deminers in mid-1993 and from 1994 started to deploy them in central
Tête province. RONCO Consulting Corporation started a programme training dogs
and handlers in late 1993 and began clearance operations in mid-1994. Handicap
International, primarily engaged in opening prostheses workshops, initiated a mine
risk education programme (then called mine awareness) and also engaged in some
clearance work. 
185 Human Rights Watch (1997). It cites an official of the UN Department for Humanitarian
Affairs stating “it is now our view that no arms producer can ever again receive a UN mine
clearance contract.”
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Although the government and some international agencies employed a number of
commercial demining companies,186 the international NGOs and RONCO have
provided the backbone of the international mine clearance effort in Mozambique. An
indigenous organisation emerged after October 1995, when the UN launched the
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). Six months later, ADP was operating with
450 mine clearers deployed in Maputo and Inhambane provinces, supported by nine
expatriate advisers and a team of Gurkha field supervisors. 
This geographic distribution of assets – with HALO Trust in the north, NPA in the
centre and ADP in the south – has survived ever since, but will not last much longer
in view of plans by NPA to withdraw from Mozambique in about two years' time and
HALO's interest in winding down in the north, posing a challenge for national
management of mine action, an area that has emerged only slowly.
The National Mine Clearance Commission (CND), first discussed in 1993, finally took
shape with a government decree issued in May 1995. It mandated the commission to
collect and analyse data, establish procedures for identifying demining priorities,
draw up a national plan, approve and licence all operators, develop national capacity
and monitor and coordinate all demining agencies. The result was disappointing.
CND did not become operational and convene its first formal meeting until the end of
1996, 18 months after being set up. Six months later, in June 1997, CND was dissolved
by government decree and replaced by the Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND),
mandated to “successfully establish and develop a coordination, supervision and
management mechanism”.
IND has also been dogged by both disagreement on its role and the inertia of national
leaders on the issue of mine action. In 2000, the government approved a staffing level
of 120 for the IND in line with UN recommendations calling for a strong national
authority – but it found little interest from donors in supporting the associated costs.
Moreover, direct donor financing of most mine clearance eroded IND's authority, and
to this day it has been in a position to provide only limited direction or support to
demining agencies. Its management role has been largely confined to accreditation,
database management, preparation of a five-year national mine action plan and an
annual plan of demining priorities. 
Current status of mine action
Since completion of the Landmine Impact Survey in 2001, IND has formulated
ambitious goals for mine action:187 By 2009:
¾ All high and medium impact areas to be cleared;
¾ All items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) to be destroyed;
¾ All existing stockpiles of landmines to be destroyed;
¾ All remaining low impact areas to be surveyed and marked;
¾ National mine risk education/marking programme to be fully operational; and
¾ Long-term survivor and victim assistance programmes to be established.
Mozambique completed destruction of its landmine stockpiles in March 2003, but the
186 These included Mechem, Zimbabwe-based Mine-Tech and Special Clearance Services and
Krohn Demining Enterprises of Germany. Their involvement has fallen off in recent years
because of the lack of funds available.
187 The Five-Year National Mine Action Plan, 2002-2006, 19 November 2001.
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IND, set up under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been no more successful than
its predecessors in attracting much government interest or support for mine action.
Until 2003, the government had provided no direct financial support for mine action.
Moreover, although the National Mine Action Programme (NMAP) identifies poverty
reduction as one of its two main aims (along with reducing risk of injury or death
caused by landmines), the government's poverty reduction plan (Plano de Accao para
a Reducao de Pobreza Absoluta) makes no reference to landmines.
To date, there has been no national survey of victims or any attempt even to develop
a mechanism for compiling accurate statistics on mine-related trauma. The IND says
it does not receive any accident data from the Ministry of Health, only what is
reported by demining operators. There has not been any national survey for the
purposes of developing mine risk education (MRE). In the 1990s, MRE was led by
Handicap International but in 2001 it handed over the role to the IND. Since then, the
IND has lacked personnel or funds to follow up on more than a limited scale. 
Against this background, mine action is in a critical transitional stage. Although IND
continues to appeal for financial assistance to undertake technical surveys for a more
precise definition of tasks and priorities, key donors are re-evaluating the importance
of mine action within Mozambique's overall development needs and reducing
financial support. A review conducted in 2004 on behalf of the Danish government, for
example, noted that the number of accidents had fallen from 133 in 1998 to 11 in 2001,
47 in 2002 and 13 in 2003. It found that “the major mine threat in the country has been
reduced to a level which no longer requires a wide and long-term involvement of
international efforts and operators”.188
NPA, as a result, is preparing to cease demining in Mozambique by the end of 2006
and hand over its demining assets to a Mozambican NGO, although which entity will
receive them has yet to be decided. Its current operations have scaled down new
clearance tasks and are focused on compiling accurate records of the clearance
conducted since it arrived in country.
The HALO Trust/UNOHAC Landmine Survey of
Mozambique
After three decades of conflict, Mozambique faced a formidable challenge to resettle
refugees and internally displaced people, alleviate acute food shortages and start the
process of rebuilding the country's battered infrastructure. Humanitarian agencies
undertaking these tasks urgently needed a survey of landmine contamination to
expedite the process. The cease-fire commission, however, regarded mine action as a
security rather than humanitarian issue and did not approve it until August 1993. At
that point, however, UN procedural obstacles caused further delays costing several
precious months. The UN did not give HALO Trust the go-ahead until October 1993
and a contract was not signed until December. As a result, fieldwork started only in
February 1994, 18 months after the end of hostilities. 
188 Review: Support to Humanitarian Mine Action, Mozambique, prepared for Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Denmark, April 2004. The review also queries whether more villagers are
threatened by HIV/AIDS spread by demining teams than are saved from injury or death by
their clearance activities.
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The survey's declared objectives were “to provide an overall assessment of the
landmine situation in Mozambique for the benefit of all organizations and agencies
working (there) and to enter this information in the Shaman database.”189 The survey
report repeatedly states that it does not provide an exhaustive survey of all parts of
the country and what has been achieved is “a basic framework”, reflecting an inability
to access some parts of the country.190 However, after the cease-fire, the key question
for humanitarian agencies was access. As the first attempt to define the scale and
geographic location of Mozambique's mine contamination, the survey focused
particularly on providing intelligence on the state of roads and infrastructure useful
to relief agencies. 
Such a focus was also necessary given tight constraints on time and budget. To survey
a country of nearly 800,000 square kilometres and few roads, HALO had four months
and a budget of US$395,000. Accordingly, resources available for the survey were, by
present standards, extremely modest. HALO employed six three-man teams
(comprising surveyor, translator and driver). Teams were broken into two groups
assigned to the southern and northern provinces but worked as self-contained units.
Their movements were constrained, however, by the poor condition of the roads, lack
of up-to-date maps, limited availability of fuel and time. 
Shortage of time meant that the teams had to concentrate on collecting data in the field
and did not have time to return to Maputo, for example after completing work in each
province, to process the data collected. This delayed the time when it became available
to end users. Instead of receiving a continuous flow of information from the provinces
as the survey progressed, humanitarian agencies had to wait for several weeks after
the completion of field work to have access to the survey findings. It also meant there
was no time for quality assurance, either of fieldwork or data entry. This almost
certainly contributed to errors later found in the data. Staff entering data worked from
handwritten, travel-stained reports and had no opportunity to send data back to
survey teams for verification. As a result, coordinates entered for some minefields
were wildly off target – anecdotal reports suggest some were located in the Indian
Ocean.
At the time this survey was conducted, there was little experience and few guidelines
to steer its implementation. Survey teams worked with a two-page questionnaire




Objective General assessment of landmine contamination
Dates/duration February to June 1994
Scope Nationwide
Focus Supporting post-conflict delivery of humanitarian assistance
Info management Software: Shaman 
Cost US$395,000
189 HALO Trust/UNOHAC (1994).
190 ibid: 14.
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options it offered for recording data were found to be too limited191. At the outset,
HALO's team leaders met UNOHAC's representatives from different provinces in
Maputo to explain the survey plans and request their assistance gathering data in
advance of teams' arrival in their area: but, to meet the demanding deadline under the
prevailing political and security circumstances, collection of expert opinion was
undertaken in the course of the fieldwork. 
The survey teams' first point of contact was UNOHAC provincial representatives,
both for an overview of mine contamination and for guidance on potential sources of
information. Contact was also made with provincial governors, military commanders,
police and administrators as well as other aid agencies. Military liaison officers and
soldiers in military assembly areas provided useful information on what type of
mines had been laid and at what locations and where mine casualties had occurred.
Data collected in these interviews was noted on provincial maps to help plan how best
to survey the area. But HALO reported that local people, including many encountered
along the roadside, proved the main source of accurate information on mine
locations.192
The survey produced reports on 981 separate, mined locations, which included
stretches of road closed by a single mine and large defensive minefields made up of
many thousands of devices. Most sites were believed to be affected by five mines or
less.193 The quality of data, however, varied widely. HALO attempted to cross-
reference location data as far as possible but found that it was “not uncommon” to
have estimates of a suspected mined area provided by different sources varying by
several kilometres. 
Survey teams only had access to maps on a scale of 1:250,000 which dated from before
independence and were therefore wildly inaccurate. These still showed towns and
villages that had been abandoned or destroyed in the years of fighting, along with
roads that had fallen into disuse or disappeared, and they failed to show new
settlements or roads. Among the products of the survey, HALO produced maps
displaying the roads travelled by the survey teams, other roads in regular use and
suspected mined areas, but on the scale of the maps available, neither roads nor
suspected mined areas could be plotted with any accuracy. As the survey report made
clear, the maps therefore had to be used in conjunction with Danger Area information
in the Shaman database.
The survey set out to cater to the needs of two different constituencies of end-user:
humanitarian agencies and the mine action community. A decade after its completion,
lack of institutional memory makes it difficult to assess the extent to which it fulfilled
the needs of the former. The report contains extensive information on the state of
roads that could have provided a useful guide to aid agencies, even two years after the
end of hostilities. Anecdotal comment suggested the information on mine
contamination was not greatly trusted because of inaccuracies in mine location data.
However, the report repeatedly warns of uncertainty over mine location reports and
of the need to use the survey as a point of departure for building up data. 
A major shortcoming appears to have been the lack of effective follow-up on the part
191 Comment by Guy Rhodes, Survey Coordinator, 16 December, 2004.
192 HALO Trust/UNOHAC (1994: 8).
193 ibid: 3-5.
of the UN. There does not appear to have been any systematic effort to distribute the
report to stakeholders and relief agencies. Sketch maps produced by survey teams
were delivered to the UNOHAC demining office in Maputo but were never entered in
the database and later were reportedly lost. The survey report also noted that some of
the best available information on mine locations was held by soldiers sent to assembly
areas prior to demobilisation and urged comprehensive efforts to debrief soldiers
before they dispersed and the information was lost. This would have been a relatively
straightforward task for the UN, staffers who served with the UN mission at the time
say, but it never happened.
As a result, the main beneficiaries of the survey appear to have been HALO Trust,
NPA and ADP, which used the survey as intended – as a reference or point of
departure for building up data on mine contamination in their respective areas of
operation. HALO and NPA, at least, continued to use the survey in this way for some
years. It also became one of the data sources used in the later landmine impact survey.
The Landmine Impact Survey
By 1997, Mozambican authorities had no more detailed information on the location
and extent of its landmine problem than the HALO emergency survey completed five
years earlier. Individual mine action operators – HALO, NPA and ADP – had built up
more extensive data in their areas of operation, but no mechanism existed for
systematically sharing this information with the government or the humanitarian
relief agencies and commercial companies interested in working in rural areas and
therefore potentially exposed to mine risks. The IND still lacked a central database
detailing the extent of the problem or any other tool that would allow it to prioritise
and coordinate clearance activity. The Landmine Impact Survey was intended to meet
these needs. 
Its stated objective was to “collect, record and analyse information on the location of
known or suspected mined areas throughout the country and to provide an overview
of their social and economic impacts as perceived by the residents of landmine
affected communities”.194 It would therefore deliver an IMSMA database including all
the location data, maps and sketches together with the system for determining the
level of social and economic impact. In line with the broader aims of the global
landmine survey initiative conceived by the Survey Action Center, it was also
intended to provide donors with a set of data according to a standard formula that
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Agency Canadian International Demining Corps, Paul F. Wilkinson &
Associates Inc.
Client Canadian International Development Agency
Type Landmine Impact Survey
Objective Assessment of social and economic impact of landmines 




194 CIDC (2001: 10).
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would allow them to assess Mozambique's landmine problems in a broader,
international context. However, almost every stage of the Mozambique LIS was to
become dogged by controversy that would prevent it achieving most of these aims.
Implementation 
Initiation and oversight of the MLIS was taken on by the Canadian International
Development Agency, already financing a programme to build mine action capacity
in Mozambique. It took up the project as a priority and signed a memorandum of
understanding with the government to support an impact survey in August 1998. At
the outset, it expected the survey to last 12 months and to cost Can$1.5 million (then
about US$1.2 million). Both estimates proved unrealistic. Planning, recruitment,
training and preparation alone took a year. Fieldwork would take 14 months. Overall,
the Canadian International Demining Corps (CIDC) needed 31 months to complete
the project at a final cost of US$2.2 million.195
This was perhaps unsurprising in view of the formidable logistical challenges faced in
a country of Mozambique's size (799,380 square kilometres), lacking a gazetteer and
equipped with few paved roads. Survey staff would travel on aggregate 800,000
kilometres to complete the survey and interviewed some 13,000 people in 31
languages.196 To complicate matters, the survey coincided with the worst flooding in
decades, particularly in the south of the country, forcing CIDC to rearrange the
timetable for implementation and start fieldwork in the north.
CIDA would only employ a Canadian company for the survey. It opened the project
to competitive bidding within Canada and then selected CIDC to implement the
project although the company had no prior experience of survey. CIDC brought in as
implementing partner Paul F. Wilkinson & Associates, a company without previous
experience in the demining sector. CIDC's inexperience was compounded by hiring
locally in Maputo a manager similarly short on experience. CIDC replaced him after
some months by a former project manager with knowledge of the country and the
sector.
The choice of operator raised immediate concerns on the part of SAC and some mine
clearing agencies in Mozambique and this factor, combined with scepticism among
some operators about the value of conducting an impact survey instead of pulling
together data already available in their separate databases, may have made it more
difficult for CIDC to obtain the optimum support and cooperation from international
members of the mine action community.
Despite the existence of an inter-governmental Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU), there also appears to have been at best modest interest in, or understanding
of, the project on the part of Mozambican authorities. At the point when CIDC arrived
in Maputo, the IND had just been created to replace the CND and was barely
functioning. Its director declined even to meet CIDC staff, let alone provide
support,197 although they did meet regularly with other IND personnel. Only after
IND gained a new director half a year later did cooperation improve, but even then it
195 The LIS notes this included US$500,000-worth of vehicles handed over to the IND on
completion of the survey.
196 Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey.
197 Telephone interview with Paul Wilkinson, 3 August 2004.
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lacked the expertise or capacity to contribute to the design or implementation of the
survey, leaving little sense of local ownership. 
The LIS states that it was implemented in accordance with the Survey Working
Group's protocols for the conduct of impact surveys. Survey Action Center contends
the methodology used in the Mozambique was flawed because impact survey
protocols require that they be conducted as a census, not on the basis of a sample of
communities,198 as was the case in CIDC's Mozambique survey. CIDC responds that
from the outset the LIS was designed to be carried out as a sample and in a country
the size of Mozambique could never have been undertaken on any other basis.199 An
evaluation of the LIS by Scanteam notes that CIDC adapted the methodology of the
survey to address the conditions that existed within Mozambique, but concludes that
“these adaptations did not change the fundamental methodological approach” of
impact surveys.200
CIDC planned the survey on the basis that teams would visit around 1,800
communities nationally, or about 180 per province. The LIS report states that in the
course of carrying out the survey, interviewers in fact visited more than 1,800
communities, including all 791 communities that identified themselves as mine
affected. Nonetheless, operators say survey enumerators did not visit some of the
mine-affected areas and communities where they were working at the time of the
survey. 
Among criticisms directed at CIDC's conduct of the survey is the suggestion that its
preliminary research and expert opinion collection (EOC) was at best rushed and
cursory. CIDC responds that, on the contrary, its EOC before starting fieldwork
required a much greater investment of time and effort than originally envisaged. It
reports conducting 202 meetings with individuals or groups to try to identify the data
available.201 These included meetings with the main actors in mine clearance,
provincial authorities, the military and the police. CIDC also had access to the
databases of ADP, HALO Trust, NPA and Handicap International. 
More than half the LIS interviews involved five to eight people, another quarter
involved nine to 12 people, and although some lasted only 15 minutes, the average
duration of interviews was 100 minutes. Because of distances involved and time
constraints, teams did not have time to revisit areas. CIDC acknowledges this may
have affected the extent to which interviewees were representative of their
community but argues that it also reduced the possibility of collusion. 
CIDC is dismissive of criticism that staff recruited to conduct the survey lacked
experience or appropriate skills for assessing information on mined areas.202 The
purpose of the LIS was not to define the extent of landmine contamination but to
assess its impact. From more than 400 initial applicants, 42 people were selected for
training. This was carried out for four weeks in classrooms located in an ADP camp
before a further two weeks' training during field testing of the questionnaire and
survey procedures. Over the 14 months of fieldwork on the survey, only four staff
198 Telephone interview with Bob Eaton, Survey Action Center, 28 July and 17 December 2004. 
199 Telephone interview with Paul Wilkinson, 3 August 2004.
200 Scanteam (2003).
201 ibid.
202 Cited by Scanteam (2003: 125).
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dropped out and two were dismissed. CIDC's only reservation about the staff
recruited was that for cultural reasons they did not include more women. Only seven
women applied for fieldwork but they then declined to take up positions offered to
them.203
The more serious criticism levelled at the LIS is that some sites reported as surveyed
were never visited by survey staff.204 Paul Wilkinson robustly rejects the charge as “so
improbable as to be almost impossible.”205 Fabrication of reports and the details of
locations (including GPS readings, identity of people interviewed and photographs
taken en route and at the location) could not have been undertaken by one enumerator
but would have required the cooperation of several team members and would have
had to escape the attention of those checking data in the field and in the analyst team.
He also discounts the idea on the basis of close personal knowledge of the survey
teams and their personal commitment to the project. The Scanteam evaluation
concludes: “The claim that the survey teams did not visit sites recorded does not seem
to be borne out by the information available.”206
Quality assurance was undertaken by two monitors. The first, a SAC employee, acted
as monitor until October 1999. The second monitor worked under contract to SAC
until November 2000 and thereafter acted on behalf of UNMAS until the survey's
completion. Even so, questions about the quality of the LIS data raised questions
about the thoroughness of the QA undertaken – and gave rise to considerable
reservations within UNMAS about whether or not it should certify the survey.
UNMAS eventually certified the LIS because there were few, and no adequate,
grounds in the SWG protocols for not doing so.207
Outcome
Mozambique gained a number of valuable resources from the survey. These included
a national gazetteer containing the names, official and alternate, of around 11,300
communities. It also yielded an Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) database linked with Geographic Information System which is, for the first
time, producing computerised maps on a sufficiently large scale (1:50,000) to be of use
to demining operators. These resources represent a quantum leap over what was
previously available to the IND or its predecessors. But the results of this exercise have
also proved highly contentious. 
The LIS found, as expected, that landmines affected all of Mozambique's ten provinces
and all but five of 128 districts. But it also identified 791 mine-affected communities
and 1,374 suspected mined areas (SMAs) estimated to cover 562 square kilometres and
affecting 1.5 million people (more than 9 per cent of the 1997 population). Most of
these areas (41 per cent) were estimated to cover less than 1,000 square metres, but the
survey also identified 59 huge mined areas estimated to cover more than a square
kilometre and 234 SMAs covering an estimated area of between 100,000 square metres
and a square kilometre. The survey acknowledges that the figure may be
203 CIDC (2001: 101-102).
204 The claim was also picked up in the Scanteam Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey
Process (2003).
205 Telephone interview with Paul Wilkinson, 3 August 2004.
206 Scanteam Annex H.
207 Information provided by a member of the certification committee.
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overestimated “to an unknown degree” in view of the tendency of interviewees to
overstate the size of suspected mined areas. In the demining community, however, the
estimates are regarded as a wild exaggeration.
After a detailed review of sites identified as suspect in the LIS in its area of operation,
HALO Trust asserts that the LIS has included large areas which are not mined. The
LIS identified 558 mined locations in its area of operation. By 31 July 2004, HALO says
it had visited 516 (92 per cent) of these locations and, after surveying them, had
cancelled 318 (57 per cent). HALO says it confirmed 198 sites (35 per cent) but had
previously cleared or surveyed 114 of them. Only 84 sites (15 per cent) were mined
areas HALO had not previously known. Of the 175 minefields HALO identified in its
area of operations as of April 1993, it says half had not been surveyed by LIS survey
teams.208 NPA did not conduct a detailed review of the SMAs identified by the LIS in
its area of operation but endorsed HALO Trust's analysis.
Paradoxically, the mine impact scoring system applied in the LIS suggested that
Mozambique's landmine problem was more manageable and easy to neutralise than
many might have assumed or deduced from the estimate of the area contaminated.
The LIS shows only 20 communities (2.5 per cent of the total) with a combined
population of 36,000 ranked as highly impacted by mines. Another 164 communities
with a total population of 393,000 rated as medium impact. More than three-quarters
of the communities assessed, with a total population of 1.1 million, ranked as low
impact. 
The LIS receives warm endorsement from the IND's director, Gamiliel Mumguambe,
as giving the IND and policy makers a more comprehensive overview of
Mozambique's landmine problems than ever before. Such an information resource
represents a “quantum leap” in terms of the scope and quality of the data resources
previously available to most government agencies, not just in mine action. This has
helped IND to assert its role as the coordinating authority for mine action. It provided
the basis for the first national five-year mine action plan issued in November 1991,
which provided donors for the first time with a rough timeline for measuring progress
in curbing the impact of mines. IND also draws on it in preparing its annual plan of
demining priorities. Yet even the IND director felt the LIS “was not able to capture the
entirety of the problem”.209
To most in the demining community, this is at best an understatement. In reality,
confidence in the LIS data appears to be too low for it to be used effectively as a
planning tool. Two particular weaknesses in the data stand out. IND staff express
concerns about exaggeration in the estimate of land contaminated and emphasise the
importance of moving on swiftly to technical surveys and area reduction in order to
obtain a more precise definition of the problem which would allow them to plan more
effectively. At the same time, ADP and NPA as well as HALO Trust report they have
discovered mined areas that are not identified in the LIS, both in areas that were and
were not covered by the LIS survey teams. 
In addition, although IND uses the LIS as the basis for drawing up annual demining
priorities, the tasks performed by demining agencies are for the most part selected by
a process of consultation with district and provincial authorities without reference to
208 Information provided by HALO Trust, Nampula, 14 August 2004.
209 Interview with Gamiliel Mumguambe, IND Director, 16 August 2004.
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the LIS. As a result, IND staff say, operators frequently decline to take on IND
clearance requests on the grounds that their resources and time are already committed
to other tasks. A review of activities in 2003 revealed that of the 207 tasks identified by
IND in its annual demining priorities, only one third were drawn from the LIS. It also
revealed that of 150 tasks carried out in 2003, only 47 were derived from the IND
annual plan and only 36 of those from the LIS. Among 103 tasks completed that were
not in the IND priorities, 46 were identified in the LIS.210 IND staff also say that many
of the LIS tasks undertaken are low priority, not the medium or high priority tasks.211
The outcome reflects the gap between priorities identified under the impact scoring
system applied in the LIS and the priorities perceived by central and local government
as a result of emerging economic and social factors such as population movement and
provincial development plans. The discovery of new areas of contamination also
throws up new priority tasks. 
The IMSMA database, initially delivered as Version 2.2 and upgraded to Version 3 in
February 2004, remains a key building block for mine action in Mozambique –
providing it continues to be funded. Salaries of the database staff are paid by UNDP.
The likelihood of those staff remaining if external funding dried up and salaries were
downgraded to government salary levels must be in doubt. IND's database team in
Maputo as of August 2004 comprised eight staff, including four data entrants. IND has
also set up two regional centres in Beira and Nampula to collect and disseminate data.
Operators say the Beira office is functioning well but Nampula, which has
experienced technical teething troubles, had fallen far behind in entering the clearance
and cancellation reports submitted by operators into the database. However, although
IND has the capacity to populate and maintain the database, operators are of the
opinion it does not yet have the capacity to provide the analysis necessary for
planning and prioritising mine clearance. 
After years of working semi-autonomously, operators are systematically reporting
clearance activity to IND but data collection has been hampered by the need to adapt
different formats employed by the operators to the IMSMA system. IND staff also say
communication and coordination with provincial governments is still weak.
Unmet needs
The priority requirement for mine action in Mozambique identified by IND is
technical survey to define more clearly the priorities and tasks identified in the LIS. A
list of survey and clearance priorities for 2005 was in the process of being prepared by
IND for distribution to operators as this report was completed. However, the danger
is that the LIS priorities are by now largely irrelevant to the actual priorities for
provincial and local authorities.  
This is partly because of the uncertain importance of some of the tasks which the LIS
identified as priorities. One of the high impact sites identified by the LIS turned out to
consist of a single UXO piece located 13 kilometres from the nearest village.212
210 Grau de implementacao das prioridades de desminagem 2003, IND, 30 July 2004.
211 Scanteam noted that in June 2003, two years after completion of the LIS, only four of 19
high impact areas, 10 of 165 medium impact and 44 of 607 low impact areas identified in the
survey had been cleared.
212 Information provided by IND.
149The case of Mozambique
Another factor is the weakness in consultation procedures between IND and other
stakeholders. Economic ministries tend to consult IND only after decisions to proceed
with development projects have already been taken. Provincial authorities similarly
operate less as coordination bodies than as a source of policy papers.
Influenced by this background, UNDP has commissioned a two-month “review of 10
years of assistance to the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique” to be undertaken
by GICHD. The study is intended to “assess (the) relevance, efficacy, effectiveness, and
impact of the mine action programme in Mozambique since its inception, and analyze
the extent of the task that remains to be done.”213
Conclusions and findings 
Mine action in Mozambique has taken place in a fragmented manner reflecting the
failure of the UN to create a framework for coordination in the immediate aftermath
of the civil war, the fact that mine clearance has been undertaken by operators
answering mainly to donors rather than a coordinating authority and the low level of
interest or commitment to mine action on the part of national leaders. 
Most survey activity has been undertaken by individual operators serving their
specific needs in their area of operation. This has delayed the process of identifying
national demining priorities and left a vacuum in national responses to mine risk
education and victim assistance. Declining donor support for mine action demands a
more proactive and coordinated national response to the task of freeing Mozambique
from the impact of mines.
The LIS claims to “constitute a basis for Mozambican authorities to define priority
targets for mine action and to design and execute cost effective measures to address
the most serious consequences of the landmine problem”.214 It provides the most
comprehensive overview of mine contamination to date but it is not fulfilling this role
because lack of confidence in the quality of the data on the part of the stakeholders in
mine action has eroded its credibility and utility as a planning tool. IND is using the
LIS to draw up plans and priorities but operators are finding they have little relevance
to their work programmes. Provincial authorities, who play a key role in setting
demining tasks, do not refer to it. Demining operators are critical of its data and work
mainly with provincial authorities. Donors, influenced by the operators they finance,
do not feel it helps to determine the appropriate direction or extent of their support.
National ownership of a survey and involvement of other stakeholders, at least
through consultation, make obvious practical sense and are essential to building
confidence in the end product. Both elements were lacking in the implementation of
Mozambique's LIS. A less proprietorial, more inclusive approach on the part of CIDA
and more effective communication with stakeholders on the part of CIDC may have
helped to avoid this outcome. CIDC insists it invested considerable time and effort in
contacting and working with operators to access their data and experience, but the
fact remains none of the operators share this perception and provincial authorities,
who enjoy considerable autonomy and are key players in Mozambique's demining
activity, are not using it.
213 UNDP Terms of Reference for a Review of ten years of assistance to the Mine Action
Programme in Mozambique, 2004.
214 CIDC (2001: 11).
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Some problems with the Mozambique LIS data, including the almost certainly
exaggerated assessment of the area contaminated by mines, highlight weaknesses not
of implementation but of the impact survey process. An impact survey, by definition,
is only as good as the knowledge of the people it taps for information. The information
which survey teams worked so hard and at such expense to obtain is often flawed
because people contributing it have at best imperfect knowledge or understanding of
the problems they attempt to describe. The problem is most visible in post-conflict
environments where population movement and resettlement means local people are
too recently arrived to have useful knowledge of local conditions and the whereabouts
of landmines. However, Mozambique's LIS started eight years after the end of
hostilities and this problem still arose.
The mine impact scoring system employed by the LIS also did not provide a
particularly useful or sensitive tool for assessing priorities in the conditions that
prevailed in Mozambique. The LIS scoring system assigns a high and fixed value to
recent casualties, it is geared more towards “accident reduction than a purely
economic benefit maximising strategy”.215 In Mozambique the number of casualties
had already fallen to relatively low levels and is therefore rarely a measure of impact.
In the absence of casualties, however, it is difficult under the LIS scoring system for
any mine-affected area to qualify as high impact. 
To illustrate the point, CIDC presents six variations on the LIS results, adjusting the
ten indices in the scoring system that can be altered, but only one of the variables
resulted in a significant increase in the number of high-impact communities (from 20
to 37). In the rest, the increase was marginal and in one the number fell. This does not
prove the scoring system wrong but the priorities identified under this scoring system
should be systematically compared with those identified by provincial authorities and
operators.
Landmine impact surveys do not set out to provide data that will provide a basis for
the operational decisions of demining agencies, only to provide “a ranking of
communities by severity of mine impact that can inform the allocation of mine action
resources”.216
The IND's IMSMA database is among the most valuable products of the LIS. It
provides an indispensable tool for Mozambique's mine action in the long term and has
given impetus to IND's efforts to function as a national coordinating authority.
Demining agencies which previously operated without reference to the central
government are now reporting clearance activities on a regular basis. At a time when
donors are curbing their financial support for mine action in Mozambique, the
database should be a priority for continued support. 
Expectations of impact surveys in general and the Mozambique LIS (as one of the first
to be undertaken) in particular have been too high. Operators looked for location data
that an impact survey does not set out to provide. Donors and government looked for
a more definitive picture of the landmine problem that would enable them to plan
more cost-effective and beneficial interventions. 
IND's calls for technical survey, however, illustrate the difficulty of using the LIS even
215 GICHD/UNDP (2001: 27).  
216 ibid.: 25.
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for planning purposes when the physical dimensions of the problem are so vaguely
and unreliably defined. Polygon mapping, undertaken in some surveys, was not a
practical proposition for a company on CIDC's budget and timetable, starting in
Mozambique from scratch. It is no more probable that IND will find donor support
for technical surveys on a large scale. Before launching an impact survey, governments
and donors need to recognise that it is not an end in itself and make provision for
follow-up survey work needed to benefit from impact survey data.
The quality assurance (QA) undertaken on Mozambique's LIS did not suffice to
maintain its credibility in the face of damaging criticisms from operators about
coverage, including charges of false reporting. Certification of the LIS was granted by
UNMAS largely by default – the protocols did not provide grounds for denying it. QA
and certification procedures clearly need to be reviewed to better protect the integrity
of the impact survey process – and the value of the big sums invested in it.
Annex. Chronology of mine action in Mozambique
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1992 Rome peace agreement ends the civil war, providing for a cease-fire,
immediate demobilisation of both armies and holding elections but making no
specific provision for mine action.
The UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is set up with a
mandate to monitor the cease-fire and organise elections.
1993 The UN Supervisory and Control Commission awards the first mine clearance
contract to Gurkha Security Guards.
1994 HALO Trust undertakes a four-month emergency survey.
UNOHAC awards a US$4.8 million for the controversial “Project Caminho”,
involving Mechem (South Africa),
Royal Ordnance (UK), both associated with the manufacture or use of
landmines.
1995 UN launches Accelerated Demining Programme, the first indigenous demining
agency.The government issues a decree establishing the National Mine
Clearance Commission (CND).
1997 Mozambique signs the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. (It would be ratified
in August 1998 and take effect on 1 March 1999.)
The government dissolves the CND and replaces it with the National Demining
Institute.
1998 Canada and Mozambique sign an MoU providing for a Landmine Impact
Survey.
1999 CIDA awards a contract for the LIS to Canadian International Demining Corps.
2000 CIDC starts fieldwork on the LIS.
2001 CIDC completes the LIS.IND issues a five-year plan providing for clearance of allhigh-impact mined areas by 2006. 
2003 Mozambique completes destruction of its anti-personnel mine stockpiles in
compliance with the Convention.
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Chapter 6
A desk study of Kosovo
Alessandro Conticini and Valérie Quéré
Introduction
This case study looks at the role of survey in the mine action programme in Kosovo,
especially the effectiveness of survey for the purposes of planning and managing
clearance operations. It begins with a brief overview of the context in the province and
then reviews the evolution of the mine action programme from 1999 to the present
day. The third section provides an overview of the use of survey in the programme;
the issues raised are then addressed in detail in the fourth section, which looks in
particular at the emergency survey conducted by HALO Trust and the Modified Level
One Impact Survey managed by the Survey Action Center in Washington DC. The
case study is completed with a few concluding remarks based on the evidence
presented.
The context 
Kosovo is a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, located to the south of
Serbia, with an ethnically mixed population of which the majority are ethnic
Albanians and the largest minority are ethnic Serbs. In 1998, civil conflict escalated,
pitting ethnic Albanian insurgents in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against
Yugoslav military and police forces. Several attempts were made to resolve the
situation but in March 1999, after the repression of ethnic Albanians increased, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) initiated a 77-day aerial bombing
campaign which led to a peace deal in June 1999 and the withdrawal of Serbian
military forces.217
On 10 June, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 authorising
the UN Secretary-General to set up an Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) charged with establishing an international security presence to deter
renewed hostilities, demilitarise the KLA and create a secure environment for the
return of refugees.218 International organisations were heavily supported by donors,
enabling the provision of a major programme of emergency and humanitarian
217 Praxis Group (2002).
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assistance for recovery and reconstruction. The international security presence was
guaranteed by the deployment of NATO's Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR)
under the control of the NATO Council. 
For the first 12 months following the removal of Yugoslav forces, the international
community focused on emergency and humanitarian assistance. The focus of activity
by UNMIK and the donor community was on the provision of energy, medical
supplies, demining, shelter and agricultural inputs. Since then, the emphasis has
shifted to support for longer-term institutional and capacity building for democratic
structures, to be managed by an elected administration, pending resolution of
Kosovo's final status in the light of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244.219
Ongoing challenges are the consolidation of the peace-building process, the
eradication of ethnic violence and reconciliation. Since the end of the conflict, sections
of the ethnic Albanian population have abused the Serb minority. Violence and
vandalism have created a pervasive sense of insecurity and have undermined
confidence in the juridical system, since very few perpetrators have been
prosecuted.220 Given continuing ethnic hatred and desire for vengeance, the province
currently remains a potential flashpoint which, without the continued security
presence of KFOR military units, could erupt in renewed hostilities.
During the conflict between the KLA and the Yugoslav military and Serbian police, a
significant number of landmines were laid across the province. As a result of NATO's
heavy bombing campaign, the province was further contaminated with unexploded
ordnance (UXO), including cluster bomblets. Mines were typically laid in fields along
the borders of the province, in large defensive minefields in the interior of Kosovo,
and around roads and trails of approach. Nuisance mines or improvised explosive
devices were also laid in houses, schools and villages.221 This scenario created a
significant hazard to the early and orderly return of refugees and IDPs, and also
hampering the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of housing,
infrastructure, essential services, as well as the rebuilding of civil society. 
Early steps for a humanitarian mine action response took the form of providing mine
awareness in refugee camps during the first few months of 1999. KFOR was initially
218 According to paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the responsibilities
of the international security presence to be deployed in Kosovo include: “(a) Deterring
renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the
withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police
and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; (b) Demilitarizing the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in
paragraph 15 below; (c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; (d) Ensuring
public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this
task; (e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take
over responsibility for this task; (f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with
the work of the international civil presence; (g) Conducting border monitoring duties as
required; (h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international
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tasked to supervise demining until the UN could take over the responsibility.
Accordingly, as soon as KFOR entered the province it began marking and clearing
mines and UXO in support of its own operations. Within UNMIK, the UN set up a
Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), which took full control of the mine action
programme at the beginning of August 1999.222
It was foreseen that MACC would not implement mine action operations but would
rely on the capacities provided by others. Its responsibilities were to consist of: 
(a) coordination and planning of activities, including surveying, marking, mine 
awareness, and mine/UXO clearance; 
(b) data collection and dissemination, information management, using the 
information field module developed by the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining; 
(c) development and promotion of technical and safety standards; 
(d) quality assurance and quality management; and 
(e) resource mobilisation, if applicable.223
With UNMIK operating as de facto government of the province, MACC received
atypical powers over the mine action operations in the province.
MACC identified a three-phase programme for mine action in the province:
emergency, consolidation and exit. For each of these MACC set specific objectives and
activities to achieve them. The objective of the emergency phase was to “ensure the
rapid, safe return of refugees and IDPs to their villages and to allow the resumption
of normal activities, free from the threat of mines”.224 This was to be achieved through
a process of verification, survey and mine/UXO clearance, integrated with effective
mine awareness education and appropriate care for victims. 
In the consolidation phase, the first MACC plans set the focus as “establishing the
institutional arrangements upon which the medium to long-term requirements for
mine action can be developed.”225 By September 1999, this objective had been
substantially amended to one of “clearing all known minefields, CBU [cluster bomb]
strike areas and other reported dangerous areas, before handing over to a suitably
trained and equipped local capacity … capable of dealing with the long-term residual
threat… Based on current progress, the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC)
firmly believes that this can be achieved by December 2001.”226
For the exit phase, in January 2001 the MACC also amended its objectives, so that it
read as follows: “The overall objective of the UNMIK MAP is to replicate the situation
that exists in virtually all European countries that have experienced conflict during
the 20th Century. Although mines/UXO can often be found in these countries, they
pose only a minor threat to the population and are not an impediment to economic
and social development. On the occasions that mines/UXO are found by members of
the public, they are aware of the reporting actions to take and a capacity is trained to
respond and deal with the threat in an appropriate and timely manner. In addition,
222 Although the formal handover of the mine action programme in Kosovo from KFOR to
the civilian sector took place only on 5 October 1999.
223 UNMAS (1999: 3).
224 As described in UNMIK/MACC (1999).
225 UNMIK/MACC (1999).
226 UNMIK/MACC (2000a).
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for those who become victims, a comprehensive assistance capacity exists. This
capacity not only includes immediate emergency treatment but also appropriate
rehabilitation, psychosocial, reintegration and vocational support services.”227
Since the municipal elections of October 2000 and provincial elections of May 2001,
the international community in general, and UNMIK in particular, concentrated on
institution- and capacity-building for the longer term.228 This was done through
efforts to transfer responsibility for public services to the population of Kosovo –
“Kosovarisation” – and mine action was no exception. As a result, in June 2001 an
assessment of the situation concluded that the mine action programme was at the
point where local capacity could take over mine action activities and in mid-December
2001 MACC completed its scheduled term and handed over responsibility for mine
action to UNMIK. 
Survey and clearance responsibilities were transferred to the Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC) and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management Section became the
focal point for all mine action activities in Kosovo. Other MACC responsibilities were
allotted to different ministries or governmental agencies, as follows: the Kosovo
Cadastral Agency managed the IMSMA database, the Ministry of Health Environment
and Spatial Planning was responsible for collecting incident and accident information,
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology was responsible for ensuring that
mine risk education was conducted within the school curricula, and the Ministry of
Labour was to deal with victim assistance. 
Kosovo has been, to date, the only UN mine action programme which succeeded in
“closing the door” after having largely achieved its intended objectives. Despite this,
there have been questions ever since as to whether the UN left too early. The MACC
Programme Manager, John Flanagan, now believes that it would have been preferable
to maintain the MACC for a further period of six months in parallel with the KPC to
guarantee that the transition would occur as planned. In addition, retaining a rapid-
response capacity could have dealt with a number of tasks that have since been
identified. This should have included a technical survey capability, which would have
been able to quickly confirm or disprove the presence of mines/UXO in a suspected
area, thereby avoiding the uncertainty that now exists in certain areas. Thus, rather
than setting time-based objectives for transition to local control, specific criteria to be
achieved should have been identified.229
The transfer of responsibilities to the various ministries and governmental
departments did not go as smoothly as planned. In fact, it has been asserted that a so-
called “Kosovo mentality” let the programme down badly. For instance, the KPC has
little or no incentive to risk their lives and limbs in clearance operations; they are paid
the same whether they are gardening or demining. Many therefore prefer to be
gardening – or doing nothing – to the evident frustration of the UN and others.230 This
is ascribed to the lack of appropriate training and equipment but also to the lack of
institutional commitment among the different bodies concerned in the early stages of
the transfer.231 In 2002, the EOD Management Section took back all the mine action
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handed over to the Ministry of Public Health. Indeed, the EOD Management Section
has, de facto, taken over all the responsibilities that the MACC held before, but on a
smaller scale.232
Overview of the use of survey in the Kosovo mine
action programme
Particularities determining a different use of survey in Kosovo
Kosovo is widely recognised as a rare, if not unique, case in the mine action world.
Factors such as the short duration of the conflict, the relatively rapid response from
donors and mine action institutions, the heavy deployment of international resources
and the availability of previously unprecedented information systems,233 reportedly
placed the mine action community on the “leading edge of humanitarian
intervention”234. In addition, when further considering the relatively favourable
physical conditions of the country and the unique political role played by the UNMIK
as de facto government, the picture obtained is one of a situation relatively easy for
survey. 
Whereas many other mine-affected countries have often had little or no information
on which to base their early plans of action, in Kosovo the MACC had a considerable
amount of valuable data at its disposal at a very early stage of intervention. In
particular, political and diplomatic efforts gave the MACC rapid access to information
concerning (a) the type of explosive devices that would likely be encountered and (b)
the approximate location of these explosive devices (in the case of many minefields,
the precise location). The records were provided by the end of July 1999, both by the
Yugoslav Army (VJ), in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, and by
NATO. On the contrary, problems were encountered with the KLA, which tried,
autonomously, to remove the landmines it had laid, but the quality of work was
uneven. Their task was also hampered by the lack of maps of where KLA fighters had
laid mines.
The VJ provided information on 620 minefields and these records were often accurate,
although they typically depicted arbitrary safety buffers or polygons, reflecting a
group of smaller minefields. The records were inserted into the IMSMA (Information
Management System for Mine Action) database but the process was time consuming.
NATO, after initial reluctance, divulged its records of CBU strikes and other relevant
information including minefield, UXO and other reports collected by, or reported to,
NATO. However, NATO's own data were based upon point target, not actual point of
impact. These might differ considerably as the location of contamination was
dependent upon factors like altitude of the drop, the speed of the aircraft and the
vector of direction of attack, making NATO's data of lesser value. 
The economic and operational value of all the available information is said to be
significant. One estimate suggests that it would have cost donors an additional US$1-
231 GICHD (2004).
232 E-mail from Steve Saunders, Head of EOD Management Section, Pristina, 15 April 2004.
233 The IMSMA, or Information Management System for Mine Action, was deployed for the
first time in Kosovo.
234 SAC (2000).
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3 million (possibly much more) to acquire this same level of information using
traditional (impact and technical) mine action surveys. What is more, the early
availability of data facilitated a rapid and more effective humanitarian response.235
One further consideration seemingly makes Kosovo an atypical case. In many mine-
affected countries, local inhabitants often possess the most valuable information on
landmine contamination and its impact. But in Kosovo, the normal process of
gathering, analysing and exchanging information between local informants and mine
action organisations and bodies was, to a large extent, reversed. Given the high
number of refugees and IDPs in a relatively small region,236 civilians needed to be
guided through minefield areas and updated about the threat by organisations which
already had information about dangerous zones. Consequently, traditional surveys
were being challenged to inform, rather than be informed by, the local
population.237As often occurs, only a limited number of refugees and IDPs were
willing to wait until they received assurances that it was safe to return, thereby posing
an additional time constraint on mine action organisations to prevent casualties.
Mine action surveys in Kosovo
The general importance of survey in emergency relief planning in Kosovo, including
for mine action, was recognised from the outset. Thus, on 13 May 1999, the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) sent a needs assessment team
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and an UNMAS programme officer joined the
mission tasked with evaluating early mine action priorities and needs in the
province.238
Although the UN team was refused entry into Kosovo, the preliminary information
gathered from NATO and members of KLA was sufficient to enable UNMAS to
produce an initial report on 1 June 1999, “The Requirement for Mine Action in the
FRY”. In addition to offering an initial assessment of the immediate challenges to be
faced in terms of mine action operations, the UNMAS report explicitly recognised the
use of surveys as a priority operational tool and foresaw the allocation of specific
funds for this activity, which would be the responsibility of the future mine action
centre.239
Subsequently three main mine action surveys were conducted province-wide in
Kosovo. These were:
¾ The “Emergency Survey” conducted by HALO Trust in June-August 1999, with
publication of the findings at the end of that period in the “Consolidated Minefield
Survey Results: Kosovo”;
¾ The “Modified Level One Impact Survey” conducted by the SAC in October 1999-
March 2000.
¾ The “Socio-Economic Survey of Mine/UXO Survivors in Kosovo” conducted by the
VVAF in July-November 2000.
235 Praxis Group (2002).
236 Comparable flows have occurred only twice in the 1990s: in the Great Lakes area of
Africa in 1994 and in the Kurdish-Iraqi war in 1991.
237 SAC (2000).
238 UNMAS Update of 17 June 1999, accessed at ReliefWeb, www.reliefweb.int.
239 UNMAS (1999, 3).
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The Emergency Survey
The first of these, the Emergency Survey, with funding from the UK Department for
International Development, aimed to gather first-hand information on the mine and
UXO contamination in the province.240 Prior to undertaking this rapid census, HALO
Trust organised with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining a
two-day training course in Geneva for the HALO staff about to implement the survey.
This included briefings on the use of IMSMA as well as on Level One/Impact Survey
data, forms, etc. Consequently, efforts were made to use portions of the IMSMA
format for entering HALO's records. These records were entered without cross
verification with other records, resulting in a variable level of accuracy.
Data areas assessed were classified into one of the following categories: (a) No
contamination exists/ Nothing to report, (b) Insufficient information (re-survey!) and
(c) Definite contamination/ Report. As noted by the SAC Survey team, while the
history of mined areas and access routes were described in commendable detail, data
on blocked access to land and facilities, and information on victims were incomplete
or in purely text form, so that MACC data operators were unable to enter the
information into IMSMA in the prescribed manner. Also, no uniform community
background or population data were elicited.241 The areas included under the
category “insufficient information” were originally planned to be re-surveyed by
HALO Trust during winter, when temperatures forbid demining. However, the course
of events made this second effort superfluous and no re-survey was undertaken by
HALO Trust:  instead MACC contracted private firms to re-survey restricted areas
where more information was still needed during the year 2000.
The emergency survey was, to a large extent, a bilateral initiative with no coordination
with the mine action community and, most importantly, with a minimal involvement
of MACC242 in formulating the information needs.243 Thus, as was the case with the
HALO Trust survey,244 these emergency-type surveys tended to focus on the
immediate needs of emergency relief efforts rather than on providing the necessary
information on socio-economic impact needed for longer-term strategic and
operational planning.245
The survey did provide a significant amount of data on the nature and extent of the
threat, which could be used to assist in the safe return of refugees and IDPs to their
villages. Unfortunately, the course of events also made this exercise partially
superfluous: at the beginning of the survey, no-one was fully aware of the nature and
extent of the threat – but by the end of July, through political pressure, the MACC had
already received minefield and bombing records from the VJ and NATO.246 The data
240 During implementation activities the HALO staff also contributed, albeit in a very limited
way, to the reduction of the UXO threat. As reported by HALO staff, they were able to
remove some of the UXO encountered during field activities.
241 SAC (1999).
242 HALO staff have also, on a number of occasions, contrasted their “prompt” initiative with
the MACC's initial bureaucratic burden and slowness in reaching an effective coordination
role. See, for instance, the Praxis-Group (2002) and the SAC modified LOIS final report (2000).
243 Information provided by John Flanagan, MACC Programme Manager.
244 ICRC (2000).
245 Rhodes (2003).
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in those records was similar to that being collected by the HALO Trust, and it tended
to be more accurate.247
Consequently, by the end of August when MACC received the final report of the
HALO Trust survey, very little of the information it contained was new. Due to its
timeframe, the survey was also unable to verify the VJ/NATO records, which would
have been a valuable exercise in and of itself. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, it
might have been better to delay the HALO survey until after the minefield and
bombing records had been received. The survey could then have been part of a
coherent, integrated information-collection plan – a useful verification of the accuracy
and reliability of the VJ and NATO records as well as to collect basic information on
the socio-economic impact of the mines and UXO.
It does appear, however, that MACC made some use of the HALO survey information
when reviewing its initial mine action plans. Also, based on the survey's output and
the VJ/NATO information MACC's director quickly decided that in two years the
province could be made impact free, as in virtually all European countries affected by
conflict during the 20th century.
Local mine action surveys
The HALO Trust survey was the largest implemented at the initial stage, but a number
of more localised general and technical surveys were also undertaken by a number of
NGOs or contracted firms. These surveys had no common data collection standards,
no common guidelines or base of analysis and they were designed and implemented
to support each organisation's own operations, without any reference to the broader
mine action information needs of the province. These organisations were all bilaterally
funded which allowed them to operate, initially at least, in a vacuum, outside any
coordination or information-sharing mechanism. 
Although the exact amount of money provided by donors to mine action
organisations in Kosovo is not known, there is little doubt that this approach, as least
as far as survey is concerned, was not cost effective. As the Praxis Group's evaluation
notes, this donor – and implementer-driven exercise eschewed coordination and a
logical division of responsibilities.248
The Modified Level One Impact Survey
246 Under the terms of the Military Technical Agreement signed between KFOR and the
government of the FRY, the Yugoslav Army was obliged to hand over all its minefields maps.
Under Article II(2), the FRY agreed to mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles
and to clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions and charges as
they withdrew. They had also to mark all sides of minefields. Under Article III(2-a), within
two days of KFOR entering Kosovo, the FRY and the Republic of Serbia were to finish
detailed records of positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive
devices, wire entanglements and physical and military hazards to the safe movement of any
personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY forces.
247 For instance, many fields in the survey forms were classified as “Insufficient
Information”, strongly conditioning the reliability of the survey, and requiring, in 2000,
extensive re-survey by technical survey teams directly contracted by the MACC.
248 Praxis Group (2002).
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The MACC, based on lessons learned from earlier mine action programmes, opted to
coordinate rather than implement. In this, it sought to effectively identify future
priorities, while at the same time making sense and rationalising the allocation of
funds, resources and organisations already on site and operating independently. This
was the rationale for the Modified Level One Impact Survey.
The SAC was tasked by the US Department of State in June 1999 to undertake a
preliminary Advance Survey Mission (ASM).249 Although MACC was still struggling
to assert its leadership over mine action activities in the province, the SAC ASM was
clearly designed according to MACC's expressed needs. This was obtained through
close initial consultation between MACC officers and the SAC ASM, as well as a
supportive collaboration for the whole period of the advanced mission. Discussions
with concerned parties indicated that with minefield and UXO clearance already
ongoing, a classical Level One Impact Survey (LOIS) in Kosovo was of limited utility,
given such concentrated resources and the short time horizon. Therefore a modified
LOIS that could account for ongoing mine action programme efforts was needed. 
According to the Advance Survey Mission Assessment Report, for example, a “clear
need exists for Mine Action organizations within Kosovo to have available to them
some form of social and economic impact information to support operational
planning and prioritisation. SAC intends to meet this need through a modified Level
One Impact Survey process that will allow existing data collection efforts to be
integrated to support the IMSMA database, and to create a socio-economic index of
the impact of mines and UXO.” Further, “the rate of ongoing clearance, and concern
for wasteful duplication of effort calls into question the need to conduct a full scale
Level One Impact Survey of the type normally considered. Instead, SAC is proposing
a modified Level One Impact Survey process that will allow for creation of a socio-
economic index of the impact of landmines and UXO. In lieu of commissioning a full-
blown Level One Impact Survey, the Survey Action Centre will support the existing
players to make their respective bodies of information mutually accessible and
fruitful.”250
The second reason for a modified LOIS arose from the need to rapidly integrate mine
action programmes into a large-scale relief and reconstruction plan. MACC's
Programme Manager strongly advocated making all possible efforts to implement
mine action simultaneously with broader humanitarian interventions. Demands from
these sectors for mine/UXO clearance in support of programme efforts were
inevitable. Again, a “classical” LOIS would have been too time consuming and would
have impeded the relief and reconstruction programmes of other international
agencies.
Shortage of time was, however, partially mitigated by the fact that many organisations
had already started a potentially useful exercise of data collection, even though these
were not centrally coordinated. This presented the opportunity to shift focus away
from data gathering to systematically collating data from the different organisations
and inserting it into a common information management system. Thus, as the
situation was already shifting from humanitarian assistance to longer-term
reconstruction and development, survey teams were trained and deployed as
information was gathered and collated from NGOs, civilian authorities, UN
249 The Advance Survey Mission took place on 26 July-3 August 1999.
250 SAC (1999: 13).
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peacekeeping forces and the records of parties to the conflict.
Accordingly, the SAC drafted a concept proposal for a modified LOIS that was
approved by MACC and recommended for full funding through UNOPS by the
European Commission (EC). The SAC LOIS was undertaken in October 1999-March
2000 at a cost of US$130,700, provided by the EC.
The project required that the SAC LOIS: 
(a) produce baseline data for the development of a Provincial Work and Priority 
Plan supporting the transition from initial emergency to a more 
comprehensive consolidation strategy; 
(b) generate baseline data to measure mine action programme progress; and 
(c) support and develop MACC internal capacity to maintain the data sets and 
recreate the modified LOIS analysis when needed.
SAC's first objective was to establish a simple, orderly and rational scheme for
assigning work to clearance organisations and to develop a prioritisation of
dangerous areas for survey and clearance based on proximity to defined areas. Given
the high degree of uncertainty and unreliability of data, the proposed mechanism
sought to be simple and flexible enough to accommodate additional (evolving)
factors. The scale for ranking all dangerous areas in IMSMA intended to combine
proximity to populated places, roads, agricultural land and wood foraging areas
(“essential livelihood space”) but, based on MACC needs, it did not intend to consider
dangerous area size or population density. 
Planned Output within this objective included:
¾ A scoring and priority classification of all dangerous areas;
¾ A scoring and classification for each existing Task Dossier251 based on averaging the
selected danger area scores;
¾ Excel spreadsheets in which normally computer-literate users could recalculate
scores and make custom summary tables;
¾ A custom ArcView project called MACC OPS for operational management and
elimination of dangerous areas outside of IMSMA.
SAC's second objective was to produce a ranking of communities by landmine impact
severity, or landmine hazard strength. This was to be achieved by ranking
communities according to the simple percentage of total area contaminated. This
measure was selected because it was thought to be highly predictive of potential
incidents. The resultant map clearly demonstrated the clustering of heavily-affected
areas and also served public information activities.
Planned outputs included:
¾ A district classification based on percent total district area contaminated;
¾ Coordination lists of towns in high-, medium- and low-impact districts, with
correlated mine awareness project information; and
251 The MACC approach to clearance of danger areas involves the use of Task Dossiers. Task
Dossiers are folders containing all available records for single or multiple danger areas. A
Task Dossier is assigned to a landmine/UXO clearance organisation for survey and/or
clearance. The Task Dossier was chosen as a management tool because it allowed the MACC
to assign for clearance an area that held a single danger area or multiple overlapping records.
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¾ Ten Public Information layouts in Adobe Acrobat format showing: (a) six district
and danger area classification maps, and (b) four landmine/UXO awareness
programme areas and district classification maps.
SAC's third objective was to develop the internal capacities of MACC and NGOs in
using the provided information, updating it and modifying parameters of the system
in order to account for evolving factors, even including re-ordering the selection of
priorities. 
Planned outputs included:
¾ User guide and structured training of MACC IMSMA and Operations staff on
advanced GIS/ArcView analysis techniques, supporting the analytic methodology
developed under this project; and
¾ 43 GIS feature data files used and/or developed in danger area and district
classifications.
Implementation of the survey
The main characteristic of the modified LOIS was that it be a dynamic operational
tool. By largely relying on information provided by the concerned organisations,
MACC and NGO staff were trained not only to update the information system, but
also to acquire the necessary skills to insert additional data to determine the
prioritisation for a mine action response of dangerous areas. Thus, by the time SAC
support came to an end in March 2000, an information system was in place that could
describe where the threat was, define the nature of the at-risk areas, and rank the
relative impact of mine- and UXO-contaminated areas on the population. Given that
only nine months had passed since  MACC had been established, this timeframe was
very short.252
The main challenge of the LOIS was to create an effective information system that
could incorporate data from a wide range of actors.253 This was because military
(VJ/NATO), NGOs and other sources had compiled rich physical mine/UXO area data
requiring an information management system capable of holding, managing and
displaying the information. At that time, IMSMA was still being developed and the
LOIS activities were largely developed “outside” IMSMA. According to Chris Clark:
“A second reason for this was that this early version of IMSMA, coupled with the poor
and unreliable power supply in Pristina, regularly caused the database and the server
it was located on to crash. Indeed it was found more reliable to “work the survey” on
a stand-alone laptop and hook it up to IMSMA when completed.” The large data set
of danger areas, cluster bomb target coordinates, minefield plans, minor reports on
suspected minefields/UXO and incidents compiled from various sources254 were
stored in multiple stand-alone tables outside the IMSMA module. More than seven
separate and independent data sets were combined by SAC to form the base for
IMSMA data set for danger areas.
252 Interview with Chris Clark, former Chief of Operations, MACC, Kosovo.
253 This includes data from the HALO Trust Emergency Survey, returning civilians, older
records from the 1998-99 Kosovo Verification Mission and the Kosovo Disengagement
Observer Mission. More than seven separate and independent data sets were combined to
form the base for IMSMA data set for danger areas.
254 MACC reported that there were about 4,000 such records of varying reliability.
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The majority of the data sets were imported into IMSMA in July and August 1999, the
remainder being progressively inserted or consolidated into IMSMA by November
1999 (before the beginning of the LOIS). The data were not easily joined by common
references, thus requiring significant manual manipulation of spreadsheet-formatted
data sets. And only a minority of these records had been verified and validated before
being inserted into IMSMA, resulting in an estimated rate of suspected number of
duplicates or false reports of 30 to 50 per cent. For instance, some duplicate reports
referred to the same area but were offset by 10 to 100 metres depending on observer
position and reporting or GPS measuring error. 
Drawing on the LOIS records, SAC created a concept of “essential livelihood space” –
an area in which most social and economic activities would take place. This comprised
the area within a 500-metre radius of a settlement and 200 metres either side of a road.
Added to this area analysis were agricultural land and wood-foraging areas.
Agricultural land was drawn by hand in the GIS using satellite imagery. Wood-
foraging areas were defined as those areas of dense vegetation that intersected the
social space buffer. 
These areas were identified as “essential”, i.e. those where it was most likely that
civilians would be at direct risk from mines or UXO and where providing clearance
and mine awareness in a short time would prevent casualties and reduce the socio-
economic impact of contamination. In total, the essential livelihood space equated to
roughly 40 per cent of the total landmass of Kosovo. This same space would also be
the location of most point-of-service relief and reconstruction projects. 
The use of the concept of essential livelihood space was at the heart of planning,
coordination and operational decision-making. The combination of essential
livelihood space and contaminated land defined the priorities for Task Dossiers for
clearance. Indeed, the information provided by the modified LOIS provided the
bedrock of clearance priorities and remained so to the end of MACC operations in
Kosovo. 
As new information became available, it was simply added to the database and the
analysis and priorities for intervention were adjusted accordingly. According to Chris
Clark, the MACC's Chief of Operations: “The SAC analysis was very useful and
provided a very simply and quick answer to where we should be working and in what
order. This formed the base and was simply modified as time went on.”255
Outputs of the survey
The actual outputs of the modified LOIS were very similar to those that had been
planned. Nonetheless, a number of differences can be identified and two are worth
noting. The first of these was the result of the lack of data available at community
level. The survey had intended to prioritise areas of intervention by ranking
communities according to socio-economic impact and need. This was actually
achieved at district but not community level. There were a number of reasons for this.
As already mentioned, Kosovo had seen significant population displacement, thereby
impeding data gathering on a community level. Also, as organisations collecting data
were not effectively coordinated by MACC in the initial stages, the need for such
255 Interview with Chris Clark, former MACC Chief of Operations, Kosovo.
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community-level data was not made clear. Finally, general time constraints
encouraged a tendency towards rapid assessments, which are more typically
conducted at district level.
A further discrepancy between planned and actual output was the training of NGO
staff to continue the modified LOIS process. According to the initial implementation
proposal,256 SAC activities would have also implied identifying training needs,
developing training curricula and implementing training sessions for both UN and
NGOs staff. In fact,257 it seems that no such training was provided to the NGOs, only
to MACC staff. This change can be explained by the subsequent decision to use the
KPC to take over MACC's responsibilities rather than one or more of the NGOs.258
Utility of the survey
Using GIS functions, SAC estimated that the total mine/UXO contamination problem
in Kosovo covered some 360 square kilometres. Early in the programme, it was
estimated that 30 to 50 per cent of the information was either duplicate or simply false,
largely due to the failure to verify data before entering it into the IMSMA database.
Thus, it was understood that the size of the physical area to be cleared, particularly
cluster strike areas which heavily overlapped, would be substantially less than this
amount. In fact, by the end of major clearance operations in Kosovo, only 32 square
kilometres of land had been demined – less than 10 per cent of the early SAC estimate.
The high number of false, duplicate and overlapping records demanded a significant
number of local follow-up surveys to eliminate inaccuracies from the database.
According to John Flanagan, it was better to err on the side of caution, rather than to
withhold information from the database simply because MACC lacked the capacity to
validate the information at the time. Therefore, it was accepted that some process
would be needed to assess the information's accuracy at a later stage.259
Yet, while mine clearance was following a rational process defined by the modified
LOIS priorities, the process was not quite so smooth for mine risk education (then
called mine awareness). There were a number of reasons for this, but it surely can be
considered a missed opportunity.
An additional element which reduced the potential benefits from the modified LOIS,
was the degree of cooperation with other relief and reconstruction agencies. One of
the outputs of the modified LOIS was to rank district impact by percentage of total
area contaminated. The methodology used allowed the incorporation of socio-
economic data of relevance to the various members of the reconstruction and
development community. 
The idea was that each reconstruction and development agency would develop a well-
defined and geographically prioritised programme and then pass it to MACC. At that
point, the MACC would insert the data into the information management system,
256 SAC (1999).
257 SAC (2000).
258 The choice of handing mine action responsibilities over to the KPC, most of them former
members of the KLA, was a controversial, political decision taken without consulting the
MACC.
259 Maslen (2004).
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obtaining a list of mine action activities to support the priorities of other agencies.260
Without the relevant sector rehabilitation priorities being provided to MACC, the
modified LOIS analysis would be essentially an accident hazard analysis, not a socio-
economic impact analysis. 
In fact, none of the key actors – the leading reconstruction agency (the EC), the
UNMIK Civil Administration and the other UN agencies – developed such spatially
planned sector priorities. While the Humanitarian Community Information Centre
had been funded and provided with GIS software and computer equipment, this
resource was not used to its full potential. Numerous agencies acknowledge that
spatial planning units exist, such as health facility catchment areas and school
districts. However, most sector planning does not seem to have used any spatial or
service area analysis.261
Estimating relative access to services and projecting future needs would seem to be
the most logical approach to allocating limited resources. MACC requests for access
to such information for incorporation into the mine action planning process did not
generate a useful level of data. Of the main social and economic reconstruction sectors
(health, education, agriculture, water, public utilities and resettlement) only the UN
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO – the leading agency for agriculture) had
come close to a priority scheme.262 However, with only one sector's priorities
available, incorporating the agricultural priorities would have biased the overall
mine/UXO clearance prioritisation towards agricultural needs only. 
While the education and health sectors had maintained master lists of facilities by
location, these lists were not prioritised for funding but maintained for would-be
donors on an ad hoc basis through individual contact of the agency concerned.263 In
addition, the locations of the facilities were rife with place-name spelling errors and
freely used either Albanian or Serbian names. Sorting out these lists would have taken
a significant amount of time and manual effort. 
Public utilities' planning was even more sporadic. Projects started with little notice
and were dependent on when and which donor government decided to fund the
effort. As an example, MACC support for clearing access to electrical power
transmission pylons and sub-stations was conducted without a master plan ever being
assembled by the coordinating bodies. Consequently some mine clearance actions
were not matched by the appropriate inputs from other sectors and overall
rehabilitative efforts were not achieved or delayed. These elements seriously
undermined the modified LOIS's goal of identifying a comprehensive and rationale
scale for intervention.
260 International relief and reconstruction assistance programmes determine project priority
based on sector-specific criteria. Depending upon the focus of the programme, these sector
priorities are usually assigned by town/village, municipality or geographic region. By
compiling the sector priorities for relief and reconstruction resource allocation, it would have
been possible to identify the relative geographic concentration of such resources across all of
Kosovo. It was reasoned that towns and villages in areas with a heavy concentration of relief
and reconstruction activities would have a higher demand on mine action services.
261 SAC (2000).
262 This prioritisation was based on a relative ranking of municipalities using the 1999 harvest
as a percentage of the 1997 harvest.
263 The largest of these ad hoc requests involved surveying and cleaning 776 schools for
UNICEF.
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Thus, in sum, while efforts were made to integrate mine/UXO activities into a general
provincial work plan, integration of mine action with development work partially
failed due to the lack of prompt response from other agencies. However, the Kosovo
LOIS did provide the opportunity to simplify the survey process – and thereby the
setting of priorities by the MACC. This positively affected subsequent “buy-ins” by
the implementing mine action organisations, which might have proved more resistant
to a more sophisticated (and therefore expensive) survey. And the modified LOIS
proved to be extremely flexible in modifying planned activities according to specific
expressed needs – what John Flanagan has deemed “finding a Kosovo solution to
Kosovo problems”. 
Lessons learned
SAC complained about the turnover of MACC personnel, which did not help the
general mine action process by frustrating the retention of institutional memory. Thus,
data collection, reliability, availability, suitability and completeness were all LOIS
constraints, producing significant statistical noise.
It can be argued that the modified LOIS had an intrinsic weakness, since information
reliability was entirely dependent on the accuracy of information gathered and
handed over by concerned parties. Yet, despite this intrinsic vulnerability, only ten
extra unrecorded minefields had been found to date by the mine action programme.
This implies that records provided, while not precise and accurate, had at least a very
good degree of completeness. In particular, information provided by the VJ was found
to be extremely accurate despite the fact that the physical representation of these
records was based on arbitrary safety buffers or polygons generally reflecting a
grouping of smaller minefields. In contrast, NATO data was often found to be
inaccurate, because records were indicating intended targets of cluster bomb units
and not the actual strike sites.
Value could have been added to the data received through a rapid verification exercise
to test the reliability and completeness of records. MACC had the unusual privilege of
receiving a comprehensive set of information which, when put together, presented the
record of nearly all danger areas. With hindsight, we know that the information
received was more or less exhaustive – but that was not certain at the time. A rapid
verification assessment would have added confidence to the reliability of data. Also,
if basic socio-economic impact data had been collected during this rapid verification,
it would have completed the information still missing at the end of the modified LOIS.
The process would also have benefited from a common, standardised system of data
collection from the outset. The fact that data sets were collected using different
systems264 imposed a manpower-intensive effort for manually adapting them and
inserting them into IMSMA. This was a time-consuming process exacerbated by the
turnover of information technology personnel within MACC. This might suggest that
organisations working on collecting information, especially if bilaterally funded and
working independently, have to agree on using compatible data collection tools prior
to implementing field activities in order to have a common frame of reference and
common data sets. 
264 Especially in the case of VJ records, a number of them were not even in digital but only in
manual format.
168 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
Finally, part of the success of the modified LOIS is due to the diplomatic efforts made
by the MACC staff in persuading concerned organisations to hand over collected data
sets. Some organisations were initially reluctant to provide access to their records,265
requiring extensive consultations and persuasive diplomacy. In Kosovo this process
was successful mainly due to the personal and human qualities of MACC officers.
However, because data needs to be released or acquired as quickly as possible, an
essential part of peace agreements between conflicting parties must be the release of
relevant, available records.
The Socio-Economic Survey of Mine/UXO Survivors in Kosovo
Between June 1999 and January 2000 there were some 235 mine/UXO incidents, in
which 92 people died and others sustained injuries ranging from minor wounds to
loss of limbs.266 MACC efforts in tracking victims and their needs were addressed
through two complementary processes. The first was through IMSMA, which
recorded details of victims and reported incidents, allowing such data to be overlaid
on maps showing geographic features and contaminated areas. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assisted the MACC in this process. The second
complementary process was based on maintaining a casualty surveillance system
based on reporting from health facilities. WHO, the ICRC and health and disability
NGOs (such as Handicap International) were responsible for this second process, in
conjunction with the Department of Health and Social Welfare. 
Despite these shared efforts, a number of gaps in the data set remained, with many
victim records lacking important details.267 Concerns were also expressed about the
quality of the data gathering and the entering process.268 As a result, organisations
such as Handicap International, Oxfam, VVAF, Handikos (a local NGO) and
UNICEF were all stressing the need to develop a long-term strategy for mine victim
assistance.
Thus, for the year 2000, MACC's victim assistance objectives were, firstly, to establish
and maintain an efficient individual mine/UXO victim data collection system that
accurately reflected the personal details, locations and circumstances of each incident.
The second objective was to monitor trends in injuries, locations and age to make
meaningful adjustments in mine awareness activities. The third objective was to
provide the necessary information to allow analysis and guidance of the primary
healthcare needs of mine and UXO victims. Overall, the MACC intended to provide a
monitoring facility for the progress of survivors through the various stages of the
assistance cycle: directly assisting the individual where possible and contacting the
concerned supporting agencies or governmental programmes where required.269
265 For instance NATO forces did not agree at the beginning to give access to strike records.
Only after a number of consultations and agreements with UN official did they provide
copies of their records.
266 GICHD (2001).
267 Data on the socio-economic situation of mine and UXO survivors was not included in the
SAC LOIS. 
268 Problems were due to the fact that sometimes the name of victims was wrong, the person
who answered the questions was not the victim but a relative, information reported was
inaccurate, and there was inadequate information regarding the activity at the time of
incident. As a result, IMSMA database was incomplete and had to be checked several times.
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Another activity to achieve these objectives was that MACC tasked VVAF to conduct
a province-wide survey of landmine and UXO survivors – to address the scant quality
and quantity of socio-economic information on mine/UXO victims and their
households.270 VVAF was selected because, since the second half of 1999, it had been
engaged in a pilot psycho-social assistance project in Kosovo, helping 45 war-disabled
persons and their families to get on the road to recovery and social reintegration into
community life. MACC reasoned that this activity, as well as VVAF's previous
experience, would provide a detailed understanding of the physical, social and
emotional well-being of the familial situation, education and economic status of
survivors in Kosovo.
Thus, data gathering, which started in July 2000, was intended to provide an accurate
picture of mine/UXO survivors in terms of demographic, economic, social, emotional
and health data. In particular, a careful assessment of the short-, medium- and long-
term needs of mine victims in Kosovo was sought. The survey was meant to cover the
age of victims, their living conditions and assets, their employment status, their school
attendance and health, their mobility and their mine/UXO awareness. MACC wanted
to be able, through this survey, to refer victims to pertinent NGOs, agencies and other
social services that could provide the necessary and appropriate support. In fact,
victim assistance in Kosovo was negatively affected by the post of Victim Assistance
Coordination Officer within the MACC being left vacant for much of the programme.
Although the post was foreseen in the original MACC organigram, the position was
not assigned and the responsibilities were assigned to the Chief of Public Information
and its Assistant, in addition to their many other responsibilities.
During survey implementation, VVAF survey teams visited 186 villages and towns,
interviewing 333 of the reported 537 landmine/UXO survivors in Kosovo. Basic
demographic data from the survey showed that mine/UXO survivors were
predominantly young (77 per cent were under 35), thus the rehabilitation and
reintegration process must be regarded as a long-term issue. Most victims were male
(89 per cent) and from rural areas.
Of the 333 survivors interviewed, nearly half had permanent disabilities and three-
quarters suffered from one or more outstanding health problems, but only a small
percentage were receiving treatments for their ailments. The living conditions of
survivors varied greatly, mirroring the situation of the general population. Most of the
families ate two or three meals a day and three-quarters owned their own land,
although 22 per cent of these home-owners did not use it because they believed that
it was mined or unsafe. 
Employment and lack of income were among the most critical issues faced by
survivors, similar to the rest of the population. Some 80 per cent were unemployed
269 UNMIK/MACC (2001b).
270 Other activities were the development of a new incident investigation report, which
analysed in depth the injury, causes, activities and implications for mine action. In addition,
following discussion with ICRC, the MACC provided support to ICRC field officers for
improving accuracy in data gathering and further developing ICRC questionnaire form.
Finally, the MACC made provisions for changing the data collection form and system for
technical incident investigation implemented with the senior demining partners in the
province.
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and 60 per cent reported their financial situation progressively deteriorating since
their accident. Education attendance was generally positive with very few cases of
school age children not attending classes. Psycho-social indicators of self-esteem were
generally high and 65 per cent of survivors deemed themselves “happy”. Only 20 per
cent reported discriminatory attitudes by mainstream society towards them.
Few families reported living in very difficult circumstances; the majority lived in
average or even good conditions. Almost every family initially received some form of
assistance (food, housing or financial), and some were still receiving support through
social assistance schemes. 
The report concluded that, given the programmes and structures already in place in the province,
“with a well organised and focused initiative, the most urgent needs of survivors can be met by
the end of 2001.” Longer-term needs were to be included in long-term planning by integrating
them with the needs of all disabled people in the province.
The utility of the survey
Information from the VVAF survey allowed the identification of activities needed for
future victim support.271 However, the MACC felt that the survey failed to place the
individual survivors in the various phases of the victim-assistance cycle. This
prevented MACC being able to directly refer victims to the relevant NGOs and
agencies that could assist them. Consequently, MACC decided to conduct a further
analysis of the information in its own database, along with the VVAF study
information as well as records from IOM, Handicap International and Handikos – to
identify and place the victims into the appropriate phase of victim assistance cycle on
an individual basis.272
Nonetheless, the MACC Victim Assistance Plan for 2001 foresaw that VVAF would be
in charge of providing psycho-social and socio-economic assistance to those identified
and surveyed by VVAF teams during the survey. VVAF would also have to provide
monthly progress reports to MACC. But a reduction in donor resources during 2001
forced a revision of initial plans. In fact, VVAF did not have the funding to continue
assisting individual survivors and their families, and the only viable option was to
refer the individuals to other agencies and governmental programmes. This exercise
enabled the creation of an individual tracking system to identify who was (and was
not, receiving assistance, to assess their needs and priorities and to allocate available
resources appropriately. This led to a referral list addressed to the most appropriate
agencies.
Survey results were also followed up by inserting disability-related issues of survivors
into a 2001 integrated mine action public information campaign highlighting
mine/UXO survivor needs. This awareness campaign was enhanced by lobbying
UNMIK, through the Department of Health and Social Welfare, to take disability
issues into account in its work. MACC recognised the need to develop its
collaboration with the Department of Health and Social Welfare for assistance with
the victim assistance cycle. One result was that UNMIK started to consider disability
access issues to all new buildings. While recognising this positive outcome, this
process of awareness-raising was rather late, considering the amount of
271 UNMIK/MACC (2000b).
272 UNMIK/MACC (2000b).
171A desk study of Kosovo
reconstruction that had already taken place and the number of reconstructed public
buildings without facilities for disabled people. 
Overall, the information from the socio-economic survey on mine/UXO survivors was
important for follow-up activities, planning and coordination. But the information
was collected in a relatively late phase of the programme due to the lack of a specific
officer within MACC to coordinate victim assistance activities. This resulted in a less
effective MACC capacity to lead coordination in this sector, a reduced impact in
inserting mine/UXO victim-related needs into long-term policy, and a lack of
sufficient visibility of mine/UXO victim needs.
Concluding remarks
The Kosovo case has confirmed the view that priority setting is potentially the most
challenging process in mine action programme management. There are no fixed rules,
no standard approaches that can be applied to guarantee a successful prioritisation of
operations, only guidelines. This process is complex and it requires a careful analysis
of many factors – and an irreplaceable component of human judgement.273
Nonetheless, surveys are perhaps the potentially most effective tool to foster a
comprehensive and coherent setting of priorities. 
Kosovo also provides evidence for the assertion that funding from donors for survey
activities is potentially more effective if it is channelled through the mine action centre
or, at least, if adherence to MAC rules and instructions is mandatory. If funding in
Kosovo had been coordinated with the MACC from the very beginning, this could
have reduced the number of NGOs or contracted firms operating in Kosovo,
considerably diminishing the duplication of survey efforts and improving the overall
management of funds.274
Nonetheless, despite MACC's attempts to better influence the type of activities and
mine action resources coming into Kosovo, it has been persuasively argued that
“MACC's first plans may well have reflected a need to put to good use the mine action
resources that had been thrown into theatre rather than a rational priority-based
approach.”275
The Kosovo experience also suggests that during the post-conflict emergency phase, in situations
where extensive mine and UXO data are likely to be provided by the former warring parties,
rapid verification exercises after data has been received would add substantial value and
confidence in its reliability. These exercises of verification and validation are more useful if they
include the collection of basic socio-economic impact data.
Finally, it can be argued that the success of the mine action programme in Kosovo is
due, in part at least, to the introduction of the first version of IMSMA. Although the
system used in Kosovo was a pilot version, inevitably subject to certain problems
(since corrected), the added value of this information management system to mine
action is evident. 
273 Rhodes (2005).
274 Information provided by J. Flanagan, April 2004.
275 Praxis Group (2002: 49).
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Annex. The history of the Kosovo mine action
programme 
CHRONOLOGY
23 March 1999 NATO begin air-strikes.
13 May High-level meeting in Geneva to discuss the Kosovo region,
bringing together the UN Secretary-General, the heads of key UN
agencies, as well as representatives of the EU and the World Bank.
The participants were given a briefing note from UNMAS on the
mine threat in Kosovo. The same day, OCHA and UNMAS sent out
a joint needs assessment team to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The team was denied access to Kosovo, but it
gathered sufficient information from NATO to enable UNMAS to
put out a first assessment of mine/UXO contamination, dated 1
June 1999.
1 June UNMAS distributes “The requirement for mine action in the FRY” to
concerned parties. This is the beginning of the first mine action
plan for Kosovo, stressing the importance of establishing as soon as
possible a mine action coordination centre. 
10 June Belgrade begins to withdraw its FRY forces from Kosovo. The same
day the UN Security Council passes Resolution 1244 authorising the
UN Secretary-General to set up an Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMAS/UNOPS sign a Memorandum of
Understanding setting the immediate mine action objective as
being to facilitate the safe return of civilians to the province.
12 June KFOR begins to enter Kosovo. By 20 June, the Yugoslav withdrawal
is completed and KFOR is established in Kosovo, taking initial
charge of mine action. By the end of June, some 17 mine/UXO
clearance organisations and 20 mine awareness organisations
had  arrived in Kosovo, progressively setting up their bilaterally-
funded programmes.276
13 June HALO Trust (bilaterally funded by DFID) begins a rapid province-
wide assessment of the mine and UXO contamination.
15 June Three major mine action NGOs (HI, MAG and NPA) send a joint
letter of support to UNMAS indicating their intention to coordinate
their joint response to the Kosovo problem and giving their full
support to coordination efforts by the UN Mine Action
Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo.
17 June The temporary UN mine action team opens the MACC office in
Pristina.
Second half of June As many as 50,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
per day return to their homes. Landmines and UXO caused at least
143 civilian casualties in June 1999. 
Early July Start-up funds and equipment donated by DFID to MACC.
26 July to 3 August The Survey Action Center (SAC) implements a preliminary
advance survey mission to Kosovo to assess the need for a
province-wide Level One impact survey.
End of July MACC receives minefield records from the Yugoslav Army and
Serbian police forces, plus NATO records of cluster bomb strike
targets.
276 Praxis Group (2002)
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CHRONOLOGY (continued)
August MACC takes de facto control of mine action programme in the
province, leaving to KFOR clearance responsibilities only in support to
their own operations.
13 August MACC issues its “Plan for Mine/UXO Clearance”.
21 August MACC issues the “Operational Plan for Emergency Phase Mine/UXO
Awareness Education”.
24 August UNMIK approves the Mine Action Outline Concept Plan and the
Operational Plans issued by MACC.
End of August HALO Trust submits the results of its rapid survey to the MACC.
September MACC issues its first draft standards for mine action activities, calling
for input and comment from clearance organisations. The final
document was subsequently issued in February 2000, prior to the start
of the forthcoming clearance season. 
October SAC implements the Modified Level One Impact Survey through to
March 2000.
13 December MACC issues its plan for the “Consolidation Phase”.
July 2000 The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) initiates a
“Socio-Economic Survey of Mine/UXO Survivors in Kosovo” which is
completed in November 2000.
3 January 2001 MACC issues its “Exit Strategy Discussion Paper”.
June An assessment of the mine action situation concludes that the mine
action programme was at the point where local capacity could
assume responsibility for mine action activities.
10 September MACC issues a detailed “Plan for the Transfer of Responsibility for
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations in Kosovo from the UNMIK
MACC to the Department for Civil Security and Emergency
Preparedness”.
Mid-December MACC completes its scheduled activities and hands over responsibility
for mine action to UNMIK which, in turn, will hand over to the
identified ministries and governmental institutes. After having passed
responsibility for mine action to UNMIK, MACC “closes its doors”. 
Mid-December UNMIK passes to different ministries and governmental offices
responsibilities for mine action activities according to their mandates,
to comply with the overall process of establishing self-governance.
2004 The EOD Management Section has taken back all mine action
responsibilities from the ministries and governmental bodies, except
for those handed over to the Ministry of Public Health.
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Glossary of abbreviations
and acronyms
ADP Accelerated Demining Programme
ARBiH Bosnian Government Army
AWOR Area Without Obvious Risk
BAC battle area clearance
BAF Bosnian Armed Forces
BHK Bolisat Phathana Khetphoudoi
BHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
BH RCS Bosnia and Herzegovina Red Cross Society
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BOMICO Bomb and Mine Disposal Centre
BTC Belgium Technology Corporation
CA Community Awareness
CACTA Air Combat Activities
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIDC Canadian International Demining Corps
CMAO Central Mine Action Office
CMVIS Cambodian Mine/UXO Victim Information System
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CND Commisao Nacional de Desminagem (National Demining 
Commission)
CNIDAH National Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian 
Assistance for Mine Victims 
COPE Co-operative Orthotic and Prothetic Enterprise
CP Civilian Protection Authorities
CRUR Center for Research and Unit Records
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)
DOD Department of Defense (US)
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EAF Entity Armed Forces
EC European Commission
EDD explosives detection dogs
EOC expert opinion collection
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERW explosive remnants of war
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EU European Union
EUFOR EU Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
FAA Angolan Armed Forces (Forcas Armadas Angolanas)
FALA Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forcas Armadas para a 
Liberacao de Angola 
FAPLA People's Armed Forces for Angola's Liberation (Forcas Armadas
Popular para a Libertacao de Angola) 
FBiH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim-Croat)
FLEC Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
FRC Federal Resources Corporation
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSD Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace (“Dayton Agreement”)
GFC Greenfield Consultants
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS Geographic Information System
GLS Global Landmine Survey
GMAA General Mine Action Assessment
GNP gross national product
GP General Purpose
GPS Global Positioning by Satellite
HALO Trust Hazardous Areas Life-Support Organization
HAMA Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action
HI Handicap International
HIB Handicap International Belgium
HVO Bosnian Croat Army
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP internally displaced person
IFOR Implementation Force
IMAP Integrated Mine Action Programme
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
INAD National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem)
INAROEE National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (Instituto 
Nacional de Remocao de Obstaculos e Enghenos Explosivos)
IND Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (National Demining Institute)
ITF International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance
KAPB Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Beliefs (or Behaviour)
KFOR Kosovo Protection Force
LDPA Lao Disabled Peoples Association
LIS Landmine Impact Survey
LMVIS Laos PDR UXO/Mine Victim Information System
LYU Lao Youth Union
MAC Mine Action Centre
MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre
184 A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action
MAG Mines Advisory Group
MCTPC Ministry of Communications, Transport, Post and Construction
MDD mine detection dog
MOE Ministry of Education
MOH Ministry of Health
MONUA UN Observer Mission in Angola
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MRE mine risk education
MSTI Management Support Technology Inc.
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO non-governmental organisation
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIPS National Combat Command Information Processing System
NMAP National Mine Action Programme
NPA Norwegian People's Aid
NPEP National Poverty Eradication Plan
NRA National Regulatory Authority
NRC National Rehabilitation Center
NSP National Strategic Plan
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHR Office of the High Representative
ONUMOZ UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAVN Peoples Army of Vietnam
PCD Post Clearance Documentation
PCE Post Clearance Evaluation
PCIA Post Clearance Impact Assessment
PDR People's Democratic Republic
PIC Peace Implementation Council
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PL Pathet Lao
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PWD Person with Disability 
QA quality assurance
RENAMO Mozambique National Resistance
RLA Royal Lao Army
RS Republika Sprska (Serb)
SAC Survey Action Center
SACCOACT Strategic Air Command Combat B-52 Missions
SADF South African Defence Forces
SEADAT SE Asia Database
SFOR Stabilisation Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SHA suspected hazardous area
SMA suspected mined area
SOP standard operating procedure
SWAPO South West African People's Organisation
TAP Task Assessment and Planning
TIA Task Impact Assessment
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TS technical survey




UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for 
Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola)
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
UNOHAC UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination in 
Mozambique
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSECOR United Nations Security Coordinator
US United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UXO unexploded ordnance
VVAF Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
VRS Bosnian Serb Army
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WV World Vision
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